Conference Paper

The Rise of Conservative Islam in the Indonesian Political Constellation

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Abstract.

Pancasila as the basis of the state has an important position in the social order of the nation and state. Pancasila, which was extracted from the values and local wisdom of the archipelago, was agreed upon by the founders of the nation as a sentence that binds various ethnic groups, religions, races, and between groups who claim to be Indonesian citizens. However, with the development of science and the emergence of a war of thought, Pancasila is currently starting to receive a serious challenge from conservative Islamic groups who doubt and even reject the existence of Pancasila as the state ideology. They consider that Pancasila has failed to become an inspiration for the government in realizing the welfare of the people, so that as a country with a Muslim majority, Indonesia should implement Islamic law. In the midst of the shock of conservative Islam, there is also an attitude of hypernationalism that both claim to be Pancasila People. In the name of Pancasila, they reject the involvement of foreign companies, capital, and workers in managing state assets. On the other hand, in the name of maintaining Pancasila as the state ideology, there are often actions taken by the government that are considered severe against conservative Islamic groups which further is assumed to endanger the sovereignty of the state.

Keywords: Pancasila, conservative Islam, hypernationalism

1. Introduction

Islam in Harun Nasution's view can be distinguished in theological and historical sense. Theologically, Islam is single and contains absolute truth that cannot be denied. However, from a historical perspective, Islam is diverse in terms of thought and practice according to the space and time that surrounds it [1]. This is in line with Nurcholish Madjid who views Islam as a doctrine and civilization. As a doctrine, Islam is a religion revealed by Allah SWT to Muhammad who makes the Koran and Hadith as the main source, while Islam as a civilization is the perception and expression of the diversity of adherents of Islam based on the context of the region and time in which he is located [2]. Related to the understanding of the relationship between religion and the state
in Islam, many emerge, according to the sociological, historical, anthropological, and intellectual settings of the thinkers and their struggles. This is also added by various interpretations of the text of the Koran and the Hadith of the Prophet which are used as the main references [3]. Broadly speaking, the pattern that has existed until now shows that Islam in the course of history has developed into various thoughts, namely secular, conservative, neo-fundamentalist, and neo-reformist [4].

The journey of Islam, in this case, which is conservative-minded as part of civilization in Indonesia, has gone through various dynamics. Conservative Islam during the New Order era tended to be silent and could not do much because it was under pressure [5]. This condition then reversed after the end of the New Order which was marked by the speech of a statement of resignation from Suharto as President of the Republic of Indonesia on May 21, 1998. The conservative Islamic movement and revival gained its momentum along with the presidential and vice-presidential elections in 2014. It is known that the presidential election contestation -The Vice President presented two candidate pairs, namely Joko Widodo-M.Jusuf Kalla and Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Radjasa, which, if you follow Clifford Geertz's trichotomy, both Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto both have abangan backgrounds. Nonetheless, conservative Islamic groups gave their support to the Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Radjasa pair because they were considered more Islamic, at least in the supporting coalition there was the Prosperous Justice Party which was clearly based on Islam, and there was also the National Mandate Party which was based on an Islamic mass.

The rise of conservative Islam grew stronger when the case of blasphemy involved the Governor of DKI Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok). The attack on Ahok was so tempestuous in various regions of the country in Indonesia. The conservative Islamic movement reached its culmination in the 212 action spearheaded by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) followed by PKS, HTI, Persis, and Wahdah Islamiyah which demanded that Ahok be arrested and imprisoned. This action continued until Ahok's trial process so that the sentence he received was the culmination of the criminalization of citizens under mass pressure by exploiting religious sentiments.

Simultaneously with the strengthening of conservative Islam, on the other hand, hypernationalism which is synonymous with fascist has emerged, namely the notion that only the state and its nation are better than other countries and nations [6]. Symptoms of hypernationalism can be seen in the rise slogan against foreign and foreign, China-illegal-unskilled. There is also the concept of hypernationalism introduced by Ariel Heryanto, which is a type of aggressive and masculine nationalism that shows high worship of state symbols and ceremonies [7]. This phenomenon can be seen
from Joko Widodo’s words that will beat up groups that disrupt the four pillars of the Indonesian nation (Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, the Republic of Indonesia, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). Apart from that, it can also be seen from the utterance of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in its final price, and the formation of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP).

The existence of quantitatively conservative Islam in Indonesia can be seen from the results of a survey conducted by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in 2017. As many as 82% of respondents agreed that the hijab for women is part of Islamic law, 67% of respondents agreed that Islamic law would be a safeguard for ethics and public morals, 63% want religious blasphemers to be punished, and 53% want state leaders to come from Islamic circles [8]. Conservative Muslims who claim to be an opposition group to Joko Widodo’s government are in symbiosis with hypernationalist groups who are anti-foreign capital and labor. On the other hand, hypernationalism has also developed, which has received support from moderate Islamic groups to issue various political policies which have been challenged by opposition groups. This phenomenon has become a separate dynamic in the national political constellation, so it is interesting to elaborate on the movements of conservative Islamic groups and opposition versions of hypernationalism groups dealing with government-style hypernationalism.

2. Method

This article was written by applying qualitative research methods using a historical approach which consists of four stages. To reconstruct traces of past history, four stages are needed, namely, heuristics, criticism, interpretation and historiography [9]. Related to this article, heuristics are carried out by exploring library sources in the form of books, journals, and daily news from various media related to the topic of writing. Criticism is carried out by providing an assessment of these literary sources by comparing them with each other, then giving an interpretation or interpretation as an attempt to relate every event related to the rise of conservative Islam in the Indonesian political constellation, and ending with a reconstruction of events in written form (historiography) which is expected to be useful for the development of science, especially in the field of social sciences and humanities.
3. Discussion

The phenomenon of the rise and rise of conservative Islamic movements cannot be separated from the opening of opportunities for every identity group and class of society in the era of democratization in post-New Order Indonesia. Democratization not only opens opportunities for the emergence and strengthening of universal values such as pluralism, tolerance and inclusiveness, but also at the same time opens opportunities for revival, return to primordialism and local ties and tends to be exclusive, both on the basis and in the name of religion, ethnicity, and region, as well as blood relations. Like the universal values of democracy which can thrive, primordial divisions also have the opportunity to grow and compete with any values that are considered to be contrary to them. Those are some of the paradoxes of democratization which often lead to lawsuits against national and Indonesian values agreed upon by the founding fathers of the nation [10].

Conservative Islam that has re-emerged in Indonesia after entering the reform era indicates that an ideology is not easily extinguished by power. It is understood that the conservative Islamic movement was restrained during the New Order government, so they did not carry out political movements. Their passivity during the New Order era was a rational act. It was a ridiculous act when there was an attempt to oppose the New Order when at that time all political and military power was under the control of the authorities. However, the power of the New Order, with all its strength, eventually collapsed due to the currents of change brought about by the reform movement spearheaded by enlightened groups of people.

In Islamic teachings, change is a sunnatullah. This change was later used by conservative Islamic circles to build strength to try to color Indonesia’s political journey. The conservative Islamic movement is based on the belief that Islam cannot be separated from the state. Even though the two are in different spheres, Islam and the state are organically intertwined. In general, they believe in the universal nature of Islam by referring to the Koran Surah an-Nahl: 89 that “And We have sent down the Koran as a holy book to explain everything” [11]. Conservative Islam is obsessed with the glory of Islam in the past, especially during the Ottoman Empire. This longing is then manifested in their aspirations to create a state system that is guided by Islamic sharia which is more popular with the term NKRI syariah [12].

The concept of the sharia NKRI desired by conservative Muslims, especially the FPI, is a form of protest against democratic practices which are instead colored by various kinds of upheavals. For conservative Islam, democracy is colored by politics on the
basis of narrow and short-term interests dominating the interaction, cooperation and competition of political elites resulting from elections. Corruption and abuse of power as well as manipulation of people’s interests are still rampant and have even become part of the public’s daily political menu amidst loud speeches by political elites about the importance of eradicating corruption, good and clean governance, and fulfilling people's aspirations. Ironically, the spirit of eradicating corruption competes with new findings on corruption, bribery and abuse of power in order to gain personal wealth coffers. The strengthening of the conservative Islamic movement cannot be separated from the assessment that Jokowi's government is anti-Islam. Some indications that show this include:

3.1. Alignment with cases of religious blasphemy

Blasphemy against religion involving Ahok has increased the tension of the conservative Islamic movement. Mass actions in Jakarta that reached several other areas in Indonesia show that the pressure on this case is enormous, especially since Ahok has a dual minority status (non-Muslim and ethnic Chinese). But there are also those who think that this is a political momentum to prevent Ahok from being elected as Governor of DKI Jakarta.

Conservative Islamic groups see the government as giving Ahok a special position. This was proven by Ahok not being dismissed as Governor of DKI even though he was already a suspect in the blasphemy case. Ahok has been on trial 16 times, but he was still given the opportunity to campaign, and even received strict security from the state apparatus. Allegations from conservative Islamic groups, in this case the FPI, that the government was protecting Ahok became even stronger when the police conducted an open questioning before the mass media on orders from President Joko Widodo.

3.2. Criminalization of the clergy (ulama)

It cannot be denied that during the reign of Joko Widodo, there were several Islamic preachers who were prosecuted because they were suspected of having caused trouble, uttered hate speech, and unsettled conditions in society. A number of figures who are considered scholars include Rizieq Shihab, Bahar Smith, Sugih Nur, Yahya Waloni, and Soni Erata (Ustadz Maaher). Arresting them is of course based on facts on the ground, but for conservative Islamic groups it is an act of criminalizing religious scholars. The term criminalization of clerics was made viral in order to gain public sympathy and
give the image of the government being truly unjust towards Muslims. However, efforts to lead to the realm of identity politics seem to have been unsuccessful, due to public literacy about the ugliness of identity politics. This is evident from a survey conducted by Saiful Muzani Research and Consulting (SMRC). The survey raises the question: the current government or state often makes clerics as people who violate the law or criminalize clerics? Do you believe in these numbers or not. The results: 3% really believe, 24% trust, 54% don’t believe, 6% really don’t believe, and 16% don’t know [13].

3.3. Dissolution of HTI and FPI

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), two social organizations that frame themselves as the most dominant Islamic movements in dominating the national political constellation. Both are organizations that are most keen to criticize the government. In the end, HTI and FPI were disbanded by the government. HTI activities are considered to be contrary to the objectives, principles and characteristics based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. HTI has no role in the nation-building process and instead creates unrest in society because of its desire to establish an Islamic caliphate. The dissolution of HTI was reinforced by PTUN Decree on May 7 2018. Likewise with FPI, since June 20 2019, FPI de jure no longer has a permit, because the permit was not extended by the government. The dissolution of FPI was based on the consideration that FPI has always carried out acts of violence, sweeping and raids unilaterally so as to disturb order and harmony in society.

4. Conclusion

Entering the reformation era, including during the reign of Joko Widodo, the relations between the state and the people sometimes still encounter clashes. The Indonesian people are currently not completely free from state intervention. Of the many incidents related to the management of relations between various elements of the nation’s children, which are diverse in terms of Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and Intergroups, there are still frequent appearances of contestation in the struggle for power arenas. The phenomenon of conservative Islamic groups that have recently been carrying out the NKRI with sharia as if they are never tired of propagating Islam which they understand to be used as the basis for managing the country as a form of their reaction to Pancasila which is considered to have failed in realizing people’s welfare.
References


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