Validity of Mortgage Rights Based on Credit Agreement Aspects


Mortgage is an important part of civil law in economic legal activities. There are four stages of the interweaving of law in this relationship, namely pre-agreement, agreement, authorization of implementation, and the elimination of mortgage. In all these phases, creditors and debtors have equal rights, because the relationship between them is consensual (balanced law) because the parties assume ownership of each other. But in the practice of mortgage rights so far, the creditor takes a dominative position so that the application of the procedure does not provide justice to the debtor. This study provides answers about how to formulate legal renewal so that the relationship of mortgage rights can be intertwined on the basis and principles of procedural justice. This type of research is explanatory, with its empirical normative nature, using sources of normative legal materials and expert opinions. It is hoped that the output of this research is to guarantee academic honesty and provide empirical benefits, which is to be a source of strengthening and law-making for the mortgage and financial rights in Indonesia.

Keywords: mortgage, credit, agreement

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