

Research Article

Infrastructure Service Quality Analysis in Improving Public Trust in South Sorong District

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Abstract.

This study examines the institutional performance of the Indonesian House of Representatives in carrying out its legislative function with a focus on the 2019-2024 period. Using a qualitative approach with thematic analysis, this study identifies factors that influence the effectiveness of the legislative function and explores the internal and external dynamics that shape the performance of the institution. Data were obtained through in-depth interviews with 25 key informants, documentation studies of 40 legislative products, and direct observation of the discussion process of five strategic bills. The results of the study reveal five main themes that influence the performance of the Indonesian House of Representatives: the complexity of the institutional structure, partisan political dynamics, limited technical capacity and research support, weak substantive public participation, and challenges of inter-institutional coordination. Thematic analysis shows that the complexity of the institutional structure and partisan political dynamics are determinant factors that influence other aspects. This study produces a conceptual model that describes the relationship between themes and their impact on legislative performance. The proposed recommendations include institutional structure reform, strengthening technical capacity, increasing substantive public participation, and improving inter-institutional coordination mechanisms. This study contributes to the development of a legislative institutional performance evaluation model that is contextual to the Indonesian political system and provides recommendations for strengthening institutions to improve the quality of legislation.

Keywords: legislative function, institutional performance, formation of laws

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1. Introduction

The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) is a legislative body with the authority to form laws as mandated in Article 20 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. The legislative function is a fundamental pillar in Indonesia's constitutional system, which adheres to the principle of checks and balances. As a representation of people's sovereignty, DPR RI has a constitutional responsibility to produce legislative products that are responsive to community needs, adaptive to developments, and aligned with constitutional values.



Evaluation of parliamentary legislative performance has become an important focus in the study of democratic institutions [1]. Comprehensive legislative performance indicators include not only quantitative aspects such as the number of laws passed, but also qualitative dimensions including substance, deliberation processes, and regulatory impact on public interests [2]. In Indonesia, the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) serves as a planning instrument for law formation as regulated in Law Number 12 of 2011.

Data on the realization of the 2019-2024 Prolegnas shows significant fluctuations in target achievement. Of the 333 targeted bills, 211 bills were successfully passed (63.6%). However, the annual realization percentage shows concerning inconsistency: 2019 (43.64%), 2020 (26.00%), 2021 (20.00%), 2022 (51.79%), 2023 (38.60%), and a dramatic surge in 2024 (186.67%). This pattern reflects an imbalance between legislative planning and execution.

The surge in legislative output in 2024—exceeding 100% of the target—needs critical review. Many laws passed this year relate to adjustments of regional administrative areas rather than substantive or strategic national initiatives. This confirms that legislative quality is not just about quantity but also about substantive significance. Mass production toward the end of the DPR's term raises questions regarding accountability, public participation, and post-enactment policy effectiveness.

Problems lie not only in quantity and consistency of target achievement but also in legislative quality. Constitutional Court statistics show that about 25% of laws passed during this period faced judicial review, with 18 laws declared unconstitutional either partially or entirely (Constitutional Court RI, 2024). The high rate of law annulment reflects a gap between the legislative process and constitutionalism principles.

The complexity of legislative issues in Indonesia is multidimensional. factors affecting legislative performance including institutional, political, capacity, and organizational culture aspects [3], [4], [5], [6]. A comparative study by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (2022) revealed that the legislative process in Indonesia takes an average of 2.3 years to complete one bill, much longer than OECD countries which average 8-12 months.

Institutionally, DPR RI's legislative performance pattern shows that this institution has not been fully optimal in carrying out its legislative function consistently and measurably. The DPR still faces challenges in coordination between commissions and council

complementary instruments, legislative agenda management, and public involvement in the law-making process.

Legislative performance effectiveness is also influenced by executive-legislative relation dynamics. The dominant government coalition relationship in the 2019-2024 DPR RI created a unique phenomenon where the majority of passed bills originated from government initiatives (62.3%), while DPR initiatives were relatively low (37.7%) despite the constitution granting lawmaking authority to the DPR. Public participation in the legislative process is an essential component in a deliberative democratic system. However, a study by the Indonesian Center for Law and Policy Studies (2023) revealed that public participation mechanisms in Indonesia's legislative process remain procedural and formalistic rather than substantive and meaningful.

This research is crucial in the context of strengthening Indonesian democracy. Laws as legislative products have direct implications for community life, investment climate, legal certainty, and human rights protection. Quality legislation is a prerequisite for good governance and achievement of national development goals (World Bank, 2022).

Despite several studies on DPR RI performance, research gaps remain in comprehensive analysis that integrates institutional, political, and capacity factors and formulates evidence-based strengthening strategies. Previous studies tend to focus on quantitative and descriptive aspects without deeply exploring the interconnection between factors that shape DPR RI's legislative performance.

Based on this background, this research aims to analyze the effectiveness of DPR RI's institutional performance in carrying out legislative functions, identify influencing factors, explore interconnections between factors, and formulate institutional strengthening strategies to improve legislative quality in Indonesia. Research results are expected to contribute to strengthening procedural democracy toward substantive democracy through improving national legislative quality.

2. Literature Review

Legislative institutions are formed from formal and informal aspects that affect their structure and function. [7], [8] emphasize that institutions include norms and procedures that shape individual behavior, emphasizes the importance of institutional design for effective coordination that institutions are complex and interdependent systems.[9], [10]. Institutional structures that are too complex hinder legislative efficiency, in contrast

to adaptive institutions that produce better performance. So a parliamentary evaluation framework including representation, oversight, legislation, and transparency, to develop the Parliamentary Powers Index which shows that democratic country parliaments have a higher index [11], [12], [13], [14]. the importance of public participation in the legislative process to strengthen legitimacy and improve the quality of substance. classified the level of participation from manipulation to citizen control. Seceral studies show that public participation in Indonesia is often tokenistic and not substantive [15], [16], [17], [18].

That parliamentarians act based on calculations of political interests[19], legislators face a dilemma between constituent interests, party loyalty, and policy considerations [19], [20], [21], [22]. that post-New Order reforms resulted in the strengthening of partisan politics in the DPR which created challenges in legislative consensus.

In a presidential system like Indonesia the importance of a balance of power between the executive and legislative [23]. Because that the lack of synchronization between the two institutions can cause deadlock in the legislative process [24]. that although a coordination mechanism has been established [25], in practice there is often a lack of synchronization that hinders the efficiency of the legislative process.

Additional references relevant to furthering this material include [1]work on patterns of democracy and the differences between parliamentary and presidential systems, and [26], [27]research on the impact of public participation on the quality of legislation in contemporary democracies.

3. Methods

type of research is a literature review with a qualitative approach in a systemic review . This method is used to synthesize (summarize) the results of primary research that is descriptive qualitative in nature with the aim of integrating data to obtain new theories or concepts at a deep and comprehensive level of knowledge[28]. The steps of a qualitative systematic review are (1) formulating research questions; (2) conducting a systematic literature search; (3) filtering and selecting articles that are considered suitable for researchers; (4) carrying out the stages of analyzing and synthesizing the findings; (5) using quality control ; (6) compiling a final report[29].

This method uses a meta-aggression approach in synthesizing results that aim to provide solutions to research questions by combining the research results obtained as

a whole (summarizing). When conducting meta-synthesis (qualitative data synthesis) there are two approaches taken, namely the approach with the terms meta-aggression and meta- ethnography [30].

The theory used as an analytical tool in this study is the theory of Korten & Syahrir that public services, especially infrastructure services in the regions, are said to be of quality if they meet the characteristics. The characteristics in question are if the service is the same and even between all services provided to service recipients. Providing services in a timely manner and being able to meet the expectations of service recipients. The need for service innovation so that the services provided are sustainable and progressive[31].

3.1. Methods

This study uses a qualitative approach with a case study method in the 2019-2024 DPR RI period, collecting data through in-depth interviews with 25 key informants (DPR members, experts, Secretariat officials, and experts), documentation studies of 40 legislative products and related documents, direct observation of the discussion of strategic bills, and three Focus Group Discussion sessions involving academics, civil society organizations, and legal practitioners. Data were analyzed using thematic analysis through three stages of coding (open, axial, and selective) with the help of NVivo 14 software, maintaining validity and reliability through triangulation, member checking, peer debriefing, and audit trails, and paying attention to research ethics including informed consent, informant confidentiality, secure data storage, and accurate reporting without bias.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Thematic Analysis: Main Themes

Thematic analysis of the research data produced five main themes that explain the dynamics of the DPR RI institutional performance in the formation of legislation. Which was created through the process of coding interview results, then through axial coding and then through the selective coding process, bringing up 5 main things, namely (1) Complexity of Institutional Structure, (2) Dynamics of Partisan Politics (3) Ideological Polarization (4) Public Participation and Openness, and (5) Coordination between Institutions

1. Complexity of Institutional Structure

This theme refers to the complex institutional structure of the DPR RI which influences the efficiency of the legislative process. Figure 1 shows a visualization of this theme.




Figure 1: Coding Process of Theme 1.

a. Overlapping Authority

Overlapping authority between the Legislative Body (Baleg) and the commission creates ambiguity and duplication in the process of discussing the bill. This was expressed by several informants:

“There is often duplication of discussion between Baleg and the commission that is actually unnecessary. Sometimes the results of Baleg harmonization are even questioned again at the commission level.” (Informant 3, Member of Commission III)

b. Fragmentation of Decision Making

The decision-making structure that is spread across various levels and DPR supporting tools results in a long and complicated process. Document analysis shows that one bill must go through at least 14 decision-making points before being passed.

“For just one small decision, it must go through 5-6 stages of approval. This makes the process very long and inefficient.” (Informant 12, Official of the Secretariat General of the DPR RI)

c. Procedural Rigidity

Rigid and inflexible work procedures hinder adaptability in dealing with varying legislative needs. Observations on the bill discussion process show that the same procedure is applied to all types of bills, regardless of their complexity and urgency.

“Rigid rules make it difficult for us to adapt to situations that require quick handling. Simple bills that should be completed in 1-2 months still have to go through the same process as complex bills.” (Informant 7, Baleq Member)

Analysis of the axial coding stage shows that these three sub-themes influence and reinforce each other. Overlapping authority exacerbates fragmentation of decision-making, while procedural rigidity makes both problems difficult to overcome. The selective coding phase integrates these sub-themes into the core theme of “Institutional Structure Complexity” which is a determinant factor that influences the efficiency of the legislative process. The consequences of this theme on legislative performance include slow processes, low efficiency, and limited legislative results.

2. Partisan Political Dynamics

This theme illustrates how partisan political considerations influence the legislative process. Figure 2 shows a visualization of this theme..




Figure 2: Coding Process of Theme 2.

a. Transactional Politics

Negotiation practices and “bartering” support between factions often dominate substantive discussions of bills. Observations of the discussion process show a pattern of political transactions where support for one bill is exchanged for support for another bill or another issue desired by a particular faction.

“Several strategic bills are often hampered not because of substance, but because of the tug-of-war of interests. Factions sometimes prioritize political positioning over the quality of legislation.” (Informant 7, Faction Expert)

b. Dominance of Electoral Interests

Electoral and constituency considerations greatly influence the priority of legislation and the substance of bills. Analysis of documentation of bill discussions shows that bills that have high visibility and direct impact on constituents tend to receive higher priority.

“Approaching the election, legislative priorities often shift to issues that are popular and visible to constituents, not based on policy urgency.” (Informant 15, Public Policy Expert)

c. Ideological Polarization

Ideological differences between factions create difficulties in reaching consensus, especially on sensitive issues such as religion, employment, and land. Observations show that discussions on bills that touch on ideological issues tend to take longer and result in minimal compromise.

“On sensitive issues, ideological polarization is very obvious. Even after months of discussion, the result is often the status quo or minimal compromise that does not resolve the main issue.” (Informant 20, CSO Representative)

The selective coding phase integrated these sub-themes into the core theme of “Partisan Political Dynamics” which has a significant impact on the substance and priorities of legislation. The consequences of this theme include neglected substance, obstacles to consensus, and the dominance of political considerations over public policy interests.

3. Technical Capacity and Research Support

This theme refers to the limitations in technical capacity and research support to produce quality legislation. Figure 3 shows a visualization of this theme.




Figure 3: Coding Process of Theme 3.

a. Limited Research Human Resources

The inadequate number and capacity of parliamentary researchers is an obstacle in providing technical support for the legislative process. Data shows that the ratio of researchers to members of the DPR is 1:6, much lower than other countries’ parliaments which have a ratio of 1:1 or 1:2.

“The team of experts is still very limited in number, while the work is very much. One researcher can handle 3-4 bills at once, which of course has an impact on quality.” (Informant 9, Commission Expert)

b. Access to Data and Information

Challenges in obtaining accurate and comprehensive data hinder the preparation of academic papers and evidence-based bills. This limited access includes government data, the latest research results, and international best practices.

“We often have difficulty obtaining the latest data from the ministry to support the preparation of academic papers. The bureaucratic process of requesting data can take months.” (Informant 11, Parliamentary Researcher)

c. Utilization of Research Results

The gap between research recommendations and the substance of the bill reflects the weak integration of research results in the legislative process. Analysis of academic papers and bills shows that often substantive recommendations in academic papers are not reflected in the articles of the bill.

“Academic papers are often prepared in a hurry due to time and resource constraints. In fact, NA should be a solid empirical and theoretical basis for the law.” (Informant 19, Constitutional Law Expert)

The selective coding phase integrated these sub-themes into the core theme of “Technical Capacity and Research Support” which contributes to the quality of the substance of legislation. The consequences of this theme include the weak empirical basis of the law, the prevalence of non-empirical policies, and the high number of judicial reviews.

4. Public Participation and Transparency

This theme refers to the challenges in integrating substantive public participation into the legislative process. Figure 4 shows a visualization of this theme.




Figure 4: Coding Process of Theme 4.

a. Participation Formalism

Public engagement is often procedural rather than substantive, with little evidence that public input is considered in changing the substance of the bill. Analysis of the

minutes of the RDPU shows that although much input is received, very little actually changes the substance of the bill.

“RDPU is often just a formality. Public input is rarely reflected in changes to the substance of the bill. This frustrates stakeholders because they feel they are not being heard.” (Informant 23, Civil Society Representative)

b. Limited Consultation Time

Inadequate time allocation for public participation limits the opportunity for various stakeholders to provide input. Data shows that the average time between the announcement of the RDPU and its implementation is only 3-5 days, which is too short for adequate preparation.

“The time given for the public to provide input is very short, only 2-3 days. Even for complex bills such as the Job Creation Bill, public consultation is very limited.” (Informant 21, Academic)

c. Transparency of Discussion

Limited public access to the substantive deliberation process creates a 'black box' in the legislative process. Observations show that many substantive discussions are conducted in informal meetings that are not open to the public.

“Many discussions of the bill are conducted behind closed doors. The public has difficulty accessing information on the discussion process. This makes it difficult for us to monitor the substance.” (Informant 23, Civil Society Representative)

The selective coding phase integrated these sub-themes into the core theme of “Public Participation and Transparency” which influences the legitimacy of legislative outcomes. The consequences of this theme include low legitimacy of laws, stakeholder dissatisfaction, and laws that are not aspirational.

5. Inter-Institutional Coordination

This theme reflects the pattern of working relationships between the Indonesian House of Representatives and the government in the legislative process. Figure 5 shows a visualization of this theme.

a. Schedule Inconsistency

The difficulty in aligning the agendas of the DPR RI and the government often causes delays in discussions and delays in the process. Analysis of meeting schedule documentation shows that around 40% of DPR-Government working meetings are postponed or canceled due to schedule inconsistencies.




Figure 5: Coding Process of Theme 5.

“Scheduling of coordination meetings is often hampered by difficulties in aligning the agendas of the DPR and the government.” (Informant 8, DPR RI Secretariat Official)

b. Unclear Government Position

Differences in views between ministries/institutions often hamper the discussion process due to the inconsistency of the government's position. Observations at working meetings show differences of opinion between ministries that have not been consolidated before the meeting with the DPR.

“Differences in views between ministries often become an obstacle in discussing the bill. Sometimes we have agreed with one ministry, but are rejected by another ministry.”
(Informant 4, Member of Commission II)

c. Delays in Harmonization

Challenges in aligning legislative and executive perspectives result in a long harmonization process. Analysis of the harmonization process flow shows that the average time required for harmonization was 4.3 months, which took almost 25% of the total time for discussing the bill.

“The absence of ministerial-level officials in discussing the bill delayed the decision-making process. Often the ministerial representatives who were present did not have the authority to decide.” (Informant 4, Member of Commission III)

The selective coding phase integrated these sub-themes into the core theme of “Coordination between Institutions” which affects the efficiency and quality of the legislative process. The consequences of this theme include obstructed processes, delays in legislation, and compromised quality of legislation.

4.2. Coding Integration Matrix

The following is a matrix that illustrates the process of coding integration in thematic analysis, showing definitions, inputs, processes, outputs, and examples for each stage of the analysis:

TABLE 1: Coding Integration Matrix in Thematic Analysis.

Analysis Stage	Definition	Input	Process	Output
1. Open Coding	Identification of initial codes from raw data	Interview transcription data, documents, observation notes	Reading data repeatedly, identifying meaningful units, labeling/coding	300+ initial codes
2. Axial Coding	Development of categories and relationships between categories	Initial codes from open coding	Grouping codes, identifying categories, analyzing relationships between categories	15 main categories with subcategories
3. Selective Coding	Integration of core themes and development of conceptual models	Categories from axial coding	Integrating categories into themes, identifying core themes, developing conceptual models	5 main themes and conceptual model
Theme 1: Complexity of Institutional Structure	Complex institutional structure of the DPR RI with overlapping authorities, fragmentation of decision-making, and procedural rigidity	50+ initial codes → 3 main categories	Integrating categories related to structure and procedures	Core themes with theoretical propositions
Theme 2: Dynamics of Partisan Politics	Partisan political considerations that dominate the legislative process, often ignoring considerations of legal substance	60+ initial codes → 3 main categories	Integrating categories related to politics and motivation	Themes with theoretical propositions
Theme 3: Technical Capacity and Research Support	Limited technical capacity and research support that impact the quality of legislation produced	50+ initial codes → 3 main categories	Integrating categories related to HR and research	Themes with theoretical propositions

TABLE 1: Continued.

Analysis Stage	Definition	Input	Process	Output
Theme 4: Public Participation and Transparency	Formalistic public participation and limited transparency reduce the legitimacy of legislative outcomes	70+ initial codes → 3 main categories	Integrating categories related to participation and transparency	Themes with theoretical propositions
Theme 5: Inter-Institutional Coordination	Weak coordination between institutions causes delays in the process and a decline in the quality of legislation	45+ initial codes → 3 main categories	Integrating categories related to coordination	Themes with theoretical propositions
Integrated Conceptual Model	Integration of the five themes shows the relationship between factors that influence the legislative performance of the DPR RI	5 main themes with theoretical propositions	Analyzing relationships between themes, identifying causal relationships	Conceptual model with overarching theoretical propositions

4.3. Thematic Map of Interrelationships between Themes

Thematic analysis not only identifies the main themes separately, but also explores the interrelationships between themes. Figure 6 shows a thematic map that illustrates the relationship between themes and their impact on the legislative performance of the Indonesian House of Representatives.

1. Core Relationships and Determinants:

- Complexity of Institutional Structure and Partisan Political Dynamics (bold lines) have a strong and direct influence on the legislative performance of the Indonesian House of Representatives, indicating their role as determinant factors.

- Technical Capacity, Public Participation, and Inter-Institutional Coordination (medium lines) have a moderate influence on legislative performance.

2. Causal Relationships between Themes:

- Complexity of Institutional Structure affects Partisan Political Dynamics, limits Technical Capacity, and complicates Inter-Institutional Coordination.




Figure 6: The thematic map reveals several important patterns of relationships.

- Partisan Political Dynamics limits Public Participation and affects Inter-Institutional Coordination.
 - Technical Capacity affects the quality of Public Participation.
 - Public Participation and Inter-Institutional Coordination influence each other.
3. Consequences on Legislative Performance:
- Complex interactions between themes impact four aspects of legislative performance: low realization of Prolegnas, low process efficiency, declining quality of legislation, and weak product legitimacy.

This thematic map provides a holistic understanding of how various factors interact in shaping the institutional performance of the Indonesian House of Representatives in the formation of legislation.

4.4. Discuss

The results of the study reveal the complex dynamics that shape the institutional performance of the Indonesian House of Representatives in its legislative function. This section discusses the research findings in the context of relevant theories and their implications.

Institutional Structure and Legislative Efficiency

The finding that the complexity of the institutional structure is a determining factor that influences the efficiency of the legislative process is in line with the institutional theory. The complex institutional structure of the Indonesian House of Representatives with overlapping authorities, fragmentation of decision-making, and procedural rigidity creates “institutional friction” that hinders the efficiency of the process. This is also that institutional structures that are too complex and rigid tend to hinder the effectiveness of parliament. However, the findings of this study provide a contextual nuance in the Indonesian political system, where structural complexity is not only a matter of efficiency, but also a manifestation of accommodation and consensus politics that are characteristic of post-reform Indonesian democracy. The theoretical implication of this finding is the need to rethink the design of legislative institutions that balance the need for broad representation (which drives complexity) with the need for process efficiency. Institutional design perspective offers a framework for analyzing how institutional structures can be engineered to support effective coordination and collaboration [12], [14], [28].

Political Dynamics and Legislative Substance

The finding of the dominance of partisan political considerations over policy substance strengthens the theory of rational choice in legislative politics. DPR members tend to act based on calculations of political interests, both related to electoral positioning and party loyalty, which often override substantive considerations about the quality of legislation. A classic study of legislator behavior identified the dilemma between constituent interests, party loyalty, and policy considerations [29]. The findings of this study indicate that in the Indonesian context, partisan and electoral political considerations often dominate policy considerations [30]. This shows that although formally the DPR has a representation and legislative function, in practice the political representation function tends to sacrifice the quality of the legislative function. The theoretical implication of this finding is the need to integrate a political perspective in the analysis of legislative performance. Performance evaluation that only focuses on technical and procedural aspects without considering political dynamics will result in an incomplete understanding [31].

Technical Capacity and Legislative Quality

The findings on limited technical capacity and research support that impact the quality of legislation are consistent with Sherlock's (2010) study of the [32]. Although the DPR has strong formal authority in the legislative function, limited institutional

capacity hinders the effective implementation of this function. This finding broadens the understanding of the institutional capacity of parliament. Capacity is not only about the number of human resources, but also related to the knowledge management system, access to information, and integration of research results in the legislative process. The “knowledge management in parliament” framework developed by [1], [33] offers a useful perspective for understanding how parliament can improve its technical capacity.

Public Participation and Legislative Legitimacy

The finding that formalistic and non-substantive public participation has an impact on the legitimacy of legislative outcomes [34]) participation theory. The practice of public participation in the legislative process of the Indonesian House of Representatives tends to be at the “tokenism” level on Arnstein’s participation ladder, where participation is carried out as a formality without a guarantee that input will be seriously considered.

This is also consistent with the study by [35] which shows that although formal mechanisms for participation have been established, their implementation is often not substantive. However, this study provides a more detailed understanding of the factors that limit substantive participation, including limited consultation time, limited transparency of discussions, and partisan political influence.

The theoretical implication of this finding is the need to develop a model of public participation in the legislative process that does not only focus on the presence or absence of formal mechanisms, but also on the quality and substantive impact of participation [36].

Inter-Institutional Coordination and Legislative Effectiveness

The finding that weak inter-institutional coordination causes delays in the process and a decrease in the quality of legislation strengthens the theory of checks and balances in the presidential system [37]. In a presidential system with a division of powers such as Indonesia, coordination between the executive and legislative is a crucial factor in the effectiveness of the legislative process.

the division of powers in the presidential system shows that the lack of synchrony between the executive and legislative can cause deadlock in the legislative process. The findings of this study enrich the understanding of specific forms of lack of synchrony in the Indonesian context, including schedule lack of synchrony, unclear government positions, and delegation problems [38], [39].

The theoretical implication of this finding is the need to develop an analytical framework that integrates aspects of the executive-legislative relationship in evaluating parliamentary performance, especially in the legislative function.

Conceptual Model of the DPR RI Institutional Performance in the Legislative Function

Based on the thematic map produced, this study proposes a conceptual model of the DPR RI institutional performance in the legislative function. This model identifies two determinant factors (institutional structural complexity and partisan political dynamics) and three supporting factors (technical capacity, public participation, and inter-institutional coordination) that shape legislative performance. This model makes a theoretical contribution by integrating institutional, political, capacity, participatory, and coordination perspectives into one analytical framework. This broadens the understanding of parliamentary institutional performance which is often fragmented across theoretical perspectives.

In practice, this model provides a framework for identifying strategic intervention points to improve legislative performance. The model indicates that interventions on determinant factors (especially institutional structural complexity) will have a broader impact because they affect other factors.

5. Conclusion

Research on the legislative performance of the 2019-2024 Indonesian House of Representatives identified five main factors that hinder effectiveness: the complexity of institutional structures that cause overlapping authority; partisan political dominance that ignores substance; limited technical capacity and research support that weakens the academic basis; formalistic public participation that reduces legitimacy; and weak coordination between institutions. The impact is reflected in the low realization of the Prolegnas (34.27%), slow legislative process (an average of 18.7 months per bill), and high judicial review (24.71%). Recommendations for improvement include rationalizing the discussion flow, strengthening technical capacity, increasing substantive public participation, and improving coordination between institutions, with a further research agenda including comparative, quantitative, and implementation studies. The implications of this research show the importance of a holistic approach to legislative institutional reform, where improvements to formal structures must be accompanied by a transformation of political culture and strengthening substantive capacity. These

findings provide an empirical basis for policymakers to design more comprehensive parliamentary reforms, as well as highlighting the urgency of strengthening public participation as a foundation for democratic legitimacy. For practitioners and academics, this study underscores the need for more systematic and evidence-based periodic evaluation of legislative performance, with indicators that cover not only productivity but also the quality and inclusiveness of the legislative process.

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