

Research article

Unholy War: Violent Extremism in Marawi and Its Impacts on Muslim Communities in Indonesia

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Abstract. Religious radicalism in the form of violent extremism is against the principles of human rights and democracy. Religious radicalism also opposes the existence of the modern state of Indonesia and, arguably, also of other Southeast Asian countries. The global political commitment initiated by the United Nations, namely Responsibility to Protect, states that several countries in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, are at high risk of atrocities. Civilians in Marawi in the Philippines have experienced atrocities carried out by the Maute family-led militant group backed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In 2017, for more than five months, the restoration of regional security and stability in Marawi by the Philippine security apparatus caused many casualties. This study aimed to identify, map and analyze the narrative structure of the goals and backgrounds of the actors involved in the Marawi case and its impacts on Muslim communities in Indonesia. The research focused on a narrative analysis that united various factors contributing to violent religious extremism. This study employed a narrative perspective that was multidimensional, consisting of the narratives of marginalization, invitation, symbolic violence, and violent extremism. It demonstrated that the narrative of marginalization and calls for Jihad served as the basis of solidarity among the members of the Maute militant group in Marawi. The narrative aimed at solidarity for jihad in Marawi had more influence on groups belonging to ISIS, such as Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), and East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT).

Keywords: violent extremism, radicalism, terrorism, Marawi, the Philippines, Indonesia

1. Introduction

The military operations to restore both security and territory in Marawi for more than 5 months in 2017 led to considerable casualties: 165 soldiers and policemen were killed. Meanwhile, from the Maute Terrorist side there were 908 people killed. More than 10,000 people became refugees and lived in emergency shelters. The Philippine government, with the help of various countries, has finally succeeded in taking over territory that was occupied and controlled by the ISIS group. This dynamic is an effect of the Marawi conflict. The issue has now been taken into consideration by ASEAN

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countries, especially Indonesia as the largest Muslim country, and Malaysia. This is because a number of rebels in Marawi come from these two countries. The case of Marawi shows how religious-based radicalization and violent extremist movements have grown into political and military forces that can take over a region or a city. One of the main aspects of the Marawi case stimulated various jihadists from various countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and beyond those countries. In various analyses and studies, the network among the jihadists has already been formed. Several other indications are as follows: (1) The existence of terrorist organizations in various countries has begun to be active again; (2) Availability of funds and logistics; (3) Networks and information networks between terrorist organizations; (4) Mobility of these organizations across national borders, including allegations of smuggling of weapons and people in the Philippines (1).

The use of narrative as a process to mobilize sympathizers through social media has become an effective strategy for groups supporting religious-based violent extremism. The narrative of calling for involvement in jihad in Marawi has a powerful structure to attract targets who have been exposed to the same religious ideology and to build sympathy for those who are getting to know them. Therefore, in this narrative, there are aspects of humanity, religion, and even a narrative about the need for a caliphate as a justification for those who wish to carry out jihad. The last narration is to carry out a physical struggle in the forms of soul, body, and material (2).

The narratives built by groups supporting violent extremism do not use a single narrative. Instead, the narratives are diverse so that they could better meet the various interests of the accessors and readers of their sites. Through various narratives, the social, economic, political, justice, welfare, and caliphate aspects are then united as awareness for jihad against states in which these groups live. There are few reasons for those who have been invited to join as jihadists to say that the narrative is false because all is framed with religion (3). For example, the narrative related to the Marawi incident has the following structure:

“To my brothers and sisters in the Archipelago, Malaysia and Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, it is time to join IS (Islamic State). It is time to unite against the thoghut (evil) kingdoms in your country. Join brothers in the Philippines under the leadership of Abu Abdullah Philippines who has been entrusted by the daulah (Islamic state) to lead.”

“To all the brothers who have taken allegiance, kill their soldiers wherever you are. With your vehicle, hit them, you have a knife, stab them in the chest. Don’t be afraid.

We will return to attack you or our friends who are there. God willing, they will cut off your necks.”

”If you can’t afford to go here (Syria), join the Philippines. If you can’t afford it because of your old age, take your children there. If you can’t afford it, do it in your country. Do not let those enemies of Allah fall asleep and trample on you. If you still can’t afford it, give your wealth for the sake of jihad.”

Such a narrative structure has been circulating from 2012 to 2019. Everything moves through social media across countries in a way that is unstoppable. Because it is easily accessible and re-circulated by the supporters and sympathizers of the extremist organizations. The development of the narrative indicates that all of this is the initial phase of the construction process of the caliphate in Indonesia. They tested whether the narrative effect was solid or not by creating a war in Marawi.

This research is based on two important questions, namely: (1) How did the Marawi case help affect the growing solidarity within the Islamic community in Indonesia in responding to the Marawi conflict? and (2) How did these conditions become the basis for the development of violent religious extremist groups in Indonesia? This study therefore aims to map, identify, and analyze the narrative structure of solicitation, motives, goals, and backgrounds of the actors involved in the Marawi conflict. It demonstrates that individuals who adhere to the interpretation of cultural Islam tend to be more socially liberal and moderate in terms of religious politics, while those who adhere to a literal or cultural interpretation of Islam have a strong tendency to adopt extreme religious political views, both socially and religiously.

2. Methods

This study uses qualitative and quantitative methods. A survey was conducted in this study to find out the degree of Islamic zeal (*ghirah*) among sampled population in Indonesia across a variety of age criteria. In addition, qualitative data were gathered through the content analysis of a collective of narratives among jihadists about the need to wage jihad in Marawi. Interviews with some key informants who have hand-on experience and deep knowledge on Islamic radicalism and terrorism were also used to add insightful data to this study. This study first examined the results of the survey about the degree of Islamic zeal among sampled population in Indonesia in order to account for the extent to which the formation of identity politics is strengthened. It then analyzed the concept of solidarity contestation between humanity and jihad war solidarity among

jihadists in Marawi. Last, it attempts to explain the views of Islamic groups or movements in Indonesia on the Marawi conflict and the call for jihad in the region.

3. Global Muslim Solidarity: Islamic Zeal (Ghirah) and The Strengthening of Identity Politics

The existence of conflicts in various countries, involving Muslims, is often narrated as the unfair treatment of non-Islamic groups against Islamic minorities. This narrative is used by leaders of Islamic organizations to raise awareness of global Islamic identity. The groups of Muslims who are generally raised to support global Islamic solidarity actions are those who have a strong perception of injustice. A perception that Muslims are treated unfairly by people of other faiths, marginalized into politics, and get unfair treatment in the economic field, and experience social discrimination both when Muslims are the majority, as in Indonesia, and when they are a minority like in Marawi, the Philippines (4).

Through a survey of researchers on Islamic zeal in the general population carried out by INFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development), it can be concluded that Islamic zeal tends to be high. There is also a high trend of Islamic zeal. Similar results were also obtained from the survey in the student population. Based on the results of the survey, it was found that 78.62 percent of students showed a high level of Islamic zeal. This explains that for the Muslim community who are not exposed to radicalism, the zeal for Islam also tends to be high (5).

In a Muslim community exposed to radicalism in Central Sulawesi Province, Islamic zeal also tends to be high with 88.71 percent of them show a high Islamic zeal (6). Thus, it can be concluded that high Islamic zeal was found to be evenly distributed among groups exposed to or not exposed to radicalism. The role of Islamic zeal is important to explain support for collective solidarity actions and violent extremism. Through a survey by researchers on the general population, it shows that perceptions of injustice are positively correlated with Islamic solidarity and extreme violence, support for *sharia*, Islamic zeal, politicized identity and intra-religious empathy. This explains that the strengthening of perceptions of injustice, increasing Islamic zeal, and the formation of a politicized identity are aspects that can explain the collective action of solidarity (5).

The data above shows that high Islamic solidarity can occur in Islamic communities that have high Islamic zeal, have high perceptions of injustice and intra-religious empathy, and tend to experience a politicized identity through narratives. The relationship

between solidarity and violence support does not always appear to have an immediate impact, and instead, there is often a mediator variable that bridges the relationship between the two variables (7). That is, there must be a special condition in which solidarity can lead to the support of violence. In this study, it was found that the relationship is a politicized identity. The process of politicization is qualitatively found in this study to be an important aspect of building solidarity in the form of an Islamic zeal. This is manifested in a sense of solidarity that can make a person called to support extreme religion-based violence if their religious identity is politicized or mobilized intentionally and strategically through narrative processes. This type of social identity is an important predictor of any movement action (8,9). Those whose identity is politicized are people who are moved to take action on behalf of a group or organization (10). The members of the movement carried out actions that were in the form of solidarity with fellow Muslims who were considered to be victims in Marawi.

4. Solidarity Contestation: Humanitarian Solidarity and Jihad War Solidarity

Islamic solidarity, as explained earlier, is motivated by increasing Islamic zeal and strengthening Islamic identity through politicized identity mechanisms. For this reason, this sub-chapter will explain the mechanism of politicized identity. Two main variables that are important to explain this phenomenon are perceptions of injustice (11) and Islamic zeal (12). A politicized identity occurs if an individual has a high Islamic zeal, which means that he has a strong tendency to identify himself within an Islamic group and to fulfill his own meaning through group values. Individuals who have a high Islamic zeal and have a high perception of injustice over the treatment of other groups tends to show attitudes that reflect readiness to take collective action in every effort to mobilize based on identity (11).

In the case of Islamic solidarity generated by conflicts involving Islamic minority groups in various countries such as in Marawi, there are two types of collective action that emerge. First, humanitarian solidarity (non-violence); second, the mobilization of jihad (violent extremism). Individuals who are motivated to join in collective action, both humanitarian solidarity and jihad mobilization, have distinctive psychological conditions, namely high Islamic zeal and high perceptions of injustice experienced by Islamic groups. These two things make individuals vulnerable to experiencing a politicized identity on the basis of religion. This politicized identity is a strong predictor, raising individuals' readiness to support collective actions. The role of politicized identity in

predicting collective actions is stronger in extreme violence compared to collective action of humanitarian solidarity. This means that individuals who experience a politicized identity tend to be more prepared to support collective actions with violence (13).

In the process of identity politicization, the leader plays an important role in constructing the narrative. The importance of strengthening identity to encourage collective action is recognized by leaders. This is the case in the context of conflicts involving minority Muslims in various countries. Leaders use group-based narratives of injustice and threat to evoke emotions of anger and fear. These two emotions will encourage a person to channel them through the potentials or strength of the group. In this case, there is a process of strengthening the identification of individuals into Islamic groups to carry out collective shifts (14). This process is carried out as an effort to jointly increase collective self-esteem after previously being very low due to the process of oppression and injustice. Leaders produce narratives that can encourage the process of increasing group identification, among others through the formation of narratives of injustice and threats. In such conditions, the Islamic zeal can become stronger with the addition of ideological narratives to fulfill the meaning of being a Muslim. Leaders again provide a very important role in producing meaningful narratives. The narratives used by the leader in this process include the importance of being a *kaffah* (complete) Muslim, *hijrah* (migration), the threat of sin if you do not carry out certain orders, the threat of going to hell or privileges for those who struggle in the way of Allah, and the highest place in heaven if you become the defenders of God's religion and become martyrs in achieving it.

Thus, it can be concluded that politicized identity can explain support for extreme violence in the name of religion, where the identity is formed through strengthening group identity which is manifest in the high perception of injustice and Islamic zeal. In the process, leaders play an important role in producing narratives that can encourage people to take collective action, both in humanitarian solidarity and jihad mobilization. The phenomenon of collective action caused by the politicization of identity is also shown to be related to support for Islamic *sharia*. There is a positive attitude among Muslims to support the formalization of *sharia* law in Indonesia. Based on a focused group discussion (FGD) among students carried out by INFID, FGD participants with a demographic target age recruit of extremist groups come from various backgrounds, student organizations, campus *da'wah* (preaching) institutions, and also alumni at a private university in Jakarta. Based on public perception, in general, support for ideological violence is caused by three things. First, economic dissatisfaction; second, the

perception of injustice. Third, high trust in religious authority figures who continue to proclaim the struggle for *sharia* enforcement in Indonesia. The community is fully aware of the role of religious leaders whose invitations tend to be followed by most Muslims in Indonesia.

The dominant view of community groups is that there is disappointment or dissatisfaction with those who are in power, both economically and socio-politically. This disappointment with the ruling government was explained, among other things, by one of the FGD participants, Kikio, a student who is active in campus organizations. He said, “...because they don't use an Islamic system, and they feel that this (democratic system) can't be done, there is no trust in the system, so they want to change the country's system because they don't have faith in it, they are considered unable to solve the problem.” The dissatisfaction and disappointment felt by the community and the perception of injustice felt as part of the Islamic group, caused the community to be vulnerable to an attitude of the rejection of the existing system. Identification of Islamic groups and increasing Islamic zeal encourage individuals to support alternative systems.

Support for an alternative system of Islamic *sharia* due to this disappointment is intuitive, because it has not been based on clear successful practices. In this case, religious ideology takes on a role in filling the conditions of uncertainty that are reinforced by the emotions of fear and anger. Islamic fundamentalist groups bring back the narrative of the glory of Islam through the practice of Islam at the time of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) (15). This belief in Islamic idealism based on Islamic practices at the time of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) can be categorized as a literal interpretation of Islam that supports the application of Islamic *sharia* in formal law and as a basis for regulating the state's affairs (14).

In general, the strengthening of support for the *sharia* system in the political narrative in Indonesia can be explained from the survey results of the Center for the Study of Islam and Society, UIN (Islamic State University) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (16). This condition can be explained based on the mechanism of the role of the religious-leader-support narrative. Islamic *sharia* narratives propagated by leaders of Islamic organizations, to Muslim communities who have a tendency to obey religious authority figures, will easily get support. In conditions of uncertainty and perceived injustice, adopting the *sharia* system as the only narrative that stands out and becomes a solution to replace a system that is considered to be lacking in the provision of welfare and justice. This was also explained by the FGD participants as follows:

"Moreover, since we were little, our culture has followed the older ones. So, whatever is given to us by the name of ustadz (a religious teacher), all kinds of things, we will definitely accept it..."

"...because I feel that his teachings are the most correct, so I feel that with the law adopted, all problems can be solved..." (Kikio)

Based on this view, it can be explained that support for Islamic *sharia* as a result of adopting a literal interpretation of Islam is a form of shifting political attitudes from moderate to fundamentalist or radicalist ones and then another step easily towards violent extremism when what they believe must be realized because it is regarded as the justified law of God. The formation of this extreme political attitude is demonstrated, among other things, by the strengthening of aspirations for support for Islamic *sharia* in Indonesia. This can be explained by increasing Islamic zeal and strengthening the aspirations of Islamic political ideology. Variations in Islamic political ideology attitudes can be explained through the diversity of interpretations of Islamic teachings (14). In Indonesia, the diversity of Islam can be divided into; literal Islam and cultural Islam, both of which are variations of interpretations of Islamic idealism.

Islamic political ideology can basically be explained as the idealization of Islam in politics. Islam is not only embraced as a religious teaching but also as values that are used as the basis for governing a state. This idealization of Islam, based on the interpretation of Islamic teachings, can be divided into two types. The first is literal Islam, which considers Islam to be the basis for formally governing the state. The second is cultural Islam, which adheres to the interpretation that Islamic teachings do not need to be formalized as a state law, but are adaptive, where Islamic values are used as an ethical basis in regulating the state, which is considered adequate. Regarding the increasing Islamic zeal that occurs in the Muslim community in Indonesia, this literal interpretation of Islam is explained to be able to predict political conservatism and extreme political views (extreme right). Individuals who tend to adhere to a literal interpretation of Islamic idealism will tend to have extreme attitudes in their political views, including supporting Islamic *sharia*. If the individual has a high Islamic zeal, it will further strengthen his extreme attitude.

When the Philippine government counterattacked the Maute group's occupation of Marawi, this group felt the need for additional personnel. They disseminate the narrative to gain support through social media. Calls for a war in Marawi against the infidel Philippine government are widespread on social media. Jihadists in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world have finally provided support and were involved as combatants in Marawi. The narrative of the call for jihad to the Philippines was shown to Muslims in

Southeast Asia and the world. Meanwhile, the Indonesian-language narrative is aimed at readers in Malay-speaking areas. The structure of the narrative in the various languages is the same. Aspects of affection with zeal is the method they use, as if not many jihadists are willing to emigrate for jihad to the Philippines and help the Maute group who is in a pinch and needs a lot of additional troops to win this battle. This call implies that the Philippine ISIS group needs the help of jihadists from the nearest region, in this case Southeast Asia to help them.

According to a terrorist observer and former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Nassir Abbas, the narrative of pressure and intimidation against Islam abroad is a narrative used by the ISIS group to open people's minds. The goal is to foster a sense of sympathy, empathy, a sense of wanting to defend, solidarity, a sense of sharing, and a sense of wanting to fight. This method is very effective in attracting people, especially in the form of photos, videos, and testimonials. This is one of the methods used by Nassir Abbas to recruit and turn young radicals into extremists. This method was not only used in the Jamaah Islamiyah era. The same method is also used by ISIS, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), and other Islamic radical groups in Indonesia (17–20). However, according to Nassir, to carry out a jihad movement, this group does not have to wait for a moment of conflict that occurs abroad such as in the Philippines. There are groups or individuals who are ready and willing to take action in Indonesia. They feel obliged to take these actions to achieve what they believe to be the truth.<fn> Interview with Nassir Abbas, a former leader of Jamaah Islamiyah, in Jakarta, August 2019</fn>

According to a former terrorist Abu Tholut, the calling of Muslims to fulfill the call for jihad could be caused by two things. First, because according to human psychology, if there are many similarities among people, they will form a community, and this is very natural. Second, because of religious factors or the beliefs of fellow Muslims. Muslims are like one body. When one part of the body is sick, other parts of the body are also sick. Accordingly, if there are Muslims who are persecuted or hurt, other Muslims will also feel the same way. This, according to Abu Tholut, has been widely understood, especially by the *ikhwan* (brothers, plural) who often participate in *halaqah* (study circles). This is also not exclusive because many preachers often convey this Prophet narration (*hadith*). Those who often follow *halaqah* and hear this *hadith* will form a character of concern for fellow Muslims. Therefore, according to Abu Tholut, if there are events that are experienced by Muslim communities in other parts of the world, it is only humane to fulfill the call for support. Moreover, if it happens to Muslims who need help, according to Abu Tholut, it is natural for other Muslims to fulfill the call or provide assistance, and this is something that cannot be stopped.

In this case, Abu Tholut is also considering whether this issue will be carried over to Indonesia: whether there will be retaliation in Indonesia. According to Tholut, a revenge is not that easy. There are factors that drive the retaliation.<fn> Interview with Abu Tholut, a former leader of Jamaah Islamiyah, August 2019</fn> The Bali Bombing I, 2002, was actually not a case with a single root, nor was it purely ideological. The Bali Bombing I was a response to the actions of America and NATO that sent troops and invaded Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban government. This is what prompted the sympathy of other Muslims to attack any Americans wherever they are. The attacks of America and its allies against the Afghan people have made the sympathy of the Indonesian Muslim community. Afghanistan's population is 99 percent Muslim. Therefore, religious narratives are very strong in attracting Indonesians to carry out jihad in Afghanistan. Their main intention is to help the Afghan people from the Russian invasion and to attend military training in Afghanistan that gives them the opportunity to have hands-on experience with the war that is going on in that country. This religious narrative, according to Badhawi, an Abu Tholut junior at Jemaah Islamiyah, also attracts Indonesian Muslims to provide assistance to fellow Muslims who feel oppressed.

Shobarin from the MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesian Mujahidin Council) said that the group's promises include institutional promises to help Muslim brothers and sisters in other parts of the world, who need assistance but with a view to enforcing Islamic *sharia*. In the Ambon case, for example, MMI took part as part of solidarity and brotherhood among Muslims. MMI must help them because in the verse of the Quran there is an obligation to help. Threat against Muslims are a pull factor for Muslims to move. But if it is just sporadic, because there are regional and unsystematic problems, then MMI will only deal with it diplomatically. If MMI goes to a conflict area, it will only be temporary. However, if it is systematic, like Afghanistan, Syria, and Palestine, MMI will continue providing assistance there. According to Shobarin, the behavior of the Muslim community is more exposed when they receive alarming information. This means that the information becomes widespread news, not just one-sided information. This will make it easier to move Muslims to help their fellow Muslims, and this movement will be possible if there are *ulama* (Islamic scholars) who move. *Ijtima Ulama* (religious decree), for example, can strongly motivate people to fulfill the call for jihad or not (5).

For the Marawi case, because it was not widely exposed by the media, it was not easy to move Muslims to Marawi. Only people who have special routes, such as ISIS and JAD (Jamaah Anshorut Daulah), according to Shobarin, who move to Marawi. Moreover, Shobarin said, not all conflict cases have to be responded by sending people to participate in their wars because now it can also be solved through diplomacy. Muslims

are now more coordinated, according to Shobarin. For Marawi, Shobarin admits, MMI has almost no movement, because it is not widely publicized by the media and there is no *ulama*'s order to go there. Therefore, the movement of Muslims in responding to an event that occurs both at home and abroad is caused by several factors, namely:

1. The call of conscience factor, namely when procedures that should be carried out by the government are not carried out, then they will take their own way. But this requires courage because there are risks and not everyone has the courage to face these risks;

2. The ability factor, because not everyone is able and has the financial ability. If they have financial back up, they can realize this desire and send their members to the mission,

3. The government's political interests' factor, because the government sometimes turns a blind eye even though they know their citizens have migrated to one country, for example in the case of Afghanistan or Marawi. However, because there is a political interest in the country, the government seems to allow or legalize this movement;

4. Mass media coverage factor, so that it can arouse the spirit of the members of Islamic movements to move;

5. The orders of *ulama*, because now Muslims have begun to be coordinated and move according to the instructions and orders of the *ulama* (5).

There are also some reasons why the JI and MMI did not move to fulfill the narrative of the call for jihad to Marawi as follows:

First, ISIS, JI, and MMI have different ideologies. Therefore, JI and MMI felt there was no need to fulfill the call. Moreover, for the Marawi case, ISIS has claimed responsibility for the incident. Thus, all non-ISIS Islamic organizations do not feel the need to provide any assistance to the Maute group;

Second, they no longer want to be reckless and trapped because they are often framed by other Islamic movements. Therefore, at the time of the Marawi incident, the JI team sent some of its members to conduct a survey to Marawi to see the conditions there firsthand. The decision to send people was based on several considerations. JI saw no need to send troops there because it was not considered obligatory to help the Maute group, even though they shared the same faith as the JI group;

Third, Abu Tholut saw the ISIS group acting without using political, not strategic, and brutal policies - which became the character of this group. According to Tholut, in the Philippines this group is now "out". They act for the benefit of the organization, not considering the community. This group understands that Marawi is an Islamic city, with

a Muslim majority population. The Maute group does not carry out its activities in Davao or Manila. Because the Maute struggle was carried out in Marawi, when the government military attacked Maute, the Muslim community was the victim. Marawi is damaged and people's lives are disrupted.

Tholut also saw Marawi being attacked by the Philippine government on a strong basis. Marawi is a business city, there are a lot of merchants and a lot of rich people. Many of them are donors to the MILF. How can this flow of funding be stopped? With Maute there, there is a reason for the Philippine government to stop this flow of funding by taking action to get Maute into action and a major conflict then occurs. Thus, there is a reason for the Philippine government to bombard the region. This is evident, after two years of conflict, the Philippine government did not rebuild the destroyed city. The government does not seem to want Marawi to run normally again. If Marawi runs normally, donors will return to donate to separatist groups who will fight the government.

The same thing was conveyed by a researcher on terrorism in Southeast Asia, Sidney Jones; and the Defense Attache in Manila, Colonel Marine Muhammad Reza Suud, who stated that the Indonesian government had disbursed funds for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Marawi City. However, up to now no construction has been carried out on the destroyed city. Sidney Jones also said that there are a lot of funds from international institutions such as the World Bank, funds from Australia, Japan, and other countries to build Marawi. Likewise, funds for children's and women's programs as well as other programs. However, until now Marawi City has not been rebuilt. It is not known why the Philippine government has not rebuilt the city while people still have to live in refugee camps.<fn> Interview with Sidney Jones in Agustus 2019 and Colonel Marinir Reza in September 2019</fn>

Fourth, Abu Tholut was not sure that there would be a Katibah (a battalion) Nusantara or Islamic territory there. According to him, the Katibah Nusantara over there is only a discourse, but cannot be realized. To make this happen, a large army is needed. Tholut doubts that there is a battalion with an army of one thousand fully armed personnel. According to Abu Tholut, the Katibah Nusantara is not a combination of these three countries, but a strong army with complete equipment. And this proved to be non-existent in the Philippines. Accordingly, the Katibah Nusantara for Abu Tholut is just a discourse, propaganda, and aimed at scaring opponents.

Fifth, a war is not just a physical battle, but also a psychological battle. The Katibah Nusantara in question, namely the triangle of Indonesia (Sangita), Malaysia (Sabah), and the Philippines (Zulu), according to Tholut, may be their only route to cross and join these groups. However, this cannot be said to be a caliphate region in Southeast

Asia. The doubt was based on the base moving around frequently. The MILF, formerly headquartered in Maguindanao Province, has now moved to Rajamuda. Abu Sayyaf did the same. They used to be based in Sulu, but now they choose to move to another region (21).

Sixth, Abu Tholut, Shobarin, or Badhawi did not agree with the ideology of ISIS. Maute is a supporter of ISIS while JI has a different ideology from that of ISIS. As such, they will not heed the Maute group's call for Southeast Asian jihadists to join. The supporters of Jemaah Islamiyah, especially those who have been trained in Afghanistan, learn more about jihad and the conditions of jihad. This teaching was then passed on to their juniors who did not participate in military training in Afghanistan. Therefore, even though JI and neo-JI are different generations, they have the same platform on jihad. JI does not agree with ISIS' style of jihad: it is brutal and easy to disapprove by fellow Muslims. The examples of brutal acts include slaughtering humans like animals and killing people for no justifiable reason. Even ISIS forbids food that is actually halal. Things like this make JI and its splinter groups disagree with ISIS. Therefore, they do not sympathize with what Maute and other ISIS groups are doing in the Philippines even though they strongly request that the Indonesian jihadist groups will help and join them.

Seventh, the changing conditions in the Philippines. The separatist group that used to oppose the government, namely the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF, is now building a peace agreement with the government. They will create an autonomous body and MILF members will work and are paid in this institution by the government. The MILF no longer wants to clash with the Philippine Government. Thus, the group that actually has the power in this battle and strategy is no longer an opponent of the government but a partner of the government. Even the MILF cooperated with the government to fight against ISIS in Marawi. ISIS in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) are small groups. Therefore, if there are Indonesians who still want to go to the Philippines to help this group, it is likely only a few of them and is from the ISIS group. Unlike the previous JI group, which is up to hundreds of people that went to the Philippines. They were not there to fight, but to take part in military training conducted by JI Indonesia at the Hudaibiyah camp they had built in Mindanao. JI only uses land in Mindanao and does not support the MILF fighting against the government. However, some JI members changed their ideology and supported ISIS in the Philippines. But the main interest of the JI group is to train its members because this is not possible in Indonesia. After these JI members finished their training period at the camp, they returned to Indonesia. Therefore, the magnet that attracted Indonesian militant groups to the Philippines was not a war such as in Marawi.

Eighth, if there is another conflict in Marawi and religious narratives are played to inspire jihadists to help them, it is possible that someone will go there. However, according to Tholut, there are many factors that jihadists must consider before they decide to depart. It is not only sympathy for Muslims in the Philippines who are oppressed, but also real factors that must be carefully considered, such as courage. Courage here does not only mean having the courage to fight, but also the courage to take risks by leaving their children and wives and losing their jobs. Although jihad is rewarded with heaven, according to Tholut, not everyone is willing to take the risks. Even if you are a fellow ISIS supporter, it does not mean that ISIS Indonesia will go to fulfill the call. Maybe they still have a hard time leaving their families even though they have the funds. In addition to the family factor, there is also a facility factor. Are there facilities that support Indonesian jihadists to go to the Philippines, such as funds for people who have no money. Likewise, a strong back up from the organization that will manage their presence there, such as accommodation and so on. According to Tholut, if anyone leaves, and because Maute is ISIS, only ISIS people who have links to Maute. Each group, according to Tholut, has its own network.

Ninth, the Maute's defeat will prompt retaliation that can encourage them to rise again. However, they are a small and exclusive group. If they retaliate, they will face the MILF group that has been working with the government. As a result, it will be difficult for the Maute supporters, because they are not only dealing with the government, but also with the MILF who has more experiences in warfare and jihad strategies (5).

5. Marawi for the Indonesian Jihadists

Janin, one of the Marawi residents who became a victim of the Marawi war, has his own views regarding the existence of foreigners, including Indonesians, who were in the Maute war. They joined the reason for the common ideology, namely the ideology of ISIS. It is this solidarity of the ISIS network that becomes their ideological similarity, which makes Malaysians and Indonesians willing to join the Maute group. Because they are not blood relatives, they are not schoolmates, they do not know each other but are bound by ISIS ideology. Janin believes that one of the reasons they came to the Philippines is because the Philippines is the territory of Daulah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia. They also know that Maute is strong and can revive the Southeast Asian region. The unification of these various groups is due to the fact they have the same goal, namely to find funds to make their war happen, and suddenly there is one group that has the funds and is willing to fund the movement of these groups.

Initially Maute was actually also a member of the MILF, from the MILF family. His father was in the MILF organizational structure. However, the group broke up. After the MILF partnered with the government, many young people were disillusioned with the MILF. Their struggle for independence could not materialize after the MILF was co-opted by the government. This is why many young people join Maute with a new hope that Maute can still realize the dreams of these young people. This is the narrative used by young people in the Philippines that they joined Maute because they saw the MILF had partnered with the government and they had no hope for the MILF anymore. However, when there was an attack on Marawi, there was a shift in the narrative of the group that they were involved in a war to establish the caliphate. However, this change in narrative does not change public support for Maute. They help Maute because they have become part of society to fight against the government. Culturally, the feeling of jihad has fused with the community as a result of the Mindanao people's long struggle against the government. Mindanao residents feel that they have been discriminated against so far. Maute also conveyed the narration: "if you are not with us, you are one of them: infidels". This narrative makes people choose to join Maute because they do not want to be considered to be infidels.

With the narrative used by the Maute group, it can be argued that the narrative that may develop in the future is no longer about discrimination or Islam being oppressed or the Muslim community being oppressed, but a narrative against the *thoghut* government. This narrative can be used in all places or countries whose governments do not use Islamic law or God's law. For Southeast Asia, the narrative sells well. They consider *thoghut* governments to exist in all countries in Southeast Asia where most of the population are Muslims. Their resistance can shift from using ideological narratives to narratives against a *thoghut* government.

The Marawi incident is suspected to be a jihadi project of the ISIS group to test the scale of the deployment of jihadist forces in nearby countries at the regional level and Asia at large. Marawi is also where they practice urban warfare by fighting the Philippines, which they consider to be the enemy of Islam. After successful war games in Marawi, they are ready to be dispatched to Syria or other countries that are ISIS targets. As explained in the previous section, the recruitment process for war jihadists takes place through the construction of a distinctive narrative on social media. The Marawi incident has the context of a conflict between Khatibah Masyarik and the Bahrumsyah group, which is an ISIS group from Indonesia in Syria. This has an impact on the dynamics of ISIS in Indonesia. Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) in Indonesia led by Aman Abdurrahman is affiliated with Khatibah Masyarik led by Abu Jandal. It can be

said that the urge for jihad to Marawi came from Bahrumisyah's group. Therefore, it is not surprising that only a few ISIS supporters in Indonesia went to Marawi because of the opposition from this large group from Indonesia (22).

Aman managed to combine various pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. He also recruited many former terrorism convicts from Nusakambangan, such as Abu Musa, Zaenal Anshori (FPI in Lamongan), Muhammad Fachri as the manager of the ISIS internet network, and Khearul Anwar, the leader of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) West Java. Pro-ISIS groups affiliated with the Katibah Nusantara led by Bahrumisyah, many of whom went for jihad to Marawi. Likewise, the East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) group, the Sumatran Khatibul Iman group led by Abu Husna, which is now called Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah, the Syaiful Anam Network alias Brekele were recruited through prison. Meanwhile, the Al-Hawariyun group, Abu Nusaibah, was recruited to send jihadists to Marawi. Syaiful Anam has a strong network related to his background and is affiliated with the MIT group led by Santoso in Poso. He is an old figure within Jamaah Islamiyah (22). The existence of pro-khilafah groups basically benefits from democratization in Indonesia because it is relatively non-repressive. Muslims are also not under colonialism or foreign occupation. The condition is relatively stable politically, there is no social unrest or conflict. Most Muslims in Indonesia are not a minority persecuted by the state. Thus, it is not too surprising that only a small percentage of Muslims who go to Syria become jihadists. This means that although there are a number of narratives calling for war to Marawi, they are always interpreted in relation to Syria. They do this because the narrative that Muslims are oppressed in Syria has become a big narrative that they believe in.

6. Conclusion

The narrative aimed at solidarity with jihad in Marawi, qualitatively has more influence on groups belonging to ISIS, such as Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) as well as the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). As for the Islamic community, such as Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and Neo JI, they are very careful in responding to the events in Marawi, by conducting a survey first. On the basis of the survey, they decided not to help ISIS fighters in Marawi. The reason is that basically JI differs in principle from ISIS — except for those who were originally JI members but later joined ISIS.

This study also finds that individuals who adhere to the interpretation of cultural Islam tend to be more socially liberal and moderate in terms of religious-based politics.

In contrast to individuals who have a high Islamic zeal, those who adhere to a literal or cultural interpretation of Islam have a strong tendency to adopt extreme religious-based political views, both socially and religiously. Narrative factors circulating through social media have the potential to be more influential in the second group. The findings explain that high Islamic zeal has an important role in explaining support for extreme political views, including providing support for carrying out jihad according to the narrative circulating on social media.

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9. Conflict of Interest

The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

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