

Conference Paper

Jokowi's Populism, Wealth and Local Democracy in Solo City

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Abstract

The making of populism in Surakarta city had almost been a tale. Mayor Jokowi was supposedly a humble, confident and broadened minded leader. Humble, that he was a person who had the willingness to listen to inputs from citizen. Confident, in a sense that he had necessary capacities to decide policies contrasting to others who often trapped in hesitance causing good policies hooked in their drawers. And broadened minded that he was open to new ideas. He was in his time people believed a potential transformative leader in Solo. This paper answers a question Why and how populism in Solo did contribute to some extent to democratic transformation, and what are challenges? It is not prepared to repeat the tale, rather written to provide a critical interpretation that populism is not shaped original from the populist's kitchen, but from power relation dynamics with democracy actors. An interpretative analysis finds that vital part of Mayor Jokowi's programmatic politics resulted from negotiation with CSOs and local fora. Despite CSO's influence, there were two challenges left. They are populism that had gained its champion and some ironies so-called discrepancy and poverty. Connecting the two, this paper argues that alternative actor presence had been influential in democratic space but not strong enough that it could spur to linking populist programmatic politics to a better life for the poor. A space to facilitate democratic actors work together again is about an imperative to make democracy again on the march at Solo city.

Keywords: CSOs, Democratic transformation, Life of the lowers, Populism, Programmatic politics.

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1. Introduction

This paper is sketched under a logic of transformative politics:

Democracy cannot be crafted by just building the supposedly appropriate institutions. It is also necessary to consider what relations of power need to be changed,

what actors have the potential to achieve this and how such process can be supported [1].

Different from most papers on populism that focuses mainly on the populist leader(s), this paper provides a wider look to include actor alternatives namely CSOs, and citizen fora that influenced the shape of populism. A critical perspective is given on the basis of the lower that one of its best represented by the poor and marginalized people. The lower is a floating conception. In this paper to include people at territory basis that has been affected by privilege on investment, the poor and the marginalized people. The poor refers to those statistically poor. The marginalized includes those who are affected by development and their existence socially decreased and threatened.

2. Methods

The concept of populism employed in this paper adopts one of most mainstreamed one, namely elite strategy [2]. Elite strategies can be seen from at least four modes. They are **first**, direct involvement of citizen [3]. He/she may, for instance, avoid intermediary body or established institutions to communicate with his/her people. **Secondly**, a populist considers the role of the people and its fundamental position. He/she may promote the unity of the people. This paper claims that these characteristics can be seen from populist programmatic politics. A populist often but not always use 'the lower or marginalized' as his/her basis of strategy [4]. **Thirdly**, a populist rebels an established structure of power in the name of the people [3-4] a populist in the name of people may fight against betraying elites in charge. **Fourth**, accentuating voices of 'silent majority' [4]. The four modes will be employed as an anti-status quo discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing society between 'the people' as underdogs) and its 'other' [5].

TABLE 1: Characteristics of populism in Mayor Jokowi.

Direct communication	✓
Sided with certain group of people	✗
Anti-establishment	✓
Accentuating 'silent majority'	✓
Adapted from Meny Y & Surel Y and Canovan M. [3, 4]	

To be seen from symptomatic readings, Mayor Joko Widodo exercised three of the four identified modes of populism. His strategy to communicate directly to the people

can be seen from his so-called 'blusukan' method. Blusukan was supposedly developed to avoid his lower officers that often pleased him with 'nice but fake data' from the fields. Learning from protests by citizen fora (especially Solidarity Marginalized People Surakarta or namely SOMPIS), he realized that it had not always been wise to take his lower officers' information without double checked to the people. Such 'blusukan' strategy had its contextual legitimacy as it was widely renown by the public that administration staffs mostly implemented their tasks as to 'abort responsibility' rather than to fulfill quality standards as part of their duty compliance.

Different from most populists that preferred to choose certain group(s) of people as the basis of his/her populism organization, Mayor Jokowi apparently avoided this specific strategy. Instead, he sided both 'classes' the upper and the lowers. This mode of populism was later visible in his programmatic politics that includes both efforts to serve both parties. Mietzner said, "Apparently, most Indonesians were open to some populist alternatives, but it needed to be efficiency-oriented rather than demagogic, inclusive rather than exclusive, and democratic rather than authoritarian. In other words, what the majority Indonesian longed for was a pragmatic, or technocratic, form of populism-lite" [6]. Indeed, Mayor Joko Widodo had pragmatically responded to any demands from any directions. One of the participants at Solo Raya discussion in Solo Pos (20/6/12), mentioned his testimony on Mayor Joko Widodo's responsive attitude by saying, "Jokowi used to see, to listen and to add in his most policies rather than to think by himself".

An anti-establishment mode can be seen from his 'quarrel' against Governor Central Java Province, his upper government. He protested against Provincial Government's plan to build a condotel at a 'heritage' area in Laweyan district.

Last, not the least ESEMKA Car that can be seen as the fourth exercised mode. Mayor Joko Widodo accentuated silent dream about transforming the people from market consumers to producers. Indeed, many people believed if the national car project succeeds it may be a milestone to turn 'inferiority complex' of this nation.

3. CSOs, Populist Programmatic Politics, and Electoral Landslide

3.1. CSOs and citizen fora in Surakarta: influence and trajectory

Existence and influence of CSOs can be seen from their 'learning processes' and advocacies from one administration and others. Data on their influences before Mayor

Jokowi is important to show that their knowledge and noise has been almost ‘tradition’ at local Surakarta. Their influences that waves from one issue to others, solitary and in the union I believe had created ‘constraint’ to local government. Many policies had been issued to respond these groups. Few as an example can be seen from this table below:

TABLE 2: CSOs and their influences.

CSOs	Issue	Influence	Administration
LeSKAP-FSDKS-LPTP and KKLDLDM	Local Democracy Institute	LKMD participatory transformation 1999-2001)	Mayor Slamet Suryanto
ITPI-KOMPIP-IPGI	Pro-poor policy: Health-housing and education for the poor	Contribute to provision services on housing, health, and education policy 2001-2012	Mayor Slamet Suryanto-Mayor Joko Widodo
KOMPIP-YAPHI	Inclusive City for Street Retailer	Contribute and criticize street retailer management (Pengelolaan PKL)	Mayor Slamet Suryanto-Mayor Joko Widodo
<i>Talenta – Interaksi</i>	Difabel rights	Narrative academic and legal drafting on disability accessibilities 2003-2007	Mayor Slamet Suryanto-Mayor Joko Widodo
Spekham	Gender Equality	PT PAS 2005-now	Mayor Joko Widodo
Pattiro-ATMA-IPGI-KOMPIP	Educations for all	Shaping MPPS (Friends of Education Surakarta) 2007-2012	Mayor Joko Widodo
LeSKAP: Institute for the study and advocacy of public policy			
FSDKS: Study forum on democracy and social justice			
ITPI: Institute for Governance Initiative			
KOMPIP: Consortium for monitoring and empowering public institutions			
Yaphi: A law enforcement body institute			
IPGI: Indonesian partnership for governance initiative			
Spekham: Women Solidarity for humanity and human rights			
ATMA: Atma foundation			
Pattiro: Center for studies on regional information			

CSOs often worked with citizen fora. One of the well-known fora in Surakarta city was SOMPIS, Solidarity Marginalized People Surakarta. SOMPIS organized marginalized people groups such as street vending, mobile street vending, pedicab drivers, street singers, garbage collectors, parking attendants, difabel groups, domestic servants and

sex workers. These groups gathered in SOMPIS mostly motivated by their pursuit of citizenship inclusiveness. Together with fora, CSOs improved their power of influence.

Power of influence by CSOs, however, cannot be seen merely from the existence of one or group of CSOs at local. Their networks to national and international level have caused circulation of knowledge be a crucial part of their influence in their areas. When local CSOs in Solo promoted housing rights, for instance, it cannot be separated from a campaign by ACHR (ASEAN Coalition for Housing Rights), KOMPIP's network at ASEAN levels. So was a promotion of health and education for poor people that cannot be separated from Kaukus 17++ campaign at national level and AEPF (ASEAN and European People Forum) at a wider network. Circulation of knowledge through such channels had caused innovation on health and education in Jembrana (2001) which was basically The Asian Foundation's champion be an opening win of all CSOs in Indonesia. NGOs' stories in this paper, in addition, cannot be separated from roles of Ford Foundation which had become relatively strongest donor supported Solo during Mayor Slamet Suryanto and Jokowi's administration.

3.2. Populist programmatic politics

Mayor Joko Widodo populism could not be separated from his programmatic politics as from them most opinion and fame were collected. From people's opinion, trust was gained. And from visualization of programmatic politic output mostly fame was personalized. Programmatic politics refer to the local government of Surakarta's yearly programs from which the people recognized few of them as Jokowi's brand.

Few of many programmatic politics can be seen below in the table. These few examples are selected as from these programmatic politics collective memory that means trust and fame mostly attached to Mayor Joko Widodo. Soon after his (first) election, Joko Widodo adopted the tourism-oriented branding, Solo: The Spirit of Java, which effectively created a sense of 'togetherness' under which to expand his political basis." [7]. This phrase describes 'Mayor Joko Widodo's holiday fiesta'. As part of this tourist-oriented branding, the mayor redesigned Solo infrastructure, including build around six kilometers city walk at the heart of his city. Middle classes were fascinated by those party like-minded and infrastructure transformation but local artist Mbah Prpto from Padepokan Lemah Putih reminds that Solo needs "Park of Wisdom" instead of selling traditions [8].

Very soon later, following holiday fiesta, Mayor Joko Widodo introduced mass transportation namely SBT Solo Batik Trans. This transportation is basically part of tourism

facilities despite that it was claimed as also to response dense traffics in this city. In other words, this SBT was also planned to migrate private car driving to public transportation. It looks that this plan had not worked very well. Titis, a transportation activist said that "There is data to say that the use of private car decrease but it is more because of they migrate to using online car services than grabbing to SBT".

A well-liked program namely bureaucracy efficiency reform was released to indicate that people could collect their civil card in an hour not day period of services. And so did investors and entrepreneurs that they could collect their licenses in the day, not week or month services. What can a critical question be delivered to such nice program? One of the most bothering question may be who double benefit of this policy? It is not a rumor that a hotel investor had once successfully grabbed one sub-village in Purwosari soon after this reform took place.

Traditional market development is also part of tourism promotion. A nicer and cleaner traditional market is prepared so that visitor feels comfortable and welcomed. Assuming that the building is nice and clean, local consumers will improve their enthusiasm to go to traditional markets. Pro contra on this program mostly located on levels of the building in which upper level mostly vacant from tenants.

Green city project is again tourism-oriented like-minded. Many decorative plants were planted at sideways of main roads. Later, this program left controversies when 'bigger threes' were planned to be executed away from their places. It looks that local government needs to be consistent with their plans.

Three least controversies in contrary can be seen from the three programmatic politics which were released as responses to CSOs together with citizen fora's demands. CSOs which struggle for the implementation of three policies were ITPI, KOMPIP, SOM-PIS, IPGI, and YAPHI. Three programmatic politics namely street vending management and, health and education services that benefit the poor and marginalized people were about to receive fewer questions from the public. These three programmatic politics received on average mostly good and very good opinion from the many. These opinions later created fame for Mayor Joko Widodo.

Did CSOs intentionally contribute to the shape of populism? There is no evidence to say yes. Several CSO's activists said it was an accident. How big was CSOs contribution to the making of Mayor Jokowi's populism? This question can be answered by other question. Which programmatic politics had least questions from citizen? Which had brought higher credit and had created fame to the populist leader? Let's do a puzzle game. Take the three programmatic politics resulted from CSOs' struggles (education and health services and street vending management) out of the table, the rest would

TABLE 3: Sample of Mayor Jokowi’s programmatic politics.

Events/ Projects	Dynamic process	Result (magnitude in shaping trust)
The shape of vision “Solo the Spirit of Java” translated to ‘weekly holiday fiesta’.	National Govt backed	+(??)
Mass transportation ‘Solo Batik Trans’	National Govt backed	+ (?)
Bureaucracy efficiency	Relatively alone by local admin	+ (?)
Traditional market development	National Govt backed	+ (?)
Green City project	Relatively alone by local admin	+ (?)
Pro-poor health services	Contested by CSOs in its dynamics	+
Pro-poor education services	Contested by CSOs in its dynamics	+
Retailer relocation	Contested by CSOs in its dynamics	+
(+) positive magnitude in shaping trust (?) questioned by limited parties		

remain questionable programmatic politics. Without them, the number of supports by many voters in election 2010 might have been not that big.

3.3. Complete win in the second election

Local election committee (as released by *detiknews*) announced to the public that Jokowi-Rudi won first direct mayor election in Solo city (28/6/2005). Jokowi-Rudi won after final calculation from 1 385 vote polls where 272 363 people used their rights. The number equal to about 72.32 % voters used their rights, while the rest of them fail to use. In percentage, Jokowi-Rudi left about 7 % margin to the second and 8 % only to third of four candidates.

TABLE 4: Local election 2005.

Candidates	Vote gain	%
Jokowi-Rudy (PDIP, PKB)	99 747	36.62
Slamet Suryanto-Hengky Nartosabdo	14 414	5.29
Achmad Purnomo-Istar Yuliadi (PAN)	79 213	29.08
Hardono-Dipokusumo (Golkar-Demokrat-PKS)	78 989	28.99
The Result of Valid Vote.	272 363	99.98
Adapted from Election Committee Surakarta via detikNews [9]		

Different from the first election that narrow gap between the first and the second candidates, the second election landslide the result. Mayor Jokowi and Rudy, the incumbent collected 90.00 % votes compared to Eddy Wirabumi and Supradi Kertamenawi who received only 9.88 % votes. It looks that the making of populism had correlated high positively to Mayor Jokowi- Rudy election.

TABLE 5: Local election 2010.

Candidates	Voters	Percentage
Jokowi-Rudy (PDIP, PAN, PKS)	186 636	90.00 %
Eddy Wirabhumi-Supradi Kertamenawi (PD, Golkar)	20 507	9.88 %

Adapted from Election Committee Election Committee Surakarta [10]

4. Some Challenges: Forget not the Ironies

While good opinion had been collected and fame gained by the populist in one hand. And celebration had also been made by alternative actors and the wider many, numbers tell differently. There had been least informed by researchers that the celebration had not been positively linked to numbers which development and democratization need to relate, namely poverty and discrepancy.

TABLE 6: Ratio Gini 2005-2010.

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Gini Ratio	0.28	0.29	0.21	0.27	0.27	0.34	0.33	0.37

Adapted from Statistic Bureau Surakarta [11]

In contrast to ‘happy face’ of the public indicated to their enthusiasm in the election(s), Gini ratio in Solo city during the making of populism went risky. Discrepancy ranged widened to a critical level. In the seventh year of Mayor Joko Widodo, discrepancy reached to 0.37.

The second homework was the increase of a number of poor people. Using local administration data, there had been an increase of poor people from 2007 to 2010, from 107 004 people to 125 732 people.

TABLE 7: The increase of poor people.

Year	Poverty number	Resource
2007	107 004	Keputusan Walikota Surakarta Nomor 470/98/1/2007 24 September 2007
2010	125 732	Keputusan Walikota Surakarta Nomor 470/81-C/1/2010 20 Desember 2010

Adapted from local administration data: Determination of Poverty Number in Surakarta in 2007 and 2010 [12–13]

5. Conclusions

The making of populism in Solo city did contribute to some extent democratic transformation due to its shape that it did not come only from the kitchen of a dominant actor namely the populist leader. Rather it was a relative power of civil society that basically had shaped populism.

It can be formulated based on the data and analysis that democracy remains in march despite the populist leader moved to higher government, by conditions that CSOs and local fora in Surakarta are re-empowering themselves. Actors of democracy (including academics), spurred by CSOs need to re-consolidate themselves in order to pursue ways to solve remains problems and meet democracy that creates wealth for all of the people.

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