

Research article

No Dating No Cry: The Anti-Dating Activism of the 'Indonesia Without Dating' Movement

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Abstract. The growing manifestation of Islamic teachings in post-Suharto Indonesia is reflected in the emergence of Islamic revivalist movements that have such religio-political aspirations as the domestic application of *sharia*-based laws and the re-establishment of the caliphate. However, the extent to which these movements interpret, implement, and frame this *sharia* varies from one movement to another. This paper examines one of these movements, the primary goal of which is to mobilize public support, particularly of youths in Indonesia, against dating. This movement is called the Indonesia Tanpa Pacaran or Indonesia Without Dating (ITP). It is a form of cultural activism that is centered on the issues of dating, which is framed as a by-product of Western modernity. Dating is thus not only labelled as forbidden in Islam; the movement also challenges its common practice among youths and attempts to offer guidance to them on the perceived ideal Islamic-based relations between unmarried male and female youths. Employing the perspective of framing in social movements, this paper shows that the ITP's anti-dating activism is an inextricable part of its larger religio-political goal of implementing *sharia* in the country. Furthermore, the paper also demonstrates the strong connection between ITP and the already banned Islamic revivalist movement that calls for the re-establishment of the caliphate — Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).

Keywords: Islamic activism, anti-dating movement, social movement, *sharia*, the caliphate, Indonesia

1. Introduction

ITP (Indonesia Tanpa Pacaran or Indonesia without Dating) is an Islamic movement that wages a sustained public campaign against dating among Muslim youths in Indonesia. The movement emerged in 2015 against the backdrop of the growing manifestation of Islamic injunctions among Muslims that affect the social and political life of Indonesian society in the post-authoritarian era (1). Salvatore and Eickelman (2004) coined the term public Islam to connote such manifestation in which ideas and practices of Islam are articulated and contested in the public sphere (2). This can take a variety of forms ranging from the mounting Islamic activism launched by Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia), MMI (Majelis Mujahidin

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Indonesia or Indonesian Holy Warriors), FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front), and FUI (Forum Umat Islam or Forum of Islamic Community) demanding the implementation of sharia (Islamic law) in the country, the proliferation of da'wah (Islamic propagation) activities through cultural approaches that particularly appeal to Muslim youths such as FLP (Forum Lingkar Pena or Writing Circle Forum) to the increasing role of Islamic charity and relief organizations in the delivery of social services, disaster relief, and humanitarian aid (3–8).

In the eyes of ITP, the practices of dating among youths as we know it in the West is forbidden in Islam. It does not mean that falling in love in Islam is haram (prohibited), but the movement holds that the common practices of Western and modern dating inevitably lead to sinful activities between dating couples such as fondling, cuddling, kissing, and other sexual activities in an otherwise permissible between married couples. However, while the public campaign that the movement has sustained so far is devoted to an anti-dating cause, it also raises public awareness through its books, social media, and seminars about the perceived alarming moral decadence of Muslim youths in the country that is attributed to the West with their Westernization project that massively and systematically propagate values mostly antithetical to Islamic teachings (9).

ITP demonstrates features normally embodied in a social movement such as the ability to engage in collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents by people with shared objectives through extra-parliamentary means of influence to engender social change that impacts on the lives of many (10–13). However, the ways in which the movement carries out its social movement activities are not overtly political, for instance, through the popularly employed collective action repertoire such as mass protests against perceived erroneous policies. ITP favors popular social media platform among millennials and Generation Z such as Instagram and Facebook through which the movement organizes a wide range of activities such as public gatherings and webinars that are chiefly aimed at challenging values that are alien to Islam. Here, dating is framed as part and parcel of Westoxification — a term coined by an Iranian intellectual, Jalal al-e Ahmad, that depicts the enormous intrusion of Western cultural hegemony to the Muslim world that has deprived Muslims of their Islamic identity and culture (14).

Although seemingly apolitical, ITP is engaged in what is referred to as a symbolic battle of cultural codes in Muslim politics in which the movement's *raison d'être* of engaging in this battle is highly political (15,16). This study is important because notwithstanding ITP's organized and persistent campaign against dating since its emergence in 2015, it has thus far insufficiently studied. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that

ITP is affiliated with the banned HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia), which was outlawed in 2017, thanks to its global caliphate and sharia (Islamic law) political agenda that is deemed threatening democracy and pluralism in Indonesia.

Employing social movement perspectives, this study aims to examine the narrative and framing strategy of ITP. Through framing, social movements construct meaning, identifying and defining problems for action and at the same time proposing solutions to remedy the problems (15,17). Most Islamic revivalist movements in the country exploited wide-ranging frames of protest owing to the ways in which they perceived injustice against Islam. For instance, HTI proposed the caliphate and sharia (Islamic law) as the panacea for a plethora of protest issues it had raised ranging from poverty, corruption, fraud and mismanagement in government agencies, while FPI and FUI (Forum Umat Islam or Forum of Islamic Community) offered “NKRI Bersyariah” as the remedy for their protest issues revolving around what is perceived to be social vices (4,5). In contrast, ITP consistently develops narrower frames of protest that center around dating. This study thus contributes to our understanding on the multiplicity of narrative and frames of protest among Islamic revivalist movements in post-Suharto Indonesia. In addition, it also adds to the understanding of how the ideological propagation of highly ideological and well-organized Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI persists in Indonesia through its affiliated movements such as ITP despite HTI’s dissolution in 2017. This article starts with a brief history of ITP, including its founder, who serves as what social movement scholars often refer to as a movement’s ‘entrepreneur’ upon which the success and failure of the movement’s agenda heavily rely. It argues that the ITP’s anti-dating activism, although seemingly cultural, is part and parcel of its larger religio-political agenda, that is, supporting the implementation of sharia and the reestablishment of the caliphate, which undoubtedly serve as the primary goals of the ITP’s parent movement — HTI.

2. Methods

This study uses a qualitative method with a case study approach of an Islamic movement called ITP (Indonesia Tanpa Pacaran or Indonesia Without Dating) in Indonesia. This case study approach is employed to generate an in-depth understanding of this movement in its real-life context. The study uses primary and secondary data. The primary data were gathered through the ITP’s website and social media, including statements or opinions of the ITP’s founder, La Ode Munafar, in his social media such as Facebook. These data are important to gain an understanding of the ways in which the movement frames its narrative and the extent to which it is connected with the banned Islamic

revivalist movement that calls for the re-establishment of the caliphate in Indonesia — Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. The secondary data were gathered from journal articles, books, and news articles that are relevant to the movement. Both the primary and secondary data were complementary to facts and information about ITP. They were essentially complementary to these facts and information. This study uses the perspectives of social movements, particularly the framing perspective to help examine the movement's framing strategy. This paper begins with the description of the ITP's organizational structures. It also analyzes the strategies of the movement to mobilize support. Last, it examines the ITP's framing strategy.

3. The Organizational Structures and Strategies of ITP

As a social movement, ITP claims to be concerned with the dating culture adopted through modern lifestyle that has penetrated Indonesian civil society. According to La Ode Munafar, the founder of this movement, dating is a destructive culture for youths especially when perceived from the perspective of Islamic teachings. He also claimed that dating will divert youths from studying and their surroundings, and to prevent that, La Ode chose to use religious approaches, employing Islam as the guidance and source of reference (18). ITP, which particularly targets youths, often addresses the cultural hegemony of the Western civilization as the main enemy of Muslim youths in Indonesia through is social media. The movement often deems the dating culture as part of the Western cultural hegemony that leads to an allegedly damaging free-sex culture among Muslim youths in the country.

Once an individual becomes a member of ITP, the movement enforces them to adhere to the movement's organizational rules and principles. After paying the membership registration fee that costs IDR 198,000 (approximately USD 13.88), they will be invited to a WhatsApp Group and are given access to offline discussions called *Kajian Bahasa Arab Muda* (A Study of Youth Arab Language), abbreviated to "Kabarmu" held every Saturday. They are also invited to ITP study group every Sunday afternoon. According to its founder, this study group is obligatory upon the movement's members. While the study group usually discusses the disadvantages of romantic relationships (*pacaran*) between unmarried couples, it also asks new recruits that possess romantic or dating relationships to vow to break the relationships in front of other members and the leaders of the movement in order to show their commitment to the movement's rules and principles. To break the relationship, one must say: "I will break my romantic or dating relationships with my significant other in the shortest time possible" (19).

Other than WhatsApp group and study groups, members of ITP are also encouraged to purchase books and merchandise that are produced by the movement. Books that are published through an independent publisher called Gaul Fresh contain critiques towards romantic relationships and their disadvantages. One of its best-selling books, *Indonesia Tanpa Pacaran*, serves as the 'starter kit' of membership and contains more than simply encouragement to not engage in romantic relationships. From the start, the book treats people that have not taken the *hijrah* in disdain by depicting them as people that have an aimless and unfruitful life. For comparison, the book describes people that choose the perceived proper life according to Islamic *sharia* possess a better life with good morals and have many achievements. The book also mentions aspects that contradict *sharia*, labeling them as atrocious and blasphemous (9).

Once we delve deeper into then book, the book then began to criticize more than just romantic relationships. Throughout the book, the author criticizes Westernized lifestyle in Indonesia that normalizes dating and free-sex culture. The author also claims that this lifestyle is caused by individualism brought by Western values often wrapped as human rights, and this is considered the reason why Muslims all over the world are disintegrated. Such narration is repeated throughout the book. The author also blatantly chastises secularism as the driving force of moral degradation that manifests in many forms. In the end of the book, Munafar stated that if Muslims all over the world can implement *sharia* as a life guidance both in individual and public sphere, they can all be united and overcome the world (9).

When we consider the ideologies that ITP hold, we can say that they are not only similar to HTI but are actually the same. HTI claims that the secularism and democracy introduced by the West through a global capitalist system has weakened Muslims and prevented the unity of Muslims under one caliphate, which serves as the ultimate solution to the multi-dimensional crisis that Indonesia has faced. ITP also claims the very same thing, as seen from the content of its primary book, which repeatedly blames secularism and the hegemonic culture introduced by the West in Indonesia as the cause of the dating culture. Like HTI, ITP also claims that a return to the caliphate is the solution that will cure the state not only from the erroneous dating culture, but also for the multi-dimensional crisis that Indonesia has faced.

To further highlight the similarities between ITP and HTI, the organizational structures of both HTI and ITP, along with their methods of dissemination of ideas, will be examined in this section. Just like how HTI possesses a strict top-down organizational structure with the central committee, regional committee, and local committee ITP also possesses similar organizational structure. However, unlike HTI, ITP structure only consists of

two committees: the central and regional committees. This is also similar to other HTI's affiliated movements such as Gema Pembebasan, a campus-based movement that has an obvious affiliation with HTI. Gema Pembebasan also mimics its parent organization's structure with slight alterations. Gema Pembebasan has an additional commissary committee in every university in which it exists to adapt to the structure of students' organization commonly applied in universities in Indonesia.

In addition to the similarity of their organizational structures, it is important at this juncture to highlight the importance of ideological uniformity among HTI members through the strict rules of no communication between regional committees to prevent multi-interpretations. In the case of ITP, the movement also enforces strict rules within its WhatsApp Groups and its regional committees (20). The rules are as follows: 1) men and women are separated into two different WhatsApp groups; 2) it is strictly prohibited to send any messages in the group except in Wednesday, Saturday, and Sunday; 3) the topics that are allowed to be discussed within the groups must be revolved around ITP or lifestyle; 4) it is strictly prohibited to promote events or products unless it has official partnership with ITP; 5) members will be given *dakwah* in the forms of articles or Instagram posts every Tuesday and Friday, and it is mandatory for the members to share the contents with their other contacts. These rules are aligned with the HTI's strict rules with a view to maintaining the uniformity of ideology, which in the case of ITP is through limiting the content of discussions from external *dakwah* and events to maintain the uniformity of ITP's ideology.

In terms of the methods of ideas dissemination, ITP also mimics HTI's methods. ITP holds offline study groups every Saturday and Sunday, similar to the *halaqah* by HTI. The movement also utilizes media such as books and articles to spread its ideology, which only comes from one publisher, Gaul Fresh, owned by the ITP founder, La Ode Munafar. ITP also utilizes social media in the age of this advanced information and technology development by having its own official website,[?] Instagram,[?] and Facebook[?]. In the public sphere, ITP often holds public gatherings and collective actions in the forms of mass demonstrations to declare their existence and to protest against the celebration of Valentine Day and New Year. It also holds demonstrations calling upon Muslim women to wear *hijab* (21).

4. The Narrative Framing of ITP and The Caliphate as the Solution Against Western Cultural Hegemony

Islamization is not a foreign phenomenon in Indonesia. When Islam first arrived in Indonesia during the 1400s, it has managed to turn many Indonesians to follow the teachings that result in the 90 per cent of Indonesians being Muslims today. Back in the colonial days, religion and politics in Indonesia have often been intertwined, with Islam being the source of opposition to authoritarian rule. However, it was only in the 1990s where Indonesian Muslims became more politicized and actively participated in civil society (22). In fact, there were Muslim student organizations that became the main component of opposition against the authoritarian President Suharto's regime. In the case of Indonesia, movements such as HTI and its affiliations have shifted the order in civil society between the state and Islamic movements. These movements firmly believe that religion and the state are integral to civil society, while the state is seeking for a secular belief in which the role of religion and the state is separated (23). In the eyes of HTI and its affiliated movements, secularism brought by democratization has shifted the order of Indonesian civil society. Unlike democracy, HTI and its affiliations believe in the concept of the caliphate, which is a political system that uses God's divinity as the primary source of their legal and political system. HTI's spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto, criticized democracy that uses electoral support as its source of legitimacy, which is against Islamic sharia. He argued as follows:

Establishing laws that are not based on the Quran and hadith, but rather from the people's representatives, which is known by the jargon of "sovereignty in the hands of the people", is part of a secular democratic system of Western countries. This system has made the people or people's representatives as a source of law and at the same time has the right to enact law. In this kind of system, Islamic sharia only becomes one option that can be taken or not, it depends on the agreement or even to those who have the strongest authority in the parliament. Islamic sharia must become the only source of law, and it should not only become an option (24).

HTI was dissolved in 2017, because its call to return to the caliphate is deemed to be a threat to Indonesia's social and political stability. However, HTI is not proven to be dissolved completely as it does not hesitate to operate under a different name based on their previous experience of meeting resistance against universities and layers of civil society, such as the case of Gema Pemabasan as a smaller HTI cell that penetrates campuses in Indonesia. The chairman of Gema Pembebasan has been proven to be a member of HTI and utilizes it to be an organization meant to recruit potential members

of HTI. Although It denies any association with HTI, one could see the connection they share with each other through their ideology, organization structure model, and their methods of *dakwah* (3). Similar to Gema Pembebasan, ITP is the other HTI's affiliations that disseminates the teachings and principles of HTI.

ITP was established on 7 September 2015 by La Ode Munafar, the Chairman of the movement. He claimed that he first established the movement due to his concern over the increasing amount of youths who follow modern lifestyle culture, which includes dating. He believes that dating destroys the youths and puts them in a disadvantageous position (25). However, ITP is more than just a social organization that is concerned with the perceived moral problems of dating. The movement also repeatedly calls for a return to the caliphate as an all-curing elixir not only for the various problems of the youths' lifestyle, but also to solve other issues and as a form of struggles against the West' attempts to destroy Islam through the Western's ideology of secularism and global capitalism.

There are several evidence that needs to be put forward regarding the chairman of ITP. Just like Gema Pembebasan's Chairman who was a HTI member, La Ode has admitted publicly that he is a member of HTI and often preached about how HTI's ideology is in accordance with Islam and should be implemented every Muslim. Like a Facebook status he uploaded on 24 June 2014, he claimed that fellow Muslims should not be afraid of his words simply because he is a member of HTI. He even claimed that HTI's bulletins and tabloids should be studied in order for one to search for the truth regarding Islam. He also made a Facebook status about how he has participated in HTI since he was in high school (26). He also believes on the need to return to the caliphate and the implementation of *sharia* to be the solution of Indonesia's situation that is currently perceived to riddled with numerous problems caused by the Western ideologies and lifestyle that contradict Islamic teachings and principles.

La Ode also claims in the same Facebook status that HTI publicly expressed its aspiration because it considered itself to be saving Indonesia from capitalism, and HTI will replace it with the caliphate (27). In 2013, La Ode also uploaded a lengthy status as a form to support a Congregation of the Caliphate (Muktamar Khilafah) held in Jakarta in 2013. La Ode described how HTI changed him into be a better individual. He labelled democracy as a cruel system that has destroyed Indonesia, and he claimed that the United States is an enemy to Muslims as they have brought the capitalist ideology to destroy the country. He also wrote in his status that he is proud with HTI's bravery to combat the aforementioned ideology and system through an educated manner (28).

La Ode believes in HTI's ideology of a return to the caliphate and that this should be disseminated at a grassroots level. Thus, it comes as no surprise that he created a smaller cell of HTI to penetrate Muslim youths to cultivate an army of youths who will continue the struggles against hegemonic culture brought by the Western civilization that is perceived to have destroyed Islam and Indonesia. The book "Indonesia Tanpa Pacaran" repeatedly mentions the terms Westernization, secularism, and individualism. They are accused to be the main culprit for various problems in Indonesia. In addition, ITP also argues that one of the root causes as to why these aspects managed to invade Indonesia is because the state did not implement Islamic *sharia*, which they claim to have clear guidelines regarding every worldly matter. ITP claims that through the return to the caliphate, it will be able to remedy the impact that the Western world has brought on Indonesia and to bring back a glorious era of Islam under the unity of the caliphate. This clearly goes hand in hand with La Ode's aspirations as a member of HTI as showcased through his statuses in Facebook before he established ITP.

If we follow the theory of globalization from below, it is true that as the winner of the Cold War, the Western bloc and their capitalist system has become the dominant system in the world. We have seen the United States and its allies promoting the said system in all over the world. In cultural terms, this has brought about a modernization of the world promoted by science and tourism industry well-known as "the westernization of the world" (29). An undeniable increase in the cultural interaction of Western products and values exists despite it is filtered through local culture (30). It is the new media of communications that has created a global society in which messages sent from a far continent can be accessible effectively. When these interactions occurred, identities within the national boundaries do not necessarily fade. Rather, the values are absorbed and often integrate themselves within the local culture.

In a more conservative society, globalization is met with local resistance in an attempt to defend cultural traditions against the intrusion of foreign ideas and global issues (31). ITP was established as a response to the intrusion of Western capitalist system that does not fit Islamic cultures and traditions. However, ITP also benefits from globalization as their local Islamic values became delocalized and readapted to new contexts through the presence of transnational networks. Here, the transnational nature of HTI facilitates such delocalization and readaptation. The call to return to the caliphate also serves as a way for ITP to establish resistance against intrusive values such as democracy and secularism they claim to have been brought by the Western civilization to destroy Islam (32).

HTI mostly utilized bulletin publications and social media to disseminate their teachings, and candidate members have to go through a lengthy process of studying some main literatures to be able to become a member of HTI. Unlike HTI, it is easier to become affiliated with ITP and to be recognized as a member. You simply need to pay an amount of IDR 198.000 (approximately USD 13.88 USD) and you will receive a package of “Indonesia Tanpa Pacaran book” and merchandises along with a member card that will allow you to get access into offline study groups. Members also receive a detailed PDF file regarding rules upon joining the movement to internalize the ITP rules and to maintain the uniformity of ideology. This is very similar to what HTI does towards its members. Despite sharing the same ideology with HTI, ITP does not bring up topics that are hard to understand. Rather, it discusses more on modern lifestyle aspects and particularly discussions that revolve around dating and that encourages its members to avoid dating and to get married early to avoid falling into sin. However, although wrapped in an easy topic of discussions, it is common to see a return to the caliphate and the implementation of sharia is repetitively mentioned to serve as the solution to combat the modern lifestyle currently plaguing Indonesian Muslim youth, particularly the dating lifestyle (33).

Members of ITP are also told to identify themselves to be “Jomblo fi Sabilillah”, a term usually used to describe single individuals (*jomblo*) who are currently undergoing a war in following God’s way of living, a jihad. The usage of the term *fi sabilillah* is interesting, since it is mostly used to describe people who are literally in a religious war to propagate their teachings or to describe people who are in war against a cruel regime that prohibited Muslims from their own faith (34). Therefore, by using the term Jomblo fi Sabilillah, ITP is claiming to be in a war against cultural hegemony imposed by the Western civilization and its secular values.

Being a smaller cell of HTI that is formed to penetrate school and university level, it is not a surprise to see that the ideology of HTI being so apparent in the notions and discussions conducted by ITP. Therefore, the existence of ITP and many other affiliated movements of HTI after its dissolution in 2017 is a clear example that the struggles of Islamic revivalist movements for a return to the caliphate still exist even after the parent organization, HTI, has been disbanded. ITP’s method of designing its discussion that is youth-friendly has proven to be effective, thanks to the social media and pop-culture related contents, such as through the usage of memes. This is all done to attract youths through unique and interesting contents and designs, rather than simply quoting some verses in the Quran or hadith. As of now, ITP has generated over one million followers in Instagram and holds over five hundred likes in Facebook.

The movement also encourages its members to participate in actions such as declaring their fight against Valentine's Day, as they believe that it is a moment that celebrates modern lifestyle associated with a free-sex culture — a culture imported from the West that is meant to destroy Islam (35).

ITP has also been seen to conduct sweeping, mainly in Depok city, towards a couple who were seen to be dating. The movement utilized religious sentiments to encourage couples to marry and would preach the couple regarding how dating is a frowned upon culture that should not be committed by Muslims. They would even prepare necessary preparations for the couple to get married (36). All of these activities proved that ITP is more than a social organization that is concerned with a dating culture, it is also a social movement that raises a religious identity sentiment like its parent organization, HTI, to create the opportunity to spread their agenda of disseminating the call to return to the caliphate and implementing sharia as a method to combat the dating culture considered to be a culture imported from the West due to its secular values. The existence of ITP and other HTI affiliated movements ensures the continuation of HTI's struggles for a call to return to the caliphate. ITP's existence and role in attracting youths helps ensure a long-term continuation of the struggles on the part of Islami revivalist movements against Western secularism.

5. Conclusion

The availability of political opportunity in post-Suharto Indonesia has provided Islamic movements to play a role in advancing their religio-political aspirations ranging from the implementation of *sharia* to the re-establishment of the caliphate. ITP (Indonesia Tanpa Pacaran or Indonesia Without Dating Movement) is of one of such movements that, unlike the other Islamic revivalist movements, primarily frames its narrative on the perceived toxic dating culture among youths in Indonesia as the by-product of Western culture that is not only alien but also antithetical to Islamic teachings and principles. This study examined the ways in which ITP frames its anti-dating narrative and mobilizes support for its cause.

The study found that although ITP is engaged in a symbolic battle of cultural codes by chastising the ubiquitous practice of dating, the movement also upholds the idea of re-establishing the transnational caliphate. This comes as no surprise considering the founder of ITP is also a member of the already banned HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). ITP is thus nothing more than the other HTI's affiliated movements such as the campus-based Gema Pembebasan with a specific religio-political platform deliberately designed

to suit its needs. Here, ITP is designed to specifically target and, at the same time, mobilize Indonesian youths from generation Z with the objective of not only denouncing the perceived Western lifestyle of dating, but also mobilizing other bystander public's support for its anti-dating campaign. Many studies have demonstrated HTI's adequate capability to exploit its organizational resources, consistently utilizing a wide range of publications and social media to find recruits (37).

The support-seeking strategies of ITP are also a carbon-copy of those of its parent movement. In addition to publishing reference books for the ITP members, the movement also utilizes popular social media among youths such as Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter to better facilitate the dissemination of its anti-dating ideas and programs. Moreover, like HTI, ITP also employs the master narrative of Westoxification as an inevitable consequence of Western cultural hegemony to the Muslim world in various forms, including dating, that is believed to have detached Muslims from their religion. Studies such as this suggests that despite the ebb and flow of the political opportunity that an Islamic revivalist movement has within a polity, it is the movement's ability to exploit its organizational resources to the maximum possible extent that determines the perpetuation of the movement's struggles for the dissemination of ideas and the finding of new recruits through its affiliated movements. This study also suggests that challenging the Westoxification does not necessary take place in streets through mass protests with provocative sloganeering against the authority and ruling elites (38). Indeed, raising the awareness of Muslim youths on the disadvantages of dating mostly through social and cultural approaches as demonstrated by ITP also reflects a sustained collective challenge against the perceived injustice of Western cultural codes that are antithetical to Islamic values.

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Conflict of Interest

The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

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