On a Cournot Game with Bounded Rational Players, Convex, Log-Linear Demand and Consumer Surplus
Abstract
Based on the Cournot oligopoly game and the nonlinear dynamics theory, we study the behavior of semi-public enterprises by considering corporate social responsibility into their objectives. The model that is established is a dynamical Cournot-type duopoly model with bounded rationality containing the consumer surplus. We suppose quadratic cost function and a convex, log-linear demand function. The game is modeled with a system of two difference equations. Existence and stability of equilibriums of this system are studied. More complex chaotic and unpredictable trajectories are resulted studying this discrete dynamical system. The complex dynamics of the system are demonstrated numerically via computing Lyapunov numbers, sensitivity dependence on initial conditions, and bifurcation diagrams.
Keywords: Cournot duopoly game; Discrete dynamical system; Homogeneous expectations; Stability; Chaotic Behavior; Consumer Surplus.
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