

Research Article

Collaborative Governance in Forest and Land Fire Control Policies in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency

Ardhi Tomiyansyah

Public Administration Doctoral Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Sriwijaya University

ORCIDArdhi Tomiyansyah: <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-5209-1794>**Abstract.**

The government has carried out collaborations with the private sector and the public, but the fires remain or has not been able to be minimized. This research aims to analyze how the governance is collaborative in forest and land fire control policy in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency. The collaborative governance theory used is the Donahue and Zeckhauser theories. The analysis in this research is collaboration in the sense of a process, starting from the initial condition, establishing collaboration, and designing collaboration. It is closely related to the process of policymaking and policy analysis, that is, from agenda formulation to policy formulation to policy adoption. The research design uses qualitative descriptive research, with research informants from government and private elements. Based on the results of the research and findings in the field related to collaboration relationships, collaboration carried out between government, private, and public has various shortcomings, such as less active collaboration, compliance in nature, and unstable stability in its cooperation. There is a tendency for some non-governmental parties who want discretion of profit preference, so collaboration as a whole possess risks, namely reputational and dependence on the private.

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1. Introduction

Even though South Sumatra Province has the most hotspots and widespread fires, forest and land fires are one of the most common incidents in Ogan Komering Ilir regency. The disaster has a number of effects, including smoke clouds, hazardous smoke, and economic losses. The Government of Ogan Komering Ilir has issued Regulation No. 23 of 2016 on the Forest and Land Fire Control System in Ogan Komering Ilir regency, which includes the empowerment of the community and the restriction of enterprises (private sector) to control forest fires in order to minimize the occurrence of forest and land fires.

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The companies also have a significant role to play in the prevention of forest and land fires, in addition to the local government. Additionally, it is consistent with Inpres number 11 from 2015. The company as one of the human actors in the prevention of forest and land fires [3], and as one of the forest fire interest actors [10]. The government must rely on resources beyond what it already has. One of the factors requiring cooperation between multiple parties, including government, private, and public entities, is capacity and financial restrictions. The government needs to rely on capacity beyond its current capacity. Capacity and budget constraints are one of the reasons for the need for cooperation between various parties, both government and private. Also, in the case of forest and land fire control, when the government has done its utmost and the results achieved are not optimal with the use of existing resources, then the government of Ogan Komering Ilir is collaborating. UNDP stated that the main elements involved in the organization of governance consisted of the state, the private sector, and civil society organizations [2]. For that, at least collaboration between the government and the private sector is necessary when it is necessary to involve the public in order to unite opinions and the interests of the parties so that the desired results can be achieved.

Collaboration in forest and land fire control, once formulated, has also been implemented. Decision No. 373/BPBD-OKI/2016, dated May 10, 2016, on the Forest and Land Fire Control Coordination Team of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency mentions the actors involved in forest and land fire control, starting with prevention efforts, countermeasures, and post-management. The company has been involved in the collaboration. In addition, the community has also participated, through the Fire Care Society (MPA) or the Fire Care Farmers Group (KTPA), for example, the MPA of the Cintajaya Village of Pedamaran district, with as many as 1 team and a total of 10 staff members. In collaboration, the three elements have played their respective roles.

In 2019, forest and land fires were still one of the most frequently discussed, while in 2016–2018, the occurrence of forest and ground fires in South Sumatra could be minimized, whereas at that time, South Sumatra targeted zero smoke in order to support the implementation of ASEAN Games 2018. Ogan Komering Ilir Regency remains one of south Sumatra's largest smoke contributors; this can be seen based on the 2019 year-round hotspot data, the Air Polluter Standard Index (ISPU) report, and the emergency response status, which has normally since 2015 been on every forest fire incident and land is only on the emergency status. The government has carried out collaborations with the private sector and the public, but the fires remain or have not been able to be minimized. Based on this problem description, the researchers conducted collaborative governance research, involving collaboration between the government, corporations

(private), and the public in forest and land fire control policy in Ogan Komering Ilir regency.

2. Methods

The study aims to analyzed how collaboratative governance in forest and land fire control policies in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency, both in the phases of prevention, control, and post-management. The method used is qualitative with a descriptive approach. The analysis was done using Donahue and Zeckhauser's theory of collaborative governance. The informants were determined purposefully, from governmental elements (BPBD OKI, DLH OKI, Disbunnak OKI, Distan OKI, and head of district), and the company. Data collection through in-depth interviews, documentation, and observations at several planting companies. The researchers were also directly involved with the research objects continuously and sustainably so that they could dig deeper. The role of the researcher in this study was that of an officer at the Distan OKI who participates in the post-treatment. This involvement then raises a series of strategic, ethical, and personal issues in the qualitative process.

3. Result And Discussion

The regional and socio-cultural conditions have led the high number of forest and land fires seen widely and the efforts made by the government of Ogan Komering Ilir county to minimize such incidents by inviting non-governmental parties (both the private sector and the public) together, in collaboration, in forest and ground fire control activities. In line with, who exemplify in sustainable forest management that inter-actor collaboration is the key to its success [10], which needs to be taken seriously to improve government performance, is one of the eight agendas reinventing local government: collaboration [9].

3.1. Reasons of collaborative

After the fires of 2015, BPBD OKI involved such companies as plantations and forest industrial crops because they had the goal of keeping the were within their permits from burning. The Government of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency issued Regulations of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency No. 23 of 2016 on Forest and Land Fire Control System, published on May 27, 2016, in which the role of external parties was mentioned. In

article 3, paragraph (1), the organization executing forest and land fire control (dalka-rhutla) consists of one of them, MPA/RKDT/KTMPA/DMPA, and article 31 relates to the empowerment of the community. In addition, the Government of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency issued Decision No. 373/BPBD-OKI/2016 concerning the Forest and Land Fire Control Coordination Team, published on May 10, 2016, in which the organization structure of the team has involved not only BPBD Kab. OKI, such as Polres OKI, Kodim 0402/OKI, Manggala Agni, related OPDs that exist in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency, the company party, and MPA/RKDT/KTMPA/DMPA. The collaboration carried out because of the disaster was a joint responsibility, not only the government wants to get legitimacy from the public, even though BPBD.

Engaging the private sector could generate more resources for public interests. Resources in this case could relate to the equipment BPBD owns in both quantity and quality, means and supplies, and budget availability. The government deficit could be covered by the private sector. Collaboration has carried out in the forest and land fire prevention and management phases in order to generate more resources for public use, although such reasons are not found in the post forest and land fires treatment phase.

When governments did not have the information that was critical to achieving public goals and private actors did, collaboration was a necessity, not an option. Going alone meant traveling blind. This was not the case if the government can easily obtain the necessary information. Collaboration to share information, which is currently in the midst of information technology advances, could be done either through WhatsApp, although sometimes there are parties either inside the government or on the non-governmental side that may, for some reason, find it difficult to provide certain information that could be useful in the smooth running of routine activities. The government of Ogan Komering Ilir regency was implemented collaboration with the non-governmental sector for various reasons, ranging from the cause of the disaster to shared responsibility, more resources, and sharing information, even though these reasons have not yet reached the reason to increase productivity.

3.2. An equalization of comprehension

Once the government saw need to involve the private sector and the public, it began discussed the importance of the matter with stakeholders, discussing establishing collaboration in forest and land fire control. BPBD, in its implementation, did not force

TABLE 1: List of Private Companies of Agricultural Enterprises, Industrial Plant Forests and Toll Manager in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency.

NO	DATA BY BPBD OKI	DATA BY DINAS PERTANAHAN OKI
1	-	PT. Selatan Agro Makmur Lestari (SAML)
2	PT. Persada Sawit Mas	PT. Persada Sawit Mas (PSM)
3	PT. Sriwijaya Palm Oil Indonesia	PT. Sriwijaya Palm Oil Indonesia (SPOI)
4	PT. Waimusi Agro Indah	PT. Waimusi Agro Indah (WAI)
5	-	PT. Cipta Sentosa Usaha Bumi (CSUB)
6	PT. Kelantan Sakti	PT. Kelantan Sakti
7	PT. Gading Cempaka Graha	PT. Gading Cempaka Graha (GCG)
8	PT. Waringin Agro Jaya	PT. Waringin Agro Jaya (WAJ)
9	PT. Rambang Agro Jaya	PT. Rambang Agro Jaya (RAJ)
10	PT. Tempirai Palm Resources	PT. Tempirai Palm Resources (TPR)
11	PT. Bailunggu Capital Investment	PT. Bailunggu Capital Investment (BCI)
12	-	PT. Lampung Karya Indah (LKI)
13	-	PT. Kosindo Supratama
14	PT. Bumi Katulistiwa Mandiri	PT. Bumi Katulistiwa Mandiri (BKM)
15	-	PT. Sun Sawit
16	-	PT. Pulau Subur
17	-	PT. Everplus Bio Energy/PT. MSS
18	PT. Ricky Agrindo Sejahtera	PT. Ricky Agrindo Sejahtera (RAS)
19	-	PT. Kirana Yudha Amandari (KYA)
20	-	PT. Gading Dwi Jayanti (GDJ)
21	PT. Treekreasi Marga Mulia	PT. Treekreasi Marga Mulia (TMM)
22	PT. Sumber Wangi Alam	PT. Sumber Wangi Alam (SWA)
23	-	PT. Tunas Inti Agro Nusa (TIAN)
24	PT. Tania Selatan	PT. Tania Selatan
25	PT. Buluh Cawang Plantation	PT. Buluh Cawang Plantation (BCP)
26	-	PT. Sinar Sasongko
27	PT. Sentosa Agri Prima	PT. Sentosa Agri Prima (SAP)
28	PT. London Sumatera Tbk	PT. London Sumatera Tbk
29	-	PT. Sawit Menang Sejahtera (SMS)
30	PT. Russelindo Putra Prima	PT. Russelindo Putra Prima (RPP)
31	PT. Mutiara Bunda Jaya	PT. Mutiara Bunda Jaya (MBJ)
32	PT. Sawit Selatan	PT. Sawit Selatan
33	PT. Sampoerna Agro Tbk	PT. Sampoerna Agro Tbk
34	PT. Selatan Jaya Permai	PT. Selatan Jaya Permai (SJP)

TABLE 1: Continued.

NO	DATA BY BPBD OKI	DATA BY DINAS PERTANAHAN OKI
35	PT. Gunung Tua Abadi	PT. Gunung Tua Abadi (GTA)
36	PT. Telaga Hikmah	PT. Telaga Hikmah
37	PT. Aek Tarum	PT. Aek Tarum
38	PT. Bina Sawit Makmur	PT. Bina Sawit Makmur (BSM)
39	PT Tania Binatama	tidak ada lagi perusahaan ini
40	-	PT. Segula Energi Sawit (SES)
41	-	PT. Patri Sawit Lestari (PSL)
42	PT. Dinamika Graha Sarana	PT. Dinamika Graha Sarana (DGS)
43	PT. Samora Usaha Jaya	PT. Samora Usaha Jaya (SUJ)
44	PT. Pratama Nusantara Sakti	PT. Pratama Nusantara Sakti (PNS)
45	-	PT. Bintang Harapan Palma (BHP)
46	PT. Prana Graha Multi Darma	PT. Prana Graha Multi Darma
47	PT. Bumi Andalas Permai	PT. Bumi Andalas Permai (BAP)
48	PT. Bumi Mekar Hijau	PT. Bumi Mekar Hijau (BMH)
49	PT. SBA Wood Industry	PT. SBA Wood Industry (SBA)
50	PT. Paramitra Mulia Langgeng	PT. Paramitra Mulia Langgeng (PML)
51	PT. Waskita Sriwijaya Tol	PT. Waskita Sriwijaya Tol (WST)

Source: BPBD OKI and Distan OKI, 2020

the private parties collaborated. BPBD, through a meeting forum, first implements compromised with non-governmental parties, asked opinions, advised, and input, ensured alignment of interests, made equalization of understanding, and socializes collaboration. Every stakeholder in Ogan Komering Ilir regency has the desire, determination, and commitment to cooperate in the phases of prevention, management/extinguishment, and post-treatment in forest and forest control. The private sector considers the collaboration to be good for implementation and can be applied. Although it was found that meetings conducted were less effective because the BPBD was conducted only once a year, the company's understanding of collaboration in control was limited to prevention and countermeasures; it has not yet fully understood related collaborations in post-treatment, and commitments in the field are still limited to focusing on counterfeiting (fire extinguishing).

In writing, the Government of Ogan Komering Ilir regency in 2016 regulated the collaboration with private parties and the public, as well as the division of duties and responsibilities in forest and land fire control, both prevention, extinguishment, and post-management, through the Decision of the Regent Ogan Komering Illir No. 23

Year 2016 on Forest and Land Fire Control System Ogan Komering Ilir District and the Decision of the Bupati Ogan Komering Ilir Number 373/BPBD-OKI/2016 on the Coordination Team for Forest and Lands Fire Control. Despite the eye, there was a little confusion in giving the date of the decision, May 10, 2016, which, according to the decision, was published after the existence of the regulation, May 27, 2016. The division of duties and responsibilities in forest and land fire control cooperation at the stage of prevention, suppression, and post-management, as a reflection of the regulations of the forest, has been promoted through the formation of teams for collaboration, which is contained in Decision No. 373/BPBD-OKI/2016. I was impressed by the creation of the Task Unit through Decision No. 263/KEP/BPDB/2018, whereas the actors involved are just that and their duties as well as their responsibilities. Why should there be different decisions for the same duty and responsibility? There has been a division of duties and responsibilities in the implementation of forest and land fire control collaboration in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency, commonly referred to as the right man in the right place, but the existing structure is only rich, fat, and has poor function.

3.3. Mapping Collaborative Governance

There are many potential dimensions where collaborative governance could be defined. According to [4, 5], there were six instructive dimensions: participant, formality, duration, focus, stability, and discretion. Collaborative relationships must involve diverse participants, comprising at least one governmental institution and one non-governmental institution. In line with Ansell and Gash's opinion participants in collaborative governance included non-governmental organizations [11].

Analyzed the data from the five firms in Table 3.2 above, it becomes cleared that for the control of forest and land fires, in particular, the dismantling of the number of non-governmental people reached a thousand, both built by companies and the government. Additionally, the number of farming enterprises in this district is 45, as stated in Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture No. 5 of 2018 on Opening and/or Treating of Farmland Without Burning. The estimated number of employees needed to control forest and land fires can be very high. However, in general, the number of ground and forest fires that started in 2019 was still relatively high. It appears that the number of employees estimated on paper

Based on primary data, secondary data, and observations, it was determined that it was necessary to distinguish between collaborations that had already taken place and those that had not yet taken place. Government collaboration with the private sector is

TABLE 2: RPK, MPA, KTPA, dan Volunteers Formation.

Team / Unit	Person Responsible	Number of Personnel	Location (District)
Company Fire Brigade (RPK)	PT. BMH PT. SBA PT. BAP PT. GCG	189 135 223 30	Pangkalan Lampam, Tulung Selapan, Sungai Menang, Cengal, Air Sugihan, Kayuagung (sepucuk)
Fire Care Society (MPA)	Manggala Agni and OPD PT. BMH PT. SBA PT. GCG	360 225 58 32	Air Sugihan, Kayuagung, Pedamaran, Pedamaran Timur, Pangkalan Lampam, Tulung Selapan
Fire Care Farmers Group (KTPA)	Disbunnak dan PT. Sampoerna Agro	181	Tulung Selapan, Kayuagung, Pangkalan Lampam, Mesuji Raya, Mesuji, Lempuing Jaya, Sungai Menang, Cengal, and Pedamaran Timur
Disaster Task Force Volunteers from 17 districts Disaster Tough Village Volunteers (Destana)	BPBD	30 85 150	Kayuagung 17 Districts (except Cengal) Pangkalan Lampam, Pedamaran and Tanjung Lubuk
Amount		1.698	

Source : BPBD, 2018

expected to run on 35 companies, but only 32 companies, and two of its companies (PT. Bailunggu Capital Investment and PT. Prana Graha Multi Darma) did not run due to collapse, and one company has died of license (PT. Tania Binatama). Collaboration on prevention and mitigation has not touched 15 other companies, out of a total of 50 actually existing companies.

Only a part of the companies were active in forest and land fire control collaboration; even worse, there is a statement keroyokan that in its implementation is only a slogan; in the field, there are only BPBD, TNI, Polri, Manggala Agni, and Company Fore Brigade (RPK) of certain companies. In the preventive phase, there are only those who feel they have been involved, some who feel the most active, others who say they have done this, that, and so on, while it's just a mode. Some have stated that they are actively communicating jointly with Manggala Agni in forest and land fire control, and their purpose is to collaborate so that they can help if there is a fire (PT. TIAN); some have stated that they have a plan with the government to form an MPA; and often follow the socialization of the collaborative system organized by the Government of Ogan Komering Ilir (PT. SES). However, based on secondary data and observations, the three companies were never included by the BPBD and were not included in the list of companies that exist in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency.

In the fire extinguishing phase, RPK was active in only 3 companies : Sinar Mas, PT. RAJ, and PT. TPR; and 8 companies: Sampoerna, PT. GCG, PT. PNS, and PT. SAP. At this stage, it was found that there were parties that did not or have not collaborated but also did not fulfill their obligations related to forest and land fires, i.e., perform extinguishment when burned (PT. MSS); no company officials could be found when the fire was extinguished by members of TNI. (PT. TIAN).




Figure 1: collaboration member. Source : data processed by researcher, 2020.

In the post-treatment phase, in 2018, the Investigation Team was formed but is not running; new activities are running in 2019. By Decision No. 472/KEP/BPBD/2019, dated October 4, 2019, on the Establishment of a Forest, Garden, and Land Fire Investigation Team in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency in 2019, the Investigations Team has begun to conduct identification and investigation of the causes of the fire. It is recorded that there were 21 firms burned in 2019, and among these 21 companies there were also companies that are not operational, or according to [8], “collapses,” but the company is actively providing data and information; only 2 collapsed companies (PT. LKI and PT. PSL) were absent, while of those 21 companies, there were 8 companies that have not been invited to cooperate in the phase of prevention and countermeasures. After the identification and investigation activities were carried out, there was no follow-up with law enforcement or rehabilitation as mandated by the regulations, and only two recommendations were drawn up for two fires that burned. And the activity is done just as it is; don't let the outsiders see that the activity isn't done. In the post-trafficking phase, the parties that act only the government have no role for the private parties or the public. The private parties that exist are burned more as an object that becomes

the center of identification and investigation, the object of law enforcement activities, as well as with the public party that burns. It could be said that this phase has not yet been called collaborative. Government actors in post-processing were still confined to the existing bodies at the district level and have not embraced those at the provincial or central level; in fact, their work programs can be synchronized as part of the efforts to prevent, dissuade, or post-process.

Collaborative relationships between the government and the private sector can be formal (through contractual agreements) or informal (unwritten agreements). In forest and land fire control cooperation, such matters can be formal or informal. Polres OKI held a coordination meeting on April 30, 2018 and signed a MoU with the company's representatives (clickberita.co.id, May 1, 2018) of 20 companies. (junalline.com, 30 April 2020). Each company is obliged to prepare the means and supplies related to forest and land fires, to carry out surveillance in print or electronic media or through balloons, and to provide information as soon as possible about the things that may cause fires at the 3 phases of control. Besides, the company was also required to complete the administrative requirements of the legality of legal bodies, business permits, and other administrative requirements.

The cooperation relationship in the control of forest and land fire between the Government of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency and the government agencies related to the company and/or new society is made globally, not specifically one-by-one, in the form of a Pact of Integrity signed on May 3, 2019 by the government, namely the Owner of OKI, Polres OKI Code 0402 OKI, with the company, as many as 23 companies, of the 50 planting companies, Forest Industries/HTI, and Tol Manager existing in Kab. OKI. Although the MoU and the Pact on Integrity already exist, they have not discussed in detail the duration of the collaboration, including the number of activities per item, starting from prevention, fire extinguishing, and post-treatment phase.

Collaborative governance in forest and land fire control was done to achieved a specific goal: solved a particular problem. Of course, the purpose and the problems were related to the public. According to the concept, collaboration was done so that the government, the private sector, and the community jointly implement forest and land fire control so that these three sectors care about each other in relation to karhutla because this is a shared responsibility. With the main focus being to suppress or minimize the burning area and smoke, or zero smoke. There's a tendency that some people don't care very much for a certain reason; kades do not move, even if it's business talk; they want how much honor per day is paid to the community; people deliberately burn the

company's land in the hope that when it burns, society is involved in its dispossession and is given income according to the UMR.

To focus, each collaborating party needs to know how to collaborate. In the Regulations of the Government of Ogan Commercial Ilir Number 23 Year 2016, the general procedures and permanent procedures of forest and land fire control have been mentioned. Chapter III contains the General Procedures for Reporting Forest and Land Fires; Chapter IV contains Permanent Administrative Proceedings, which include the Communication Procedure, the Procedural Use of Information Through Satellite Images and Other Sources, and the Permanently Financial Procedure. BUMN/BUMD/BUMS is obliged to monitor the deficiency of either personnel, equipment, or other supporting factors; the community around the forest and/or the land that is vulnerable to fire to be vigilant and participate in the prevention and prevention efforts, both through individuals and groups of the Fire Care Society (MPA) and/or existing non-governmental organizations; and the holders of farm permits and HTI to protect their land from fire hazards and have the appropriate precautionary means to prevent the occurrence of forest and land fires. Regarding the cooperation of forest fire and land prevention, including both individuals or groups that have found the source of the fire point to report to the authorities responsible through communication means, BPBDist distributes hotspot information to the relevant parties: the government, MPA elements, civil society organization, land owners and layers in case of early forest fires, and forest communities in the province of South and requests immediate assistance in the event. With regard to post-treatment collaboration, there is no role for the private or public. The private and public are more conditioned as individuals, being the object of identification, investigation, and law enforcement.

The results of the research were not found in detail related to the Operational Standards Procedures (SOPs) related to collaboration, which existed just how related to controlling forest and land fires. Based on the secondary data, the existing SOPs are SOP on Disaster Emergency Preparedness Establishment, SOP about Disaster Response Activities Implementation, SSP on Emergence Response Posts Establishing, SOF on Disaster Emergencies Established, and SOP for Disaster Damage and Loss Assessment. (LPPD, 2018).

In order to achieve the objectives of traffic control, the division of duties and responsibilities in collaboration and the way in which we collaborate, of course, must be in line with the focus we want to

In collaboration, prevention includes implementing all pre-fire prevention efforts and empowering the public. It could be seen in Table 3.3 above that almost every agency

TABLE 3: Matrix of Roles in Forest and Land Fire Prevention.

Institution	Things To Do	Information
Kodim 0402 OKI	Carrying out socialization on the prohibition of burning land, direct socialization door to door, inviting people to cultivate pineapples on peatlands, inviting people who often do sonor to cultivate mushrooms and plant chilies, put up banners prohibiting land burning, hold coordination meetings, patrol areas prone to forest and land fires	Riyandi Mallay (2019:24, 94)
BPBD OKI	Socialization, installation of banners, banners and information boards, formation of Fire Care Villages, Fire Care Communities	Interview, LPPD BPBD OKI, Decision of the Regent OKI (the villages cares about fire)
Polres OKI	Socialization and patrols with the TNI	Riyandi Mallay (2019:99)
Dinas Kehutanan Sumsel	Socialization on prevention of forest and land fires, patrols of forest and land fires in forest areas, wetting of peat in revegetation areas in the Sebung Limited Production Forest area, Technical Guidance on Securing Demonstration Areas for Peat Revegetation in Ex-Burned Areas	Facebook UPTD KPH V Lempuing-Mesuji
Dinas Perkebunan dan Peternakan OKI	Socialization, monitoring of facilities and infrastructure, assessment of plantation businesses, facilitation of plasma development for surrounding communities, KTPA, community empowerment	Observation
Dinas Lingkungan Hidup OKI	Socialization	Interview
Dinas Ketahanan Pangan, Tanaman Pangan dan Hortikultura OKI	Optimizing land on peatlands (printing rice fields)	Observation
Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan OKI	Prohibition of electrocuting fish in rivers, ponds and swamps	District Regional Regulations OKI Number 9 of 2008, concerning Management of Lebak, Lebung and Rivers in the District. OKI
Badan Kesbangpol OKI	-	Interview
Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Desa OKI	an appeal for head district and head villages not to leave their places or to remain in their respective work areas during the hot or dry season, patrol regularly while still coordinating with officers from Koramil, Sector Police and other related agencies, with sanctions for village heads who do not heed the circular This will have an impact on recommendations for the disbursement and use of Village Funds.	OKI Regent Circular Letter Number 712/I/2019 dated 12 September 2019
Manggala Agni Daops III OKI	Socialization, patrols, disaster response training, forming preparedness team personnel,	Norma Juainah (2019:70-79)
BUMD (PD. Bende Seguguk dan PDAM)	-	Observation
Companies	Socialization, installation of banners prohibiting burning, formation of MPA/KTPA, preparedness rally, provision of facilities and infrastructure	Idem
MPA/RKDT/ KTMPA/DMPA	Attend training	Norma Juainah (2019:79)

Source : data processed by researcher, 2020

has taken on a role related to the role of prevention; only a few agencies have not yet performed. Because of the tasks and functions of their agencies, nothing is related

TABLE 4: Role Matrix in Forest and Land Fire Management/Fire Extinguishing Phase.

Institution	Things To Do	Information
Kodim 0402 OKI	Fire extinguishing	Riyandi Mallay (2019:93-99)
BPBD OKI	fire extinguishing	Interview, Riyandi Mallay (2019:101), dan observation
Manggala Agni Daops III	fire extinguishing	Norma Juainah (2019:59)
Dinas Kehutanan Sumsel	Notification to HTI companies when there are hot spots, ground checks in the field,	Facebook UPTD KPH V Lempuing Mesuji
Dinas Perkebunan dan Peternakan OKI	Notification to HTI companies when there are hot spots, ground checks in the field,	Interview
Dinas Kesehatan OKI	Health services, distribution of masks in affected areas	Interview
Diskominfo	-	Observation
Dinas PU dan Penataan Ruang	-	Idem
Dinas PRKP OKI	-	idem
Dinas Sosial OKI	Clothing and food assistance	Norma Juainah (2019:81)
Badan Kesbangpol	-	Observation
Dinas Ketahanan Pangan, Tanaman Pangan dan Hortikultura	When farmer groups see a fire, they must immediately report it	Interview
Tim Damkar Kabupaten	Fire extinguishing	Interview, and facebook PUSDALOPS BPBD OKI
Tim Damkar Perusahaan	Fire extinguishing	Fire extinguishing

Source : data processed by researcher, 2020

at all and can be associated with forest and land fires, for example, BUMD PD. Bende Seguguk, who managed photocopy, and ATK enterprises.

Disarmament was any effort, activity, or action that started with preventing a fire, monitoring and detecting the occurrence of a fire early, deploying energy, equipment, and costs to extinguish the fire, and removing coal and smoked that burn land and forests. It could also be seen in Table 3.4 above that there are some bodies that do not cooperate in the management of karhutla. Collaboration between the various sides run smoothly; collaboration felt like it relies only on a few sides, and some agencies did not perform their roles.

Post-management/post treatment phase was all efforts, activities, and actions carried out on land and forests as well as other environmental impacts after a fire disaster to identify and undertake efforts to improve or normalize, even restoring to better conditions, including law enforcement. From table 3.5 above, there is no role of the private sector or the public in post-treatment, and at that stage, there are some government actors who do not fulfill their role.

TABLE 5: Matrix of Roles in Post-Forest and Land Fire Management/Post Treatment Phase.

Institution	Things To Do	Information
Kasat Reskrim Polres	Law enforcement	Interview
Bidang RR BPBD	Identification and investigation, Rehabilitation	Interview, OKI Regent Decree Number 472/KEP/BPBD/2019
DLH	Identification and investigation after forest and land fires	OKI Regent Decree Number 472/KEP/BPBD/2019, and 2019 Post-Forest and Land Fire Handling Report
Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Sumsel	Identification and investigation after forest and land fires	idem
Dinas Perkebunan dan Peternakan OKI	Identification and investigation after forest and land fires	idem
Dinas PMD	Identification and investigation after forest and land fires	Idem
Dinas Kesehatan	-	Observation
Dinas Sosial	-	idem
BPN OKI	-	idem
Dinas Pertanahan	Identification and investigation after forest and land fires	OKI Regent Decree Number 472/KEP/BPBD/2019, and 2019 Post-Fire Handling Report
Bagian Hukum	-	Observation
Bagian Pemerintahan	Identification and investigation after forest and land fires	OKI Regent Decree Number 472/KEP/BPBD/2019, and 2019 Post-Forest and Land Fire Handling Report
Satpol PP	Identification and investigation after forest and land fires	idem
BUMD (PD Bende Seguguk dan PDAM)	-	Observation
BUMS (Companies)	-	interview, secondary data and observations

Source : data processed by researcher, 2020

Stability was related to the ability of the actors to create a common purposed in collaborative governance. It was said to be stable when the entire actor was able created a common goal. Collaboration would be stable if its members share a goal. If there were collaboration participants who have not yet been able to unify the vision, then volatility in the collaboration would occur. In the prevention phase, compliance to implement collaboration was compliance. When the OKI BPBD requests data in prevention, it was not approved because there were not sanctions, but when it was identified and investigated because of the land burned, which subsequently ends with law enforcement action, whether the granting of administrative sanction, temporary freezing of permits, withdrawal of permissions, or sanctions forwarded to the authorities, the company is

absolutely cooperative. Even if on December 26th, 2019 has been submitted in this post-management activity, there will be no sanction freeze or revocation of permission.

On the company's side, when it looked at the extinguishing officers as if they were asking for money, there was one agency that feels that the agency was the most active in work, felt the most able to worked, and felt the most understanding in the work. There was not mutual trust between the participants in the collaboration; government agencies suspect other governmental agencies; non-governmental parties also suspect the government; and coordination in the cooperation in forest and ground fire management by the perpetrators has not gone as expected. From the above statements, it could be said that stability in cooperation in forest and land fire prevention and management was not stable; the participants were still unable to excluded their own interests and advanced, the focused focus to be achieved jointly.

TABLE 6: RKA and DPA Comparison Table.

No	Programme/Activity	2018		2019	
		Proposal	Realization	Proposal	Realisasi
1	Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Program	1.808.266.000	515.100.000	1.808.266.000	480.000.000
2	Emergency Response Program	740.000.000	590.347.934	740.000.000	520.000.000
3	Post-Disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program	340.000.000	51.600.000	445.000.000	250.000.000
	Total	4.727.266.000	2.481.167.934	5.044.266.000	2.729.928.847

Source : BPBD OKI, 2020

Based on table 3.6, it could be seen that the prevention budget only realized on average 27 percent of the amount of applications, and it can even be seen that the rehabilitation (recovery) budget in 2018 realized only 15 percent of applications. The implementation of the forest and land fire control budget was only 0.1% of the total APBD of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency. The ratio of capital expenditure to the existing BPBD budget was 2.5% in 2017 and 7.65% in 2018. Regional government budget commitments related to forest and land fires were still relatively low, but the local government has always asked companies to be committed to forest and ground fire control activities and to the availability of extinguishing, prevention, and other facilities. With the budget reinforcement, each participant in the collaboration can maximize collaboration, as BPBD can increase the capacity of the monitoring system and information system through GIS technology and remote sensing. Food Plant Sustainability and Horticulture Service in the preventive phase can use technology, i.e., heavy equipment and excavators, to open up agricultural land.

In collaboration, the government of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency gave discretion to non-governmental actors determined the desired position. Based on the data collected, there were two discretions that the company has, namely, the discretion to determined the program and profit. The government of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency gave the company the freedom to determine sub-clusters and village buildings in collaboration to prevent and combat traffic. Through the cluster pattern, the planting companies and HTIs in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency discuss their own interns, discussing which sub-clusters they enter based on the characteristics of the enterprise and geographical conditions. Besides, the government does not impose how many MPAs, how many villages should have MPAs, or whether the MPA should come from the villages that are covered by the deal. PT. RAJ, whose gardens comprise 6 villages and 2 villages, only has 1 MPA in 1 village; PT. TPR covers 3 villages and 3 towns and does not have MPA; P. SUJ has 6 towns and 2 towns and only has 2 MPAs in 2 villages.

In conducting collaborations, there were times when the private party purely carries it out for the common interest, but then for the company's special missions. In this preventive and countervailing collaboration, there were two types of companies: the first one that actually collaborates to help the community, and the second one that has a profit preference. In order to obtain the ISPO (Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil) and RSPO (Roundtable on Sustained Palm Oil), companies must comply with 7 principles, 27 ISPO criteria with 5 indicators, as well as 8 principles and 39 RSPO criteria. Benefits by obtaining ISPO and RSPO certificates, such as RSPOs that introduced the RSPOs trademark to the market in June 2011, and members can use trademarks on packaging for products that contain ingredients that use sustainable palm oil. By collaborating on prevention and countermeasures, it was in line with the principles and criteria that the company must follow, as it has obtained a certificate that ends with the sale. Product and preference discretion are found only in the phase of prevention and rejection, whereas in the post-forest and land fire management phases, no product discretions, discrepancies of results, or discrepancies of preference for private parties are found.

3.4. Monitoring and motivation

In conducting collaboration, not to forget also monitoring for the achievement of aims. The minimum monitoring for cooperation in the prevention and management of forest and land fires is characterized by the lack of evaluation results released by the government of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency. The Government of South Sumatra Province has just issued the results of the evaluation of preparedness for prevention and control of

forest fires and land in 2019, and this is in accordance with the Indonesian Research Center for Environmental Law, the assessment of the performance of the government and local government in the field of forest fire control and land in 2015–2017, in particular for the government of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency.

The results of monitoring activities provide information on what the private sector is doing, what it is failing to do, and even what is known. Furthermore, to motivate these parties to focus on achieving public goals, incentives or awards can be provided, either directly or indirectly. Based on the results of interviews with government and private parties, searches through documents, and observations, the government has not provided incentives or rewards for non-government parties who participate in collaboration to prevent and control forest and land fires.

3.5. Risk

Collaborating with external actors could pose risks to governments; as previously explained, private parties have discretion in production and their own preferences. Such discretions are vulnerable to abuse by the private sector. There were four government risks in collaborative governance: 1) less and less diluted control; 2) higher spending; 3) reputational vulnerability; and 4) decreasing capacity (diminished capacity) [4, 5]. The risks that the government of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency may encounter are divided into two categories: reputational risks and decreasing capacity. At the prevention and mitigation stage, the government has been assessed to have actively implemented activities [7] and has become less reputable to deal with forest and land fires due to the inactivity of some companies in the activities. The government's dependence on the private sector and the community in preventing and dealing with forest and land fires is a risk of diminished capacity, so that the post-treatment phase presents obstacles.

3.6. Barrier

Factors that hinder collaboration in the phase of prevention and rejection:

Failure of imagination in playing roles. A government that could not go beyond the status quo when considering options to perform it was duties Based on the comparison of interview results with secondary data obtained, there are some instances where the wrong placement of roles does not play a role.

The gap in information. Existing government agencies and companies did not support plantation data or corporate permission maps, which were only inputs of village

boundary and municipality data from the Department of Government, so when there is a hotspot, the BPBD can only distribute it through Whatsup and could only assume it was around the village or what municipality, without knowing whether it was in a particular corporate permit, in a forest area, or outside the forest area. There was still a sectoral ego that's selfish without thinking about others. It is in line with the [6], which found problems in the openness and information management aspects to be one of the factors inhibiting forest and land fire control efforts in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency.

Interests conflict. One of the community-based disaster risk reduction efforts is through the development of disaster-resistant villages. According to NPA Chief Regulations No. 1 of 2012, a disaster-resistant village was a village that has the ability to adapt and face potential disaster threats, as well as to recover promptly from the adverse effects of disasters. PT. WAJ did not build a village in Ulak Depati and Jermun while there has been a village-wide disaster and the company is in the village. PT. WaJ has built a community caring for fire (MPA) in 8 villages and does not know there is a village in the company's license that has been built into a village tough disaster/destana. On the other hand, the Department of Agriculture and Farms of the Cabinet of OKI also requested that the company form and build a Fire Care Farmers Group (KTPA), which, when seen as its purpose and purpose, is not far different in fact, as volunteers who participate in the collaboration in the control of the fire. It appears that there is no synchronization of Destana with MPA and KTPA in the sense of no sync of collaboration in forest and land fire prevention.

4. Conclusion

The Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency, in order to prevent or minimize the occurrence of forest and land fires, carries out it was efforts through collaboration with non-governmental parties, both private and public. Concluded by the time the prevention phase of collaboration has been implemented, most of the parties have fulfilled their roles; 32 of the 35 companies expected to have carried out the collaboration have, even though there are still 15 companies that have not been invited to contribute. As far as the post-management phase is concerned, it has not yet been categorized as collaboration, not even part of any form of government-private cooperation. At this stage, the government is merely exercising its authority, responsibility, or obligation to the entrepreneurs who have burned the land with their permission. Based on the results of the research and findings in the field related to collaboration relationships, collaboration carried out between government, private, and

public has various shortcomings : less active collaboration, compliance in nature, and unstable stability in its cooperation. There is a tendency for some non-governmental parties to want discretion of profit preference, so that collaboration as a whole pose risks, namely reputational and dependence on the private.

As for the obstacles in prevention and counteraction collaboration, 1) the failure of government imagination in playing a role; 2) the gap in information; 3) the still existence of some sectoral egos that selfish themselves without thinking of others; and 4) the conflict interests.

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