



Research Article

Tracking Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: From Kartosuwiryo to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir

Ali Abdul Wakhid*, Abdul Kohar, Gesit Yudha, Ade Selvyana

Universitas Islam Negeri Raden Intan Lampung

ORCID

Ali Abdul Wakhid: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6586-8312

Abstract.

This article evaluates the perceived connection between the religious radicalism that emerged in Indonesia following the establishment of the new, independent Republic, and the development of new groups associated with terrorist activities in recent decades. Tracing the historical development of religious radical movements in the country through to the present day, this article seeks to elaborate and analyze the interconnections of religious radical movements that occur in Indonesia and their relationship with global radicalism. This article uses a qualitative method based on library research.

Corresponding Author: Ali Abdul Wakhid; email: aliabdulwakhid@radenintan.ac.id

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1. Introduction

In the Asian region, Indonesia is one of the important areas in the study of terrorism and religious radicalism. Referring to the Global Terrorism Database (2007), out of a total of 421 acts of terrorism in Indonesia that were recorded from 1970 to 2007, more than 90% of acts of terrorism occurred in the years leading up to Suharto's resignation and entering the era of democracy.

In addition, the types of acts of terrorism that are fatal attacks also increase including the use of new methods of terrorizing, suicide bombings (suicide attacks). The last decade alone, from 2013 to 2023, has seen at least 12 suicide bombings in the country. The radical Islamic group known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is considered to be the party most responsible for most of the terror waves in post-reform Indonesia. Responding to the various acts of terror, until mid-2014 the government had arrested approximately 900 terrorists and around 90 more suspected terrorists had died.

The involvement of radical Islamic groups in acts of terror is not a new phenomenon in the political history of the country. From the many acts of terror which happened in one and a half decades after the reformation, there have been many political and religious upheavals since the formative period of the formation of this republic until afterwards

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and can be seen as the roots of current Islamic radicalism. Not all of them have any connection with previous similar movements, but insofar as certain sections of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) led by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were involved. Only a small portion, which are local-scale radical movements or those are individual, could be new movements that have little connection with the previous ones. The existence of influence which has global networking is the Afghan Mujahideen, al-Qaida, and ISIS. This movement is very different from the religious radicalism of the previous period which was domestic in nature: including the causative factors and as well as the actors.[1]

Dividing the post-independence acts of terror and religious radicalism into several phases, it seems that the phenomenon of terrorism in the reform era is the third phase which is an evolution of the two previous phases. The first phase, mentioned earlier, was marked by the emergence of the DI/TII Kartosuwiryo movement which was later joined by Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureuh. The second phase was the emergence of the Komando Jihad movement from the 1970s to 1980s, in which several of the main actors were former DI/TII members from the Kartosoewirjo era. Then Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'ashir who became known as the emirs of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) had emerged during that phase. The third phase, various acts of terror and violence that took place during and after the reformation from the late 1990s to the present.

In addition to historical roots, the genealogy of thought/ideology that inspired the development of religious radicalism is also important to explore. The development of radical Islamic ideas in Indonesia, some of which are politically expressed through acts of terror, was heavily influenced by the Islamic views of the classical Islamic scholar Ibn Taimiyah and also Sayid Qutb – the radical Islamic thinker of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Justification of jihad hanging-. Qutb's thoughts -through Ma'âlim fi al-Tharîq- inspired a lot of religious radicalism among young people in the 1980s. In particular, his views on modern ignorance and the broad definition of kufr. Then, this idea was reinforced by Shaykh Abdullah Azzam - with his concept of jihad, which then succeeded in influencing Indonesian Muslim activists to go to jihad in Afghanistan. Then, Osama bin Laden, became the most important figure in influencing the direction and development and the religious arguments that many radical activists emanate today are in fact nothing more than "copy and paste" phrases that Osama bin Laden used to make before. The strong influence of the above figures can also be clearly read in various books, magazines, tabloids or other media produced by radical Islamic groups in the country.

In addition to historical and ideological factors, the factor of state policies which were very repressive towards Islamic groups was also considered to have played an important



role in encouraging Islamic groups to carry out acts of terror. Mohammed Hafez (2004) confirms this by concluding –in the case of Islamic group terrorism in Algeria- that the regime's brutal repression was the most important factor that gave birth to acts of terror by Islamic groups who were ruthlessly suppressed. In a moment where all spaces for participation are tightly closed and there is continuous oppression, one thing that might happen is resistance in its most extreme form: terrorism.[2]

In the context of national politics, acts of terrorism that have been rife in Indonesia in the post-reform era are a continuation of the anti-NKRI political movements that have occurred before, that is movements which want to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) driven by S.M. Kartosuwiryo with Darul Islam/Indonesia Islamic Army (DI/TII). With Kartosuwiryo's death, the ideas, ideals and movement of the NII are still being carried on by his followers or those with the same ideological affiliation. The movement pioneered by figures such as Imran and Warman in the decade of the eighties as well as the Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Ba'asyir groups is a genealogy with the DI/TII/NII movement.

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were followers of Kartosoewirjo who continued the NII movement and then moved to Malaysia. They metamorphosed" the movements into the radical organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). If previously the movement of these groups and their networks were limited to the territory of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, now they are expansion and deepen the spheres of influence covering the Southeast Asian region, Asia, and part of the "global jihad" movement network.[3]

The movement of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has developed rapidly, especially since the reformation started in Indonesia. Since Indonesian independence, there have been many organizations based on religion, these organizations thrive because of the freedom granted by the government. Over time, in the process of filling Indonesia's independence, religious organizations emerged as they perceived that they had an obligation to uphold the symbols of their religion.

Uprising after rebellion is still being carried out today, under the pretext of religion in the name of *jihad fisabilillah*. In order to provide an adequate explanation, this paper aims to explain how the origins of radical movements in Indonesia and their political activities have resulted in a significant influence on the development of modern Indonesian Islam.

Based on the descriptions above, this paper tries to describe the ideology of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. The radical fundamentalism developed by the above movements has brought many excesses in the religious, social, political and economic



fields. Therefore, knowing the ideology, and practical actions of the salafi movement is important as an "ingredient" that the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is facing ideological and practical challenges.

2. Methods

In carrying out this research, the type of research used by researchers is qualitative, and research design is naturalistic research. [4] The reason why researchers use this type of qualitative research is to provide a complete and comprehensive and in-depth picture of the genealogy of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. Literature studies are mainly used to trace the origins of radical movement thought in Indonesia, from DI/TII Kartosuwiryo to Abu Bakar Bashir. In an effort to provide an overview, this study refers to literature relating to the genealogical relationship of radicalism in Indonesia from Kartosuwiryo to Abu Bakar Baasyir.

3. Results and Discussion

Islam is a religion of peace that teaches peace and seeks peace [5]. While what is meant by radicalism is a movement that is old-fashioned and often uses violence in teaching their beliefs [6]. Islam has never justified the practice of using violence in spreading religion, religious understanding, and political understanding. However, it could not be denied that there have been certain Islamic groups which used violence to achieve political goals or to maintain their religious understanding in a rigid manner, which in turn the language of global civilization is often called Islamic radicalism.

The term radicalism, referring to hardline groups, is seen as more appropriate than fundamentalism because fundamentalism itself has an interpretable meaning. From a Western perspective, fundamentalism means the understanding that people are rigid, extreme and do not hesitate to act violently in defending their ideology. Meanwhile, from an Islamic perspective, fundamentalism means tajdid (renewal) based on the moral message of the Koran and Sunnah [7]. In the tradition of religious theology, fundamentalism is a movement to return all behavior in the life order of Muslims to the Al-Quran and Sunnah [8]. Fundamentalism also means anti-westernization (westernism) [9]. Sometimes fundamentalism is interpreted as radicalism and terrorism because the fundamentalism movement has political implications that endanger industrial countries in the West[10].

The term fundamentalist is indeed sometimes intended to designate Islamic revivalist groups [11]. But sometimes the term fundamentalist is also intended to refer to Islamic radicalism movements. In the Western media, fundamentalism means intolerance and violence supported by religious fanaticism [12]. There are also various names for labeling radicalism movements for hard-line Islamic groups. M.A. Shaban calls hard-line schools (radicalism) neo-Khawarij [13]. Whereas Harun Nasution called it the twenty-first century (21st century) Khawarij because indeed the path taken to achieve the goal was to use violence as was done by the Khawarij in the post-tahkim period [6]. The term Islamic radicalism originates from the Western press to designate hard-line Islamic movements (extreme, fundamentalist, militant). The term radicalism is a code that is sometimes unconscious and sometimes explicit for Islam [12]. The problem in the West and America is actually not Islam itself but violent practices carried out by a group of Muslim communities in the process of forming their group identity [14].

Thus, this paper tends to use the term radicalism rather than fundamentalism, because the notion of fundamentalism can have other meanings which sometimes obscure the intended meaning. While radicalism is seen as clearer in the meaning. Radicalism is movements which use violence to achieve political targets and supported by religious sentiments or emotions.

3.1. Kartosoewirjo: The Pioneer of Islamic Radicalism

Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo (born in Cepu, Central Java, 7 January 1905 - died in the Thousand Islands, DKI Jakarta, 5 September 1962 at the age of 57 years) was an Indonesian Islamic figure who led the Darul Islam rebellion against the Indonesian government from 1949 to 1962. The movements aim to practice the Qur'an and establish an Islamic State of Indonesia based on sharia law.

In 1901, the Netherlands established ethical politics (politics of reciprocity). The application of this ethical policy led to many modern schools being opened for indigenous people. Kartosoewirjo is one of the country's children who has the opportunity to receive this modern education. This was because his father had a important position as a native at that time.[15]

At the age of 8, Kartosoewirjo entered the Inlandsche School der Tweede Klasse (ISTK), this school is the school for the natives. Four years later, he entered ELS in Bojonegoro (a school for Europeans) which indonesian children who have successfully entered the ELS are people who have high intelligence. In Bojonegoro, Kartosoewirjo knew his spiritual teacher, Notodihardjo, a modern Islamic figure who followed the



Muhammadiyah line of thought. He instilled modern Islamic thought into Kartosoewirjo's world of thought. Notodiharjo's thoughts greatly influenced Kartosoewirjo's attitude in responding to Islamic teachings.

After graduating from ELS in 1923, Kartosoewirjo continued his studies at the Nederlands Indische Artsen School Medical College. At this time, he knew and joined the Syarikat Islam organization led by H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto. He had lived at Tjokroaminoto's house. He became a student as well as private secretary of H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto and Tjokroaminoto greatly influenced the development of Kartosoewirjo's political thoughts and actions. Kartosoewirjo's interest in studying politics was further stimulated by his uncle, who increasingly influenced him to study politics more deeply. Therefore, it is not surprising that later Kartosoewirjo will grow as a person with strong Islamic integrity and high political awareness. In 1927, Kartosoewirjo was expelled from the Nederlands Indische Artsen School because he was considered to be a political activist and had socialist and communist books.[16]

Kartosoewirjo also works as Editor in Chief of the Fadjar Asia Daily Newspaper. He made writings which contained the idea in opposition to Javanese aristocrats (including the Sultan of Solo) who collaborated with the Dutch. His article shows his radical political views. He also called for the workers to rise up to improve their living conditions, without being pitiful. He also often criticizes the nationalists through his articlesHis career then shot up when he became general secretary of the Indonesian Islamic Sarekat Party (PSII). PSII is a continuation of Sarekat Islam then Kartosoewirjo then aspires to establish an Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah). At PSII he found his soul mate. He married Umi Kalsum, the daughter of a PSII's figure in Malangbong. He then left PSII and founded the Truth Defenders Committee of the Indonesian Islamic Sarekat Party (KPKPSII).

According to Kartosoewirjo, PSII is a party that stands outside the institutions established by the Dutch. Therefore, he demands an implementation of hijrah policy that knows no compromises. According to him, PSII must reject all forms of cooperation with the Netherlands without any compromise in the way of jihad. He based all his political actions at that time on his own dissection and interpretation of the Al-Qur'an. He remained steadfast in his stance, even though he faced various obstacles, whether both the obstacles from the party and from nationalist figures or obstacles from the pressure of Colonial government.

During the 1945-1949 war for independence, Kartosoewirjo was actively involved but his tough attitude often made him in conflict with the government, including when he refused to allow the central government to carry out the long march to Central Java for the entire Siliwangi Division. The long march order was a consequence of the Renville



Agreement which greatly narrowed the sovereign territory of the Republic of Indonesia. Because all the agreements made by the Dutch government brought suffering to the people of Indonesia, the agreements were all just to trick important people into obeying the Dutch East Indies. Therefore, Kartosoewirjo rejected all the agreements made by the Dutch.

Kartosoewirjo also rejected the ministerial position offered by Amir Sjarifuddin, who was then Prime Minister. At that time, Sugondo Djojopuspito who knew Kartosoewirjo and Amir Sjarifuddin at the 1928 Youth Pledge in Batavia persuaded Kartosoewirjo: "Never mind Mas, choose to be any minister, but not the Minister of Defense or the Minister of Home Affairs@. Kartosoewirjo replied: "I don't want it, if the basis of the state is not Islam".

His disappointment with the central government made him more determined to form an Islamic State of Indonesia. Kartosoewirjo then proclaimed the NII on August 7, 1949. It is noted that several regions stated that they were part of the NII especially West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh. The Indonesian government then reacted by carrying out an operation to arrest Kartosoewirjo. The NII guerrilla against the government lasted a long time. Kartosoewirjo's struggle ended when security forces arrested him after a long hunt in the Mount Rakutak area in West Java on June 4, 1962. The Indonesian government then sentenced Kartosoewirjo to death on September 5, 1962 on Pulau Ubi, Seribu Islands, Jakarta.[17]

3.2. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir: Islamic State Utopia

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir bin Abu Bakar Abud, also called Ustadz Abu and Abdus Somad[18] (born in Jombang, East Java, 17 August 1938), is an Islamic figure in Indonesia of Arab descent. Ba'asyir is also the leader of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and one of the founders of the Al-Mu'min Islamic Boarding School. Various intelligence agencies accused Ba'asyir of being the spiritual head of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Islamic militant separatist group with links to al-Qaeda.[19] Although Ba'asyir denies having any connection with JI or terrorism.[20]

Ba'asyir was educated as a student at the Gontor Islamic Boarding School, Ponorogo, East Java (1959) and an alumni of the Da'wah Faculty of Al-Irsyad University, Solo, Central Java (1963). Ba'asyir founded the Al-Mu'min Islamic Boarding School in Ngruki, Sukoharjo, Central Java, together with Abdullah Sungkar on March 10, 1972. During the New Order, Ba'asyir fled and lived in Malaysia for 17 years because of his rejection of the single principle of Pancasila .



His career journey in the field of religion began with carrying out activities as an activist at the Solo Islamic Student Association (HMI). When he was young he was very energetic, not only was HMI the place for the process, he was also in the Al-Irsyad Youth Association, Solo and served as secretary at the institution. Subsequently, he served as Chair of the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement (1961), Chair of the Islamic Student Da'wah Institute, led the Al Mu'min Islamic Boarding School (1972) and became Chair of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) Organization in 2002.

On March 10, 1972, Ba'asyir and his best friend, Abdullah Sungkar, founded the Al-Mu'min Islamic Boarding School in Ngruki, Sukoharjo, Central Java. When there were political divisions and economic problems during the New Order era, Ba'asyir chose to live in Malaysia for 17 years. This is because of the rejection of the enactment of the single principle of Pancasila. Because of that, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was arrested along with Abdullah Sungkar in 1983. It is suspected that not only did he reject the principles of Pancasila, Abu Bakar also forbade his students to salute the red and white flag at every flag ceremony. This policy is according to Ba'asyir understanding that respecting the flag is included in an act of shirk.

Apart from being accused of being an instigator, Abu Bakar was also considered a figure in the Hispran movement (Haji Ismail Pranoto). Haji Ismail Pranoto is known as one of the figures in the Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army movement in Central Java. In court, Abu Bakar and Abdullah Sungkar were sentenced to nine years in prison. However, Abu Bakar and Abdullah Sungkar did not want to accept the classification decision, so they fled to Malaysia. It is known that the two of them ran through the city of Solo first, then the two of them crossed over to Malaysia by sea from Medan. According to an intelligence agent from the United States, the CIA, in Malaysia Abu Bakar formed a radical Islamic movement together with Jemaah Islamiyah which has long had ties with Al-Qaeda.

Since then, concerns about Abu Bakar Ba'asyir actions have not only come from Indonesia, other countries are also concerned about Ba'asyir. In 1985-1999, Abu Bakar's activities in Singapore and Malaysia were observed to increase significantly they are known to convey Islamic teachings to Muslim communities based on the Al Quran and Hadith in these two countries. When interrogated about the contents of these activities, Ba'asyir denied reports from US agents regarding efforts to form a radical Islamic movement in Malaysia. Even so, the United States government included the name Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as a terrorist. This decision is based on the relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah, which was formed by Abu Bakar and is closely related to the Al-Qaeda network.

It is known that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir returned to Indonesia in 1999. As soon as he returned to his homeland, this white-bearded man in his old age immediately became active in the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) organizing forum. Mujahidin Council is one of the New Islamic Organizations that is determined to uphold Islamic Sharia in Indonesia in which Abu Bakar Ba'asyir served as chairman of the assembly. Around 2000, there was a bombing in Bali and the name of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir re-emerged in the public as the mastermind behind the incident. This news of terrorism has attracted the attention of many people both at home and abroad. This is because the victims were not only Indonesians but foreign nationals who were traveling in Bali. On January 10 2002, the Head of the Sukoharjo District Prosecutor's Office, Muljadji, for the sake of the state immediately coordinated with the Police and Sukoharjo District Military Command to summon Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir on January 25 2002, fulfilled a summons from the National Police Headquarters regarding the charges against him. He complied with the summons in order to clarify. After holding a meeting with the National Police Headquarters, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's lawyer, Achmad Michdan, held a press conference. In this forum, he provided information that the summons of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to the Intelligence Directorate Building was a form of Interpol's attempt to protect Abu Bakar.

TIME Magazine also conducted an investigation into this issue. They wrote news under the title Confessions of an Al Qaeda Terrorist and published on September 23, 2002. This prestigious magazine in the United States wrote about allegations that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had a network with international terrorism. TIME also included excerpts from CIA documents in the article, it was written that Abu Bakar Bashir was "involved in various plots." This data was obtained based on the confession of Umar Al-Faruq, a 31-year-old Yemeni citizen. Al-Faruq was arrested in Bogor in June 2002. After being caught and subjected to light interrogation, Al-Faruq was sent to Bagram, Afghanistan. The country was currently occupied by the United States. Al-Faruq issued a confession to the CIA after several months of silence. He claimed to act as an Al-Qaeda operator in Southeast Asia and claimed to have close ties to Abu Bakar Bashir.

TIME magazine created a news report based on the intelligence report. In an article made by TIME, it is stated that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is the spiritual leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah group who aspires to establish an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. TIME also said that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was a supplier of people to support Faruq's movement during its operations, especially during the 1999 Istiqlal Mosque bombing case.

On October 1, 2002, Abu Bakar denied the contents of an article published by TIME Magazine. He insisted that he did not know someone named Al-Farouq from



Afghanistan. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir bravely asked the Indonesian government to bring Omar Al-Faruq to his homeland to carry out ongoing investigations related to his confession.

Regarding the Bali bombings, on October 14, 2002, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir held a press conference at Pondok Al-Islam, Solo. He used the press conference to express his opinion, he believed that the Bali bombing incident was made by the United States to prove accusations that Indonesia is a nest of terrorists.

The National Police Headquarters sent a summons to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir on October 17, 2002 and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had already been named a suspect. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's reaction was not unpredictable, but actually strengthened this suspicion because Abu Bakar Ba'asyir did not comply with the summons from the National Police Headquarters. By the Indonesian Police, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was officially named a suspect on October 18, 2002 before the public. This decision followed again because of the confession of Omar Al Faruq, who was involved in the bombing in Bali, to the National Police Headquarters Team in Afghanistan. The legal process for Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was also carried out, even so, on March 3 2005, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was successfully sentenced to prison with a sentence of only 2.6 years in prison. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was released on 14 June 2006.[21]

During the commemoration of Indonesian Independence Day in 2005, Ba'asyir received a reduced sentence and was only released on June 14 2006. On August 9 2010 he was again arrested by the police on charges of forming and training an Al-Qaeda branch in Aceh. Finally, on June 16 2011, Ba'asyir was sentenced to 15 years in prison. He had struggled through legal mechanisms from cassation to judicial review. The judicial review that was filed by Ba'asyir in 2015 was rejected by the Supreme Court in mid-2016. Ba'asyir place of detention was moved from the former Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison to the Gunung Sindur Prison. Ba'asyir was once said to have pledged allegiance to the radical ISIS group based in Iraq and Syria. This was said to be due to the influence of Aman Abdurrahman alias Oman who had joined the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). However, Aman, who later founded Jamaah Anshar Daulah (JAD), denied this when he was accused of terrorism at the South Jakarta District Court on April 3 2018.

3.3. Metamorphosis of the Darul Islam Movement

If we look at history, it can be noted that the first act of terrorism or bombing occurred in Cikini on 30 November 1957. Then it was followed by the emergence of violence



by the Darul Islam (DI) movement led by Kartosoewirjo (1950s to early 1960s). Then, during the New Order era, a series of violence and bombings emerged which were linked to the Komando Jihad movement, the hijacking of a Woyla airplane by a group of fundamentalist congregation Imron bin Muhammad Zein in 1981 and the bombing of the Borobudur temple by a Shia group led by Hussein al Habsy in 1985. Sporadic acts of terror and on a massive scale, also with a religious background are returning along with the democratic transition to date.

Many studies have tried to understand the roots of terrorism and radicalism in various perspectives, both from an economic, cultural, political, psychological and religious perspective.[22] Experts agree that the roots of terrorism are complex. However, there are several aspects of religious terrorism in Indonesia which differ from phenomena in Western countries and other Muslim countries such as Malaysia, that is the historical element.

The roots of terrorism which involve many radical Islamic groups in Indonesia today can be traced properly by looking at their relationship with radical Islamic movements which have existed before. It can be seen that current Islamic radicalism is a "metamorphosis" of Islamic radicalism which was started previously by Kartosoewirjo with his Darul Islam since the 1950s and the Komando Jihad or Komji movement which emerged in the late 1970s. This relationship is clearly visible not only in terms of ideological similarity but even in terms of biology. Several names of suspected terrorists, who were either captured alive or shot dead are recorded as having a long history of being linked to previous religious terror movements.[23]

Furthermore, the various post-independence acts of terror and religious radicalism can be classified into several phases. The first phase, as mentioned earlier, was marked by the emergence of the DI/TII Kartosuwiryo movement which was then followed by Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureuh. The second phase was the emergence of the Komando Jihad movement from the 1970s to 1980s, in which several of the main actors were former DI/TII members from the Kartosoewirjo era. The names Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir later became widely known as the emirs of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), who emerged during that phase. The third phase, various acts of terror and violence that took place during and after the reformation, from the late 1990s to the present. The fourth phase is marked by the development of new radical Islamic groups, especially from youth groups, which have little or no connection with the figures of the previous generation. Their radicalization is more influenced by various global events. The factor of modern information and communication technology is an important thing that plays a role in the transmission of radical views or attitudes of this new generation group.



Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is the most widely mentioned figure and perhaps plays the most important role in the development of the post-Kartosoewirjo radical Islamic movement. His work in the Islamic extremist movement has been widely mentioned since the late 1970s alongside Abdullah Sungkar in a series of Komando Jihad cases. The movement which was later called by Pangkopkamtib Soedomo as Komando Jihad itself involved many NII exponents from the Kartosoewirjo era, including: Aceng Kurnia (former Kartosoewirjo adjutant commander), Haji Ismail Pranoto (HISPRAN), Danu Muhammad Hassan, Dodo Muhammad Darda, Ateng Djaelani, Warman etc. This movement launched terror in several areas in Java and Sumatra.

According to Solahudin, Ba'asyir and Sungkar who were previously active in the Dakwah Council joined NII in the late 1970s through Haji Ismail Pranoto. At almost the same time several young groups also joined the NII, including: Irfan Awwas (currently chairman of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council) and his brother, Fihiruddin alias Abu Jibril. Abu Jibril was arrested by the Malaysian government in the early 2000s for allegedly being involved in the Malaysian Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) terror group and currently he is still active in MMI. The importance of kinship or brotherhood in bridging one's involvement in a radical organization occurs in the case of Abu Jibril. His son, Muhammad Jibril was sentenced to prison in the late 2000s for his involvement in financing terrorism in Indonesia.[24]

The central role of Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in the development of a network of radical Islamic movements took place through the mobilization of the Mujahideen, mostly consisting of young men, for jihad in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. They departed from Malaysia, where Ba'asyir and Sungkar developed their da'wah after escaping from a court verdict. It was from this mujahidin network that new radical Islamic groups began to emerge and continue to grow. Until their return from Afghanistan, those who later became widely known as members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) were seen in a series of bloody acts of terror in Indonesia after Suharto's fall. From various reports issued by the International Crisis Group (CGI) Indonesia, important data was found related to the background of these new mujahideen. Some of them turned out to have links, either directly or indirectly, with historical relations and relatives or other family members who had been involved in the struggle to establish an Islamic State, either through the Kartosuwiryo DI movement, Komando Jihad, or other movements with almost the same ideology and motives. . Farihin, for example, one of the perpetrators of the August 1, 2000 bombing at the Philippine Embassy, apparently still has a kinship with the terrorists who threw the bomb at Cikini in 1957.[23]



3.4. Ba'asyir relationship with the Islamic State of Indonesia and Jemaah Islamiyah

The issue of Ba'asyir involvement in the Indonesian Islamic State organization was issued by a statement from the US government responding to the September 11, 2003 incident of the destruction of the World Trade Center building in New York. This issue is firmly attached to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir because of his close relationship with Abdullah Sungkar and other radical Islamic figures while in Malaysia such as Hambali and Ali Ghufron.

The term Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) was also followed by the emergence of the term Jemaah Islamiyah. The roots of the birth of JI and NII originated from a recitation held in Malaysia where the fillers from this recitation were brought by migrants from Indonesia such as Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Jibril and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

As explained by a former member of Jemaah Islamiyah, Nasir Abas in his book, dismantling Jemaah Islamiyah. Immediately the members of this recitation group were about to depart for jihad in Afghanistan with an allegiance to obey the leader, who at that time was held by Abdul Halim, none other than Abdullah Sungkar. The reason for this initiation is that after carrying out jihad in Afghanistan, another agenda is for jihad in Indonesia to become an Islamic state. This NII will continue Kartosuwiryo's struggle when it was pre-independence. Indonesia must be converted to Islam before others because the history of upholding Islam has existed before.

While in Afghanistan, there was a split within the body of the mujahidin followers of Abdullah Sungkar's recitation. This group consists of the followers of Abdul Halim and the followers of Ajengan Masduki. Abdul Halim's group continued to remain in Afghanistan while Ajengan Masduki's group returned to Malaysia. In Malaysia, the Ajengan Masduki group will prepare for their jihad in Indonesia.

Since then, in early 1993 the Indonesian people who were at the Torkham training camp, either participating in the Military Academy program or short courses, only consisted of people who chose Abdul Halim as their new leader under the Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah organization, both the students and the instructors.[25] It can be seen that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir followed the movements of Abdullah Sungkar in carrying out his preaching in Malaysia. Abdullah Sungkar is the bearer of the NII teachings from Indonesia. As reported by the International Crisis Group, Abdullah Sungkar is the chairman of the NII in the Central Java region with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as his confidant. Sungkar and Ba'asyir then pledged allegiance to Ismail Pranoto in 1976.



Hispran's arrest for his involvement in the bombing of the Methodist Church in Medan led to Ba'asyir being jailed who was later charged of being a Hispran follower and participating in establishing an Islamic state as a reaction to Suharto closing down the ideals of political Islam in Indonesia. Ba'asyir denial of his being active in NII was based on the release of Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar from NII while in Afghanistan who later founded a new organization, Jemaah Islamiyah which was also rumored to have a network with Al-Qaeda led by Usama bin Laden. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir also lost contact with NII when he moved to Malaysia. The reason for Ba'asyir release was due to Ba'asyir own goal of wanting the universality of Islam itself compared to NII which was only limited to the regional area. This includes Ba'asyir ideals of upholding an Islamic state that is not only national but transnational.

During this time, Ba'asyir was later appointed as the new emir of JI due to the death of Abdullah Sungkar. The impact of Abdullah Sungkar's death caused many JI members to separate themselves from JI activities. There were seniors and members of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah at the leadership level at that time who did not agree with the appointment of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as Amir.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir closeness to Abdullah Sungkar could be seen from his similar vision in realizing the ideals of an Islamic state in which the state system is based on sharia, especially in Indonesia. This can be seen from Abdullah Sungkar's strong criticism of nationalist ideology. Believing that the Indonesian state belongs to the Indonesian nation means destroying the Tauhid Rububiyah of a Mu'min, because in essence Allah is the owner of all creatures, including the Indonesian state and its inhabitants.

This closeness with Abdullah Sungkar was then strengthened by having the same ideals that the true leadership of the country is the leadership that has been exemplified in the previous Khilafah system. This shared vision is a reflection of the vision currently being carried out by Ba'asyir. Ba'asyir refusal to be involved in JI in one of his trials could have been due to certain reasons so that Ba'asyir firmly refused to be directly involved in JI. Ba'asyir reasoned that the JI which had been reported by the ICG was the result of Western engineering only to trap him in prison. The explanation about JI that was reported was considered unbalanced and unfounded. In this case, there is still a separate debate about how the complete form of Jemaah Islamiyah is added by JI members who have their own level of solidarity to close the movement in line with the nature of JI's own organization as Tanzim Sirri, in other words, is a secret organization, both ideologically and in terms of movement.



3.5. Motives of Radicalism Movement

To find out the motives behind radical Islamic groups carrying out acts of violence which they consider to be part of jihad in their country over the last decade, could be seen through at least two aspects. First, the reasons stated by the perpetrators themselves. Second, explaining using an academic approach through several social theories. Ali Imron—the perpetrator of the October 12, 2002 Legian Bali bombing-stated the reasons why he carried out the bombing jihad.

First, feelings of dissatisfaction with the existing government. The absence of Imamat - leadership in the concept of NII - has caused various damages and immorality, be it the emergence of heretical sects, promiscuity, until it has to submit to the leadership of other people (American and Western). Second, the implementation of Islamic law as a whole is not enforced. Through this bombing, he hoped to trigger a revolution that would lead to the formation of the Imamate and the implementation of Islamic law as a whole. Third, the hope for the opening of jihad fi sabilillah. The only effective way to fight evil is to open up the battlefield of jihad that is the war between truth and falsehood. By carrying out bombings that killed foreigners in Bali, he hoped to open up a field of engagement between Muslims and infidels. Fourth, carry out the obligation of jihad. Jihad is a holy war in the way of Allah, according to him, by involving oneself in the bombing means one has carried out jihad in the way of Allah. Fifth, reply to the unbelievers. The Bali bombings and the church bombings on Christmas Eve were acts of retaliation against the Israeli and American Zionist atrocities against Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan, Somalia, Kashmir, Chechnya, and so on. Also retaliation for Christians related to the Ambon and Poso cases.

The motive for revenge against America, Israel and their allies who they consider to be colonizing and acting barbarously against the Islamic world is also clearly visible in the statements of the Bali bombing perpetrators. This actions which distinguishes it from the justifications that underlie acts of terror by Islamic groups in the past which were more filled with domestic issues rather than global issues.[26]

A historical study that was conducted by Murba Abu,[27] listed ten factors that influenced the growth of radicalism among Muslims in Indonesia. The ten factors are proposed by mentioning several actors involved. However, due to the closeness of the related factors, it can be summarized into five factors. First, due to political disappointment on the issue of the "Jakarta Charter" which failed to serve as the basis of the Indonesian state. Kartosuwiryo, a hardline Masyumi figure, expressed his disappointment by proclaiming the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) in August 1948. The movement



spread to Aceh led by Daud Beureuh and Kahar Muzakkar in Sulawesi.[28] Second, due to the behavior and political pressure of the New Order.

Third, groups inspired by the Iranian Revolutionary Movement in 1979 and Middle Eastern Islamic movements. Apart from being inspired by the revolution pioneered by Khomeini in Iran, this group also received inspiration from his movement, especially the Ikhwan al-Muslimin model formed by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt.[29] Fourth, groups from Islamic boarding schools. This group emerged as a result of the emergence of the perpetrators of bombing in various places in Indonesia who were alumni of several right-leaning Islamic boarding schools. There are at least three Islamic boarding schools that are often mentioned in radical Islamic discourses in Indonesia, which are the Ngruki Islamic boarding school in Surakarta led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, al-Zaitun in Indramayu led by Abu Toto, and Al-Islam Islamic boarding school in Lamongan.[30] Fifth, as part of an Islamic transnational organization.

3.6. Jama'ah Islamiyah and Radical Movements

One of the most interesting studies entering the 21st century is how to explain acts of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. In addition to the visible violent movements, there is a misunderstanding of Muslims themselves who tend to be literalistic in understanding religious texts (al-Qur'an and al-Hadith) which have added to the strengthening of the issue of terrorism.[31] This is exacerbated by the attitudes and religious expressions of "some" Muslims who tend to be exclusive and often justify their understanding of Islam which is considered the most correct. It is these elements that have spread, not only the struggle between religious ideologies but also wide open the discourse of terrorism in parts of the world. Especially in the global context, after the collapse of the WTC in the United States in 2001, terrorism which has the support of radicalism and religious fundamentalism is often the object of accusations by the perpetrators of the bombings. Of course, this phenomenon has strengthened the West's suspicion of the Islamic world,[32] on the other hand, it can be denied by many groups, especially within Islam itself, who say that not all terrorist acts represent Muslims.[33]

Acts of terror in Indonesia throughout the past two decades have occurred in the JW Marriott Bombings, Bali I Bombings, Kuningan Bombings, Bali II Bombings, and the Ritz-Carlton Jakarta Hotel Bombings, and finally the Sarinah Bombing. This act of terror is like an opera and a vulgar orchestra of a project of global, total, syumul and kaffah dehumanization. Not infrequently the terrorists do all that to fulfill the demands of theology that they understand. Islam seems to teach its loyal and fanatical followers



to carry out acts of terror as a form of faith. Their theological doctrines even claimed the truth that God had told him to do whatever was possible to defend His religion.[34] This is what leads us to keep saying, if they do it all in the name of defending God and applying the message of the Apostle, then this is an insult, tearing and distortion of the sacred values of religious texts.[35]

The thoughts and ideology of radical Islamic movements in the history of Indonesia, starting from the Darul Islam (DI) movement to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), uphold the three doctrines above. In the text of the proclamation of DI, for example, it is clearly stated that it is the obligation of the Ummah to establish an Islamic government because only this model of power is "approved" by Allah. DI also introduced the concept of hijrah, which contained an appeal to citizens of the Republic of Indonesia – a country he considered kufr – to move to the Islamic State formed by Kartosoewirjo. The killings and attacks by DI in Muslim areas that do not support their political goals are also based on the belief that even though they are Muslims, they can be judged as kufr because they do not support jihad in the establishment of an Islamic State. The killing of Muslims who are not supporters of the NII is also justified as part of the civil war. The idea of jihad itself had been written by Kartosuwiryo in 1930, which was followed up later by giving birth to the concept of hijrah, from "Makkah-Indonesia" to "Madinah-Indonesia", in 1940. Only then, along with the increasingly violent confrontation between the DI movement and the Indonesian government in In the 1950s, this concept was interpreted and applied in its most radical form.

4. Closing

The debate between religion and state relations is still a long debate and there is no agreement between these relations. From the history of the rebellion of Islamic religious leaders, the rebellion was based on the desire to establish Islam in Indonesia. It is ironic that throughout its history the efforts to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia have always used inhumane violence full of bloodshed in the name of God, who is truly the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.

From the description above, several conclusions can be drawn about the dynamics of Islamic radical groups in Indonesia today. The existence of support for ISIS shows that the potential for radicalization in the Islamic movement in the country is still ongoing. Those who want an Islamic caliphate still exist, including those who are willing to fulfill the call of jihad abroad.

Radical ideology continues to develop, in line with the development of information technology and online media with a way of working that is more effective and has a wider impact. Not a few young people are called to jihad through the means of television, the internet, and social media. In an easier way they also gain access and networks to be able to join the transnational radical group. Conditions like this seem to be a new phenomenon that has not been encountered before. Jihad instantly becomes a term that is quite appropriate to describe groups of young people, generally middle class and fairly educated, who suddenly become radical due to the development of increasingly sophisticated information technology. Furthermore, it will be seen that they no longer need a clear group or organization to join, as a means of mobilizing jihad. Several families and individuals who currently have joined or are currently joining jihadist groups in the Middle East, are reported to have departed separately. They met and later got to know each other, having been in Syria, Iraq or the surrounding area.

With such a pattern, it is of course increasingly difficult to identify or map out people who have the potential for a new generation of radicals. Unconventional methods must be carried out by the government as an effort to detect, prevent and overcome religious radicalization whose pattern is increasingly varied. So far, hard action has been carried out as a form of prosecution, it seems that it is starting to become irrelevant. If it is not properly anticipated then this country is just waiting for a ticking time bomb.

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