

Research Article

Political Clientelism in Presidential Elections and Political History in Madura

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Abstract.

This research was conducted to reveal clientelism political data and to analyze why clientelism politics has not worked in the presidential election in Indonesia. This study uses a descriptive qualitative method and a case study approach. The selected cases are voters in the Madura region, East Java. Data collection techniques were carried out by conducting in-depth interviews with many informants from various backgrounds, ranging from religious leaders, community leaders, entrepreneurs, media figures, and others. In addition, data collection was also carried out by searching documents on published online media during the presidential election process. The research that has been conducted reveals data that the incumbent presidential candidate, Joko Widodo, and his winning team practiced clientelism politics, through various government programs he led, ranging from social assistance (grants) to programs originating from official ministries and state-owned enterprises. However, the political clientelism exercised by presidential candidate Jokowi is not working in the Madura region. Moreover, in the 2019 presidential election, Jokowi still lost to his rival, Prabowo Subianto. From the analysis conducted, the dysfunctional clientelism politics run by presidential candidate Jokowi is due to three factors that lead to local politics of voters in Madura.

Keywords: presidential election, clientelism politics, political history in Madura

1. Introduction

The politics of clientelism has become a topic that has attracted the attention of political experts in the last five years. This can be seen from the many studies related to the topic of clientelism. In Lebanon, political parties use clientelism in elections to gain contestation advantages [1]. In South Africa, political clientelism is seen as a general mechanism for holding political officials accountable, so clientelist politics

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Published: 4 April 2024

Publishing services provided by
Knowledge E

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Selection and Peer-review under the responsibility of the ICOLIS Conference Committee.

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is considered to be able to encourage development in certain areas and fields [2]. In Mexico, political clientelism is considered the favorite option. In Pakistan, political clientelism is exercised by politicians who are also landlords, to bind politically and economically the relationship between landowners who become politicians and tenants [3]. In Brazil, political clientelism works in a broader field, not only during general elections but also outside the general election. The goal remains the same for political purposes [4].

As a democracy, Indonesia also experiences the phenomenon of political clientelism. [35] Political clientelism in Indonesia hurts politics and democracy. Clientelism is a form of corrupt behavior that reflects transactional politics between candidates and prospective voters [5]. Not only has an impact on individual behavior, political clientelism also has an impact on social life in general. Clientelism politics causes social inequality [6]. As happened in the direct election of village heads, clientelism politics led to the emergence of seeds of hostility among team members supporting candidates, including friends and family [7]. Political clientelism also fosters patronage politics in Indonesia [8].

This research reveals data related to political clientelism in the 2019 presidential election in Indonesia, especially what happened in the Madura region. This research also analyzes political clientelism in presidential elections from a local political perspective, and relevant theories of clientelism are put forward by experts. Research on political clientelism in Indonesia has previously been carried out by researchers. Research on political clientelism was conducted by Gede Ari Pratama Putra and friends who researched political clientelism in Lampung Province. In Lampung political clientelism is run by political volunteers who also act as political brokers [9]. Research on political clientelism was conducted by Muhammad Syamsul Hidayat and Sri Budi Eko Wardani who researched political clientelism in Banten Province [10]. Research on political clientelism was also conducted by Iqbal Arif Siregar who conducted research on political clientelism in regional head elections in Labuhan Batu Regency, North Sumatra Province [11].

Political clientelism is interpreted as an exchange between politicians and their prospective voters, both in material and non-material forms. According to Berenschot, clientelism politics is a political practice that refers to the provision of assistance provided by politicians to voters. Assistance can be in the form of money, welfare benefits, employment, contracts, etc. in return for voters to provide electoral support [12]. Robinson and Verdier said the practice of clientelism is a political exchange, politicians (political actors) provide protection (assistance) in return for support or votes obtained

from voters. clientelism politics takes many forms depending on the focus, scale, and context [13].

Bénit-Gbaffou argues that clientelism politics is a form of exchange between voters and politicians in the form of political support from voters and public goods (assistance) provided by politicians. The relationship that occurs in clientelism politics is not only for two people who are personalized between the two parties, but will also develop between politicians and a group called collective clientelism. In addition, the practice of clientelism also involves the distribution of public goods, in the form of access to social services, work contracts, and public housing. clientelism politics is not just about voting, or political support, but can take other forms such as taking part in party rallies or representing parties in public or local meetings, one might say clientelism politics [14].

Research that specifically discusses political clientelism by presidential candidates in Indonesia has not been found.[36] This topic is also a novelty for this research. This research has an urgency to be carried out, as well as disseminated, for further discussion and discussion by political scholars and experts regarding Indonesian politics, as well as in other countries that also run a democratic system and hold direct presidential elections. This is meant as a comparison, is there any possibility of political clientelism being practiced by presidential candidates in countries other than Indonesia who are incumbents?

2. Methods

This research uses a descriptive qualitative method, which specifically describes the presidential election in 2019 in Madura. This research approach is a case study, the case studied is the case of the presidential election in 2019 which was participated in by two presidential candidate pairs, namely Joko Widodo paired with Ma'ruf Amin, and Prabowo Subianto paired with Sandiaga Uno. The case studied is the case of the presidential election in the Madura region, which consists of four districts, Sumenep Regency, Pamekasan Regency, Sampang Regency, and Bangkalan Regency. The four districts are part of East Java Province, Indonesia.

The Madura region has specificities from other regions in Indonesia, Madura is a certain ethnicity that is different from ethnicities on the island of Java, such as Java and Sunda. Likewise, the language used is different. Madurese uses the Madurese language. Madura is also an island separated from Java Island. Although relatively homogeneous, Madurese society is heterogeneous, because in Madura there are many tribes other

than Madura, there are Bugis, Mandar, Bajo, and others. This is possible because Madura consists of 128 inhabited and uninhabited islands.

This research lasted for a long time, for three years, starting from 2019 to 2022. Data collection was carried out in 2019, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic that occurred from 2020 to 2021, research in the field was stopped. Data collection is only done by searching documents through online media. Field research will resume in 2022 after the COVID-19 pandemic has subsided. Data collection techniques in this study were carried out in two ways. First, in-depth interviews. In-depth interviews were conducted with several informants from various backgrounds and professions. The informants interviewed came from four districts in Madura, Sumenep Regency, Pamekasan Regency, Sampang Regency, and Bangkalan Regency.

Second, document browsing. Data was also collected through tracing documents related to the process and results of the 2019 presidential election in Madura. The data was traced and collected from the official website of the General Election Commission, and major online media in Indonesia which reported on the 2019 presidential election. Online media that is referenced and data collected is not just one media, but several. This is done to avoid reporting bias, from the possibility of media interests or partiality, both the interests of media owners or journalists in the field who do the reporting. Below is a list of media used as references or data collection in this study.

To test the validity of the data collected, the researcher double-checked the various data that had been collected. This re-check is carried out in two ways. First, check the source. There are two sources referred to here, sources in the form of informants and sources in the form of documents in online media. Between one informant and another, a cross-check was carried out, whether the information conveyed was accurate or not. In this case, an accuracy test is carried out, so that there are no more doubts about the information or data provided. Likewise, with data sources originating from online media, cross-checking is carried out, whether there are different data, written by one online media with other online media. Second, is technical triangulation. Data collection techniques using in-depth interviews and document search are two different data collection techniques. To test the validity of the data obtained by the two techniques, the results were checked with each other. The results of the in-depth interviews were then checked against the results of document searches in online media and on the election commission's official website.

3. Results and Discussion

At the time the 2019 presidential election was held, Jokowi was the incumbent President of the Republic of Indonesia, as president of the results of the 2014 presidential election. As the incumbent, Jokowi is of course the most well-known figure in Indonesia. Not only known, development activities and government programs, especially those related to social assistance, are one of the assets for his victory as a presidential candidate in 2019. This government program was later referred to as political clientelism carried out by President Jokowi when he was running for re-election.

As the incumbent Jokowi has enormous political capital. Jokowi, who served as president, had many development programs and social assistance that the people as potential voters felt benefited from. One of the programs that is felt by the community is the social assistance or grant program, Hope Family Companion (Pendamping Keluarga Harapan) which is run by the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. There are many other programs run by the Ministry of Social Affairs to help less fortunate citizens. Jokowi also presented a development assistance program at the village level known as the Village Fund (Dana Desa) which amounts to billions every year for every village in all regions of Indonesia.

In addition to general grants, the Jokowi government also provides special assistance to Madurese. In October 2018, President Jokowi specifically made the Suramadu Toll Road free for all types of vehicles. According to Jokowi, the waiver of the Suramadu Toll fee is to accelerate economic growth in Madura. The waiver of toll fees is expected by Jokowi to reduce the expenditure burden of Madurese residents. In addition, it is hoped that this will reduce the price of goods in Madura because goods transport vehicles also do not need to pay when crossing the Suramadu Toll Road. This can reduce transportation costs [15].

Assistance was also provided by ministers who came to Madura. Visits from ministers and state officials continued until the 2019 presidential election. In September 2015, the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Indonesia, Susi Pudjiastuti visited Madura. During a visit to Madura, Minister Susi met salt farmers in Pamekasan, Madura. When meeting with salt farmers, he assisted in the form of geomembranes to salt farmers [16]. In July 2017, Minister of Religion Lukman Hakim Saifuddin visited Madura. While in Madura, the Minister of Religion inaugurated the Madura State Islamic Institute which was previously called the Madura State Islamic College. In February 2019, the Minister of Agriculture of the Republic of Indonesia Andi Amran Sulaiman

also visited Pamekasan Madura. At that time the Minister of Agriculture handed over assistance of more than 10 billion rupiah to farmers and breeders in Madura.

The assistance was given in the form of tractors, agricultural seeds, and others [17]. Minister Amran admitted that his visit to Madura was ordered by the president to shower farmers and breeders in Madura with a lot of help. The total assistance provided by the Minister of Agriculture to residents in Madura reached IDR 135 billion [18]. In March 2019, the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Luhut Binsar Panjaitan also came to the Nurul Cholil Islamic Boarding School in Bangkalan, Madura. At that time, Minister Luhut assisted Kyai Zubair to help with his treatment [19]. In April 2019, Minister of State-Owned Enterprises, Rini Soemarno also visited Madura. At that time, Minister Rini assisted in the form of cheap food packages, namely that people only needed to pay IDR 10.000 and get rice, salt, sugar, cooking oil, and sardines [20].

Ahead of the 2019 presidential election, State-Owned Enterprises are also intensively assisting Madurese. On April 6, 2019, PT Garam assisted IDR 706.000.000. The funds are realized in the form of building public facilities in the form of toilets. Apart from that, they also bought an ambulance. The assistance also purchased two units of trash bin containers for the Sampang and Pamekasan areas. In the Sumenep area, Madura assistance was provided in the form of road repair and paving in the Gersik Putih area, with a budget of hundreds of millions of rupiah. Not only PT Garam, but several other State-Owned Enterprises are also actively carrying out various social activities. Such as PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (Persero), which provides free electricity assistance to 300 underprivileged households in particular in Sumenep, and Madura Island in general. PT PLN also assists in the form of connecting 450 VA electricity for free to less fortunate residents. This power is considered sufficient for lighting lamps, cooking rice, turning on the television, as well as several other standard electronic needs [21]. PT Pegadaian (Persero) also carries out social activities with gold prizes. This activity was held in Sumenep Regency, Madura. PT Pegadaian also handed over assistance to the residents of Sumenep, Madura in the form of a garbage bank building, a press machine, a plastic chopping machine, motorcycle trash cans, and various other equipment. The total assistance provided by PT Pegadaian reached IDR 336.8 million [22].

Various assistance provided by ministries as well as state-owned enterprises and others, had no impact on the victory of incumbent presidential candidate Joko Widodo in Madura. In the 2019 presidential election, the candidates for President and Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin suffered defeat in the Madura region, East Java. In Sumenep Regency, Jokowi-Ma'ruf won 242,305 votes, or equal to 35.67 percent. Meanwhile, his competitor, Prabowo-Sandi, won 436,931 votes,

or equal to 64.33 percent. The difference between Jokowi's vote and Prabowo's in Sumenep Regency, Madura is large. Jokowi lost heavily in Sumenep, Madura. Not only losing in Sumenep Regency, but in Pamekasan Regency, Jokowi-Ma'ruf also suffered defeat. In Pamekasan Regency, Madura, Jokowi-Ma'ruf won 102,931 votes, or 16.22 percent. Even though Prabowo-Sandi won a large vote, namely 531,561 votes, or equal to 83.78 percent. Meanwhile in Sampang Regency, Madura, Jokowi-Ma'ruf won 187,189 votes, or equal to 24.70 percent. As for his opponent, Prabowo-Sandi won 570,597 votes, or equal to 75.30 percent. Jokowi-Ma'ruf only won in Bangkalan Regency, winning 440,129 votes, or equal to 57.74 percent. Meanwhile, the opposing candidate, Prabowo-Sandi, won 322,131 votes, or 42.26 percent [23]. The four regencies in Madura, when counted as a whole, presidential candidate Jokowi still suffered a significant defeat in Madura in the 2019 presidential election.

When analyzed, there are several factors caused the death of the incumbent presidential candidate Joko Widodo in the 2019 presidential election, which is also the answer to the invalidity or non-functioning of clientelism politics in the Madura region. First, local political factors. According to Gerry Stoker, there are several views as variables in local politics, one of which is a localist approach [24]. This approach is relevant to what happened in the 2019 presidential election in Madura. Jokowi, who won nationally, suffered a defeat in the Madura region. According to Chaniago, local politics consists of freedom of action [25]. In the presidential election which is held directly and democratically, local citizens have the freedom and opportunity to act and make choices according to their own will. Thomas O'Nee mentions that politics has a very local dimension [26]. Political locality is also found in the power cube theory popularized by John Gaventa. According to Gaventa, everyone has a space of power, as well as being influenced by power [27]. Spaces of power can be large and small scale. The local scope is the scale of power.

In the context of local politics, voters in Madura have experienced a shift. In the past, voters in Madura always made religious figures their preference in political choices. Now, voters in Madura do not merely make religious figures their sole preference. The political preferences of voters in Madura are generally more independent and open. This can be seen from the votes acquired by parties in the 2014 and 2019 general elections. In the 2019 general election, the vote acquisition for religious-based and nationalist-based parties in Madura was not much different. In one district in Madura, the gains of nationalist political parties are even greater than those of religion-based political parties.

In Bangkalan Regency, the party that won the most votes's Gerindra Party, and the party that won the second most seats was the PDI Perjuangan. Voters in Madura have experienced a political shift, no longer fanatical towards religious-based parties. Voter preferences in Madura, even though they have a Nahdliyin background, do not automatically choose a party that is close to Nahdlatul Ulama. People become more independent in making political choices [28]. This was also recorded in a survey conducted by the Terukur Survey Institute during the 2018 regional head elections in Bangkalan Regency. From a survey conducted from March to May 2018, 69.2% of residents in Bangkalan voted for regional head candidates based on their own choice. This figure is quite high, more than half of the prospective voters will vote based on their own choice, not because of the influence of other parties. What about the influence of religious figures? From the survey results, only 15.7% of prospective voters will vote because of a religious figure.

Second, Madurese voter character. Voters in Madura in general are people who stick to their promises and are not comfortable with people who are inconsistent with their promises. It happens in politics. As the president who was elected in 2014, many of Jokowi's promises were not realized by the government. During the presidential election campaign, Jokowi promised not to carry out any kind of political transaction with political parties and promised to prioritize a professional cabinet. As it turns out, Jokowi appointed a lot of ministers from political parties. In Some of them are administrators and general chairmen of political parties.[34] During the presidential election campaign, Jokowi promised not to increase the state debt. However, after being acted, the fact is that it has added to the national debt. In fact, among the presidents who have ruled in Indonesia, Jokowi is recorded as having the most debt. During the reign of President Soekarno, Indonesia was recorded as having debts of USD 2.3 billion or the equivalent of IDR 32 trillion. In 2014, Jokowi was elected president and replaced Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. As of May 2021, Jokowi's government has added IDR 6,418.15 trillion in debt.

Jokowi's inconsistency in his campaign promises has disappointed voters in Madura. The disappointment of voters in Madura can be called cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is defined as an uncomfortable condition, caused by expectations that are different from reality. The difference between expectations and reality creates discomfort for someone. The higher the expectation, if it doesn't come true, the greater the discomfort that will arise later. Cognitive dissonance theory is included in the study of social psychology.[35] In cognitive dissonance theory, one person's behavior and motivation of the perceptions and cognitions of others. According to Harmon-Jones

and Mills, there are three basic assumptions in cognitive dissonance theory. First, humans pay attention and are sensitive and sensitive to something that is considered inconsistent, between what is believed and the actions taken. Second, assertions that something inconsistent happened can lead to dissonance. Third, statements or acknowledgments that inconsistent things have happened cause discomfort. Furthermore, these conditions encourage a person to overcome the discomfort [30]. Voters in Madura then determine political attitudes to overcome discomfort with unrealized promises by not voting for political actors who are considered to create this discomfort.

Experience has a stronger influence on perceptions which in turn shape behaviour, when compared to mere information or cognition factors. The experience of getting political promises by Jokowi during the presidential election campaign, which was later not realized when Jokowi became president, formed a strong perception of voter cognition in Madura and then shaped attitudes and behavior not to vote for him in the 2019 presidential election. Any factor that is considered to change perceptions and behavior is not useful, including the real program. It is considered an effort to change their perceptions and attitudes. Government programs, social assistance, and others provided are only seen as an attempt to change the political attitude of voters in Madura. Programs that benefit, such as eliminating toll roads, distributing basic needs, and other social assistance provided before the presidential election in 2019, have not been able to change the political choices of voters in Madura.

Third, political history. Voters in Madura have a history of rejecting power. The history of the Madurese resistance can be seen in several models.

1. Armed resistance. Armed resistance occurred during the Dutch occupation of Madura. Historian and sociologist Kuntowijoyo wrote a book entitled "Social Changes in the Madurese Agrarian Society 1850-1940." In the book, Kuntowijoyo mentions that the history of the first rebellion that occurred against the Dutch colonial was a rebellion carried out by a kiai and his followers in the Prajjan area, Madura, now that area is included in the Sampang Regency area. The kyai and his supporters were even involved in acts of resistance against the Dutch troops who spied on the kyai's recitation and medical activities. The Dutch feared that the large number of residents who came to the Kiai would lead to a consolidation movement against the Dutch colonizers. Finally, the location of the kiai's activities was attacked by Dutch troops, which were then met with armed resistance by the kiai and his supporters [31].

2. Political resistance. Political resistance occurred in the New Order era. This resistance was driven by political figures who were in Islamic parties who opposed Golkar's

domination in Madura. Every general election, the New Order carried out a kind of “fabrication” to win Golkar in various regions in Indonesia. A resident of Sampang, Madura, who incidentally is a fanatical supporter and voter of the Persatuan Pembangunan Party, is fighting against the election “fabrication”. Due to this resistance, the general election was repeated in Sampang, Madura. This event was recorded as the first re-election in Indonesia [32].

3. Silent resistance. This form of silent resistance occurred in the reform era, especially against the incumbent president Joko Widodo in 2019. This resistance was carried out against President Joko Widodo who was considered not to have kept his political promises when he ran for office in 2014. This resistance was without any driving force, taking place on a wider scale, evenly distributed throughout the districts in Madura. In the 2019 presidential election, voters in Madura also rejected President Joko Widodo’s re-election. This refusal was recorded in a video that went viral when Jokowi visited Madura in December 2018, coinciding with Jokowi’s campaign in Bangkalan, Madura. The video contains shouts from residents asking Jokowi to “mole”, which means asking Jokowi to return from Madura [33]. This is a form of soft resistance, as well as legal resistance, and has a legal basis. Borrowing James Scott’s term, the match is referred to as an unrecorded match [34]. The way to fight in a democratic country is not to vote for candidates who are deemed unable to represent and fight for the aspirations and interests of the voting public. In the presidential election in 2019, Joko Widodo then lost in Madura. This clearly shows that clientelism politics does not apply.

4. Conclusion

The 2019 presidential election was attended by two pairs of candidates, namely Joko Widodo who was paired with Ma’ruf Amin, and Prabowo Subianto who was paired with Sandiaga Uno. Joko Widodo is the incumbent presidential candidate who has served as President of the Republic of Indonesia as a result of the 2014 election. Joko Widodo became president for the 2014-2019 period. At the time of running for re-election in the 2019 presidential election, Joko Widodo was still serving as president. His position as president allows him to use government tools and programs as a campaign tool when he is running for re-election. The campaign tools vary, ranging from corporate social responsibility programs for state-owned enterprises, grants, social assistance, freeing the Suramadu toll road, and others. The program is part of the clientelism politics that was carried out in Madura to win him over, which in the previous period experienced defeat in the Madura region. However, in the 2019 presidential election,

Joko Widodo's clientelism politics also failed, and he lost again for the second time in Madura. Clientelism politics does not always correlate with positive sentiment towards presidential candidates. Voters have their preferences in making choices during the presidential election. The choice is more due to local factors. In addition, there is discomfort with the promises that were not fulfilled by the previously elected president. This is an important lesson for presidential candidates and political parties as well as their supporters to pay more attention to the character of the voters. So that it does not only rely on clientelism politics in winning political contestation.

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