Corruption and Organised Crime Signalling Indicators for Foreign Investors as Applied to Eastern European Countries

Abstract

The former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and, implicitly, their economies, went through specific and sometimes asymmetric developments since the fall of the “iron curtain” at the end of the 1980s. During those years, they faced many challenges to create a secure and predictable economic environment for individuals and businesses, local or foreign. We propose a framework that considers legal, social, and economic indicators which can be used by foreign investors to make wise and efficient business decisions. Our main purpose is to expand the traditional economic analysis framework and enrich it with new institutional and societal indicators from the social, quality of life and legal layers of research. This new landscape could offer relevant information on vulnerabilities that could favour organized crime and corruption in some Central and Eastern European countries, a factor that foreign investors may need to address before deciding to invest in the region.


Keywords: foreign direct investments, organised crime, corruption, economic vulnerabilities, GDP

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