Does Audit Quality able to Reduce Cost Stickiness? Evidence from Property, Real Estate and Building Construction Industry
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to determine the level of cost stickiness at SG&A cost (Sales, General, and Administrative) and test whether the level of stickiness costs can be reduced through audit quality. The study sample used property, real estate, and building construction industry listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2016-2018 period with a purposive sampling technique, so that the final number of samples obtained was 117 sample observations. This study uses eviews version 10 analysis tool. The results of the study show that every 1% increase in net sales will increaseSG&Aby0.610%.Meanwhile,every1%decreaseinnetsaleswillreduceSG&A by (0.610043-0.071380) 0.538%. Furthermore, the research findings show that audit quality can reduce stickiness costs. The implication of this study is that policy makers can use audit quality to reduce stickiness costs.
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