Game Theoretical Analysis of Corruption on the Road in Indonesia
Abstract
This paper aims to analyze the empirical mechanism of the bribery and extortion on the roads in Indonesia. Using a game theoretical approach, the game is played by two representative agents, namely Police and Rider. The mechanism is modeled into two stage games. Stage 1 adopts the 2x2 simultaneous Tsebelis’ inspection game refined by Pradiptyo. Stage 2 illustrates two scenarios of sequential game. Stage 1 proposes that the benefit of enforcing the law gained by the police becomes rider’s important consideration to violate the traffic laws and rules while stage 2 proposes that the benefit of enforcing laws and rules is the important point to avoid bribery. Stage 2 also suggests that the law enforcement institutions may think carefully before increasing the severity of penalties and sanctions suffered by riders because it would increase the likelihood of police to extort the riders.
Keywords: Bribery, Extortion, Game Theory, Inspection Game
References
[1] Abbas, M.H.I. (2017). Tax Evasion in Indonesia: a Game Theoretical Model. Jurnal Ekonomi dan Studi Pembangunan (JESP), 9(2), 191-201.
[2] Andreozzi, L. (2004). Rewarding policemen increases crime. Another surprising result from the inspection game. Public choice, 121(1), 69-82.
[3] Bianco, W. T., Ordeshook, P. C., & Tsebelis, G. (1990). Crime and punishment: Are one-shot, two-person games enough?. American Political Science Review, 84(2), 569-586.
[4] Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. In The economic dimensions of crime (pp. 13-68). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
[5] Granovetter, M. (2004). The social construction of corruption. On capitalism, 15.
[6] Handoyo, F. W., & Kautsar, I. (2016). Strategi Pemberantasan Korupsi di Indonesia Menggunakan Inspection Game [The Straregy to Eradicate Corrupt Activities in Indonesia Using The Inspection Game]. Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan, 22(1), 41-52.
[7] KOMPAS. (2013, September 25). Masyarakat Cenderung Korupsi Saat Ditilang [People Tends to Corrupt When Get Ticketed]. Retrieved from https://kompas.com
[8] Mostipan, I. (2010). Economics of corruption: game-theoretic modelling of traffic police bribery in transition countries (Doctoral dissertation, Tartu Ülikool).
[9] Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2000). The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of economic literature, 38(1), 45-76.
[10] Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2007). The theory of public enforcement of law. in A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (eds). Handbook of law and economics, 1, 403-454.
[11] Tsebelis, G. (1989). The abuse of probability in political analysis: The Robinson Crusoe fallacy. American Political Science Review, 83(1), 77-91.
[12] Tsebelis, G. (1990). Are sanctions effective? A game-theoretic analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34(1), 3-28.
[13] Tsebelis, G. (1990). Penalty has no impact on crime: A game-theoretic analysis. Rationality and Society, 2(3), 255-286.
[14] Tsebelis, G. (1991). The effect of fines on regulated industries: Game theory vs. decision theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3(1), 81-101.
[15] Weissing, F., & Ostrom, E. (1991). Crime and punishment: further reflections on the counterintuitive results of mixed equilibria games. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3(3), 343-350.